

John M. Dorsey M. J.

PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION SELF DISCIPLINE BY CONSCIOUS EMOTIONAL CONTINENCE

Published by Center for Health Education 4421 Woodward Avenue Detroit, Michigan 48201 I discovered, though unconsciously and insensibly, that the pleasure of observing and reasoning was a much higher one than that of skill and sport.

Charles Darwin's Autobiography

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Foreword

We should employ our passions in the service of life, not spend life in the service of our passions.

Richard Steele

My presentation of the foreword to this volume is a privilege and responsibility which I cherish to the utmost. I realize that my living is universal in scope, which means to me that it is all a subjective experience, occurring here and now, and is all and only about one individual, my self. I live all of my appreciation for this book and its author.

Not unlike Dante, John M. Dorsey creates consolation in his free use of his whole mind, using his imagination unreservedly to work up the kind of self world he considers most worth living. And not unlike Kant, he would dispel the illusion of "common" knowledge to make room for his belief in his self knowledge, thereby accurately localizing it as completely his own mental activity.

Prospecting for the foundation of his nature, John Dorsey discovered its spirit in loving kindness. His conception of ubiquitous love as the creating, sustaining, unifying power that forms, organizes, integrates, synergizes and systematizes man into the perfect work that he is,—this omnification approaches Claude Bernard's hope: one language for all interests, religion, art, philosophy and science.

Dr. Dorsey's devotion to subjective living, itself, as being the height of his ambition, success, progress, peace, attainment, or meaning of any kind, is biologically adequate. His recognition of nothing but perfection everywhere, is the scientist's reverence for the sufficiency of fact. His view of the intact and inviolable wholeness of every human being is true to the orientation of the physiologist; his observation that every man must be all that he means by "monan," and that every woman must be all that she means by "man," is consistent with anatomical, physiological, biochemical, as well as psychological data; and

humanity. The conduct of this research is based upon my realization that my individuality contains my laboratory, rather than that my laboratory subsumes my individuality. As scientist I find I can perform my experimental work most helpfully with the full realization that it is all and only about my own mental development, quite as my colleague's research living is subsumed, rather than excluded, by his own existence.

I work with vigor realizing that "objectivity" is repressed selfness and purposefully stay with my acknowledged self as much as possible, to uphold humanitarian perspective in a manner I consider effective and economical. Self conscious living in experimental work gives me the assurance of success. Simply going ahead with my living of my laboratory experience constitutes the necessary creating called scientific discovery. Each of my scientific colleagues lives his own unique laboratory as his own self's possession. So-called external agreement with another merely means harmony within each worker.

During his study of his emotion I have seen my author develop and augment his resources—wisdom of love of life—by building constitutional strength, fitness and insight. His active participation in community affairs has brought him into close association with his fellowman of every walk of life. His kindness and respect for all of his creation serves as a catalyst for accelerating feelings of confidence, helpfulness, hope and charity.

The courage to face hazards in living his contemporary civilization is what I appreciate most in my living of my colleague Dorsey. Writing on the worth of self consciousness in health physiology is frequently appreciated with incontinent adverse-ness, feeling phrased as "your philosophy", "it's irrelevant", "it's distasteful", "it's unsimportant", "it's unscientific", "it's nothing", "it's impractical", or simply "it's not suitable for this journal." The words of P. W. Bridgeman point to the basic truth: "The insight that we can never get away from ourselves is an insight which the human race through its long history ... deliberately, one is tempted to say willfully, refused to admit." Each major insight from Copernicus, Newton, Dar-

his description of development of conscious emotional discharge, retention, continence and control finds its like in other physiological functioning subserving conscious organic control. His theory of emotion highlights the necessity that a person acknowledge all of his being if he would work up consciousness for his own emotionality in any of that being. His ideally unifying recognition that each emotion functions physiologically in quite the same practical way as does each of his senses (such as smelling, tasting, hearing, seeing, touching), by helping him to feel the nature (needs) of his being, is choice self insight.

The method of so-called impersonal science can lead only to the meager life appreciation of an impersonal science. After reading my Dorsey's radical self observations, I recall Kant once wrote that he was "thinking many things, with the clearest conviction and to his great satisfaction, which he would never have the courage to say." Author Dorsey solves his phantom problem traceable to the illusion of "communication" by heeding the truth of his inviolable universal self, and exercising restraint. He feels confident that all of his observing is inexorably restricted to his feeling his own self experience only. He realizes the importance of understanding all emotion on a private, personal basis and regulating each of his excitements without forfeiting any of his sense of self possession thereby.

Dorsey devotes his creativity to consciously meaningful, accurate, and useful life experiences. As an individual of integrity he must of necessity claim no more for the validity of his observations than the simple statement: "This is what I have found to be true and helpful for my human welfare." One's personal report cannot arbitrarily apply to anyone else. Willingly considering this book as my very own report, I find it most rewarding to study my fear, anger, disgust, grief, joy, surprise, yearning, sadness and all emotion as functioning of my standard human biological equipment. In the matter of how to live, the essential issue is the living, rather than the regulating of it.

Practically each day of the past three decades of my life has been occupied with my laboratory experimentation in physiology, biochemistry and hematology. I feel that this work contributes to the creation of power and cultural enrichment in all my

PREFACE

Emotionality is all about itself. An explanatory hypothesis regarding it will do well to attend to it exclusively rather than to use it as a starting point, then proceed to "change the subject," and finally attend to something else that causes emotion or something else that emotion causes, or visceral concomitants, or whatever. It is only my unreadiness to recognize, and thus honor, all of my instinctive emotionality as my naturally functioning mind, that allows me to evaluate any of it as potentially harmful, hence "bad" or "undesirable." Whenever any affect of mine arouses itself, its arousal merits my full appreciation as being my only momentary way of helping my self, Whatever I live is deserving of my complete love, for it is that very living with which I preserve my life. The real issue of my psychology of emotion is: Just how does every affect serve the enjoyment and preservation of the wholeness of my individual being?

Until a thorough understanding of the constant usefulness of all of my emotional power, itself as such, is worked up, there can be no science of my human being. Whenever I become emotional, experience any kind of affect, without recognizing its usefulness to me, I must endure the illusion of being used by (subjected to) it. All self control is emotional control. To the extent that I do not work up conscious control of the excitement of my affectivity, I must substitute the illusion of being controlled by it.

When I can consciously conduct my affectivity while realizing its life enriching nature, while recognizing how it is all that does, or can, make my life interesting for me, then indeed I can enjoy the attainment of conscious self sovereignty, of completely free and independent individuality. Take the emotionality out of my conscious living and all I have left becomes recognizable as not worth living.

To illustrate for my self such a barren existence, all I have to do is to try to imagine my self becoming interested in a biograwin, Freud and many another was met by his contemporary with fear and hostility.

Quite as with the mastery of mathematics or any other discipline I cannot expect the growth of my self insight without diligent work. In my opinion every artisan, scientist, statesman, clergyman and just plain any human being, will have to find out just how to feel his (her) self, realizing that one's self is all that can feel or be felt, or reveal the painful but precious signs of this neglected development.

I thank my self for the contributions already made by physician John M. Dorsey in his lectures, letters, books and journal articles. In my association with him, careful listening to his soliloquy is the main assignment I give my self. Good food is eaten and incorporated in cellular metabolism but the original is not remembered even though utilized. The same appears to be true in the helpful and useful ensouling of my wisdom just by listening to my very own auditory experience. I have already profited greatly from Psychology Of Emotion for I, too, find: "Whatever is, individually is." I, too, can feel: "What I cannot love, I am sore sick of."

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expression of ever intact individuality.

The life sustaining meaning of a person's appreciation for his being a whole individual is rarely recognized by him, so that he tends regularly to develop a self image that is far from representing his actual allness. Then the distressing psychological consequence of his resulting self disesteem is hardly ever even considered, much less measured, although his costly self ignorance is helpfully signalized by symptoms such as hyperplasia, hypoplasia, and every kind and degree of lowered resistance to succumbing to his microscopic and macroscopic health "accidents."

"Objectivity" is merely unconscious subjectivity, accounting for all symptomatic feelings signalizing illusions like separation, departure, absence, incompleteness, insufficiency, incontinence, loss, and every other meaning implying more or less than the wholeness of one. To illustrate, it is of inestimable value to me as a so-called disabled one when I can grow my mental strength to recognize and renounce my illusional "objectivity" supporting such an undesirable concept of my self limitation and thus tap the marvelously unlimited resources of my true subjectivity.

A human being may safely be conceived as an ever intact and inviolable organism generating the wholeness he (she) possesses in each individuation of his (her) individuality. The essential quality of the human organism, vitality or life, exists entirely throughout its total extent, endowing all of the human economy with all of its precious power of being human, accounting completely for each and every property of individual growth and achievement. The wholeness of the life of a human being is specifically characteristic for its allness in its every functioning of its so-called cell or organ or organ system.

In the sense that a preface may provide a purview, I wish to account briefly for what I feel in "self discipline by conscious emotional continence." Self discipline is necessary for me to make my self choose to endure hardship in order to attain hardihood, court difficult living in order to develop my potential power. Conscious living is necessary to acknowledge my

phy or a novel bereft of any emotionality! On the other hand, to illustrate for my self the personal advantage in vibrantly feeling alive, all I have to do is to study the consciously skillful use of emotional power practiced by the able author of prose or poem, as he invigorates each of his "characters" or "settings" with every kind and degree of vivifying passion.

Emotionality confers personality. It provides my life with all of its variety of meaning. Its chief function is that of furnishing, including preserving, my joy of living my individuality. It serves my appreciation for the integrity of my body (of my mind) through functional pleasure (comfort), even as it protects such life satisfaction through functional pain (discomfort) signalizing threat to, or actual endangering of, that body's wholeness. Similarly my appreciation for the wholeness of my mind is furnished, including preserved, by my joy of living my individuality. My emotionality in its every turn steadfastly serves my appreciation for the integrity of my whole organic being 1) through pleasure created by its facile functioning and 2) through unhappiness in some form signalizing threat to, or actual endangering of, my whole mind's freedom to act.

Usually the attempt is made to describe "man" somewhat in block building fashion as an ensemble of organs and organ systems, as if his (her) wholeness derives its meaning from its elements, rather than the converse. This description slights the truth that the organic wholeness of man accounts for all of the organicity of his (her) every organ or organ system. An inadequate view of human individuality derives from a so-called "objective" appraisal of it, whereas one's true wholeness consists of subjectivity that can only be appreciated subjectively. Only in my conscious subjectivity can I recognize realize and exercise the truth of the inviolability of the wholeness of my. life. So-called losing a limb, or going blind and deaf, or repressing truth from my conscious personal identity, or any such "objectively" conceived "loss," can and does result in my forfeiting access to my appreciation for my everlasting wholeness. But any and every life experience of whatever seeming "loss" is only appreciated by me subjectively as life affirming

"As a man thinketh in his heart so is he," thus, my proverbial aesthetic doctrine identifies emotionality as the substance of my fully earned character, revealing to me the self directive mental condition that is all and only in my self-subservient manhood.* It is precisely my own life that makes up (conceives) my feeling of the "all else" of my world, including my hearsay divinity which I may, except on occasion, perceive but darkly. My agnosticism issues from my anaesthesia. The feeling of godliness issues from the deeps of appreciation for my living, as a matter-of-fact yet marvelously spiritual unity of powerful love and truth. I find the soul or essence of my spirituality is my innate subjectivity, the real inwardness of my whole being, the intuitive nature of my every meaning, the intrinsic originative immediacy of my underived and unattested sensibility within its self.

What is the reward of the feeling of self consciousness? Further life consciousness. Basically, nothing can be of any worth to me except in so far as it is my living. For me, Whatever is, is my intrinsic being only and completely. My conducting my life as if its show is all that is present, and its living the absentee, is providentially painful. I can only appear to undo my self by any of my doing, for all of my doing is merely my being. Despite the appearance, I really cannot feel good for nothing. Conscious self reverence is synonymous with sanity. Once I feel my self, I realize that the just payment for whatever work I do must be in the coin of my appreciating my life's worth.

I have awakened to the marvelous possibilities for my welfare in studying the rationality of sentiment, the wisdom in passion. For a long while now I have been taking feeling looks at the "scream of the hysteric" "abject despair of the depressed" "shriek of the catatonic" "inane laugh of the heberphrenic" "exultation of the manic" "terrified cry of the anxiety ridden" "curse of the enraged" "blunted affect of the hypophrenic" and so on throughout each such emotional aid. I formerly prejudged such excitement as a sign of helplessness,

^{*}My italics.

self authority and self responsibility. Continence, self containment, is necessary since every emotion that I feel is all and

only in and of my own living

My living of love is tantamount to my love of living. There is nothing for me to live but love, quite as there is nothing for me to love but life. My wish to live is based upon the pleasure my life-love provides. The life-and-death adventure of living regularly tests the strength of my conscious self love. How to account for the frequency with which my inhibited conscious self love (hate, pain or any unhappiness) occurs is not too difficult once I consider 1) how far from smooth the course of conscious self love must be and 2) how immediately conscious self love can resort to its opposite, namely, unconscious self love (conscious hate, pain, or any unhappiness).

My conscious self love must inhibit itself whenever I live an experience which I cannot feel (justify) as my lovable self identity. Then the resulting consciously unlovable self experience limits rather than advances the extent of my mind that I can consciously acknowledge as my own and consciously regulate as my self possession. Only my conscious self love can enter into development of the mental unity I recognize as my personal identity. The comprehensiveness of my conscious personal identity varies directly with the force of my conscious will, with the strength of my conscious control of my mental nower.

The Right Reverend Robert L. DeWitt called my attention to the strength of conscious self love eloquently described by St. Paul (Corinthians 1:11-13):

But let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of that cup. . . . (12) If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing? If the whole were hearing, where were the smelling?. . . . And the eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee: nor again the head to the feet, I have no need of you, . . And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honored all the members rejoice with it. . . . (13) For we know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done awav.

INTRODUCTION

The Patient to the Doctors

Name me no names for my disease With uninforming breath; I tell you I am none of these But homesick unto death. Witter Bynner*

I pose the question, Why am I tempted to write of the physiology, instead of the psychology, of emotion? As a psychologist, even if I do seem to subsume nearly every kind of interest but physiology, Why do I hesitate to regard such evident organic functioning as emotion also as psychological? As a psychological scientist, do I seem to balk at honoring my study of my emotional living as being justifiable psychological research? True, as a scientist I have tended to rule out passionate living, but is not the purpose of that precaution obvious, or must I forever construe it to mean that my emotional living is beyond the valid purview of my science?

Such inquiry certainly gives me pause, but I return from it with the conviction that my term "psychology" has become exceedingly depersonalized for its significance as applying only and entirely to the functioning of the individual organism, whereas my term "physiology" has never lost, but constantly gained, this demonstrable realistic meaningfulness. Indeed my usage has now altered the meaning of my term "psychology" to obscure its specific and only possible definition, as the meaningful functioning of the individual mind. For example, instead of its becoming clearly understandable as the only science of all that is mental (meaningful) it has developed the limited significance of being merely a branch of Science.

It has been my intention to write as a psychologist seeking to study the nature of the functioning of my mind without appeal-

^{*}Robert Hunt, ed. Selected Poems (2nd ed. rev.; New York: Alfred Knopf, 1943), p. 25.

rejecting it as useless or impractical. I deprecated it as weakness, hushed it up as a fit, even regarded it as unreasonably unnecessary display, or somehow turned from it as being worthless as far as the wisdom of living might be concerned.

The real nature of loving is the essential principle of being, the originative joy of self functioning favoring my experiencing my fullest and freest conscious living. Hence love is identified as the wisdom of God, as the ideal justice for self management, conforming exactly to the law of being,—no so-called worlding shift coming from "extrinsic" observation, but rather the life principle ensouled in the activity of one's own sensibility itself. The reward to my love of life is no less than seeing my workable life prevail, and feeling my so-called objectivity as the virtual treadmill of my vitality that it is.

The being of wisdom dispels all illusion of "distance between" discrete elements of my self experience as I sense only my own identity in whatever I live. Only by loving when my flow of life seems unlovable can I feel my self identity enlarging itself. Endurance begets endurance, furthering appetency for endurance, the very staying-power of life.

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Sir Charles Scott Sherrington, in Man on His Nature (1940), feelingly noted:

Mind, for anything perception can compass, goes therefore in our spatial world more ghostly than a ghost. Invisible, intangible, it is a thing not even of outline; it is not a "thing." It remains without sensual confirmation and remains without it forever. Stripped to nakedness there remains to it but itself. What, then does that amount to? All that counts in life. Desire, zest, truth, love, knowledge, "values," and, seeking metaphor to eke out expression, hell's depths and heaven's utmost height. Naked mind.

All of my experience of any discoverable meaning is mental. All that stirs my conscious mentality is emotional. Every pleasing proof or puzzling problem of my being is traceable to my emotional excitation. All that I can mean by any process of my body is constituted only of my mental process. Thus, I conceive all of my meaning for my world as confluent with, indeed as an extension of, my body meaning.

In order to discover fact (truth) revealing the law of my nature so that I can control my conduct in a biologically adequate way, I must study the reality consisting of my total individuality. My conscious self observation derives its justification from my realization that it has the authority of my human constitution behind it. By "biologically adequate" I mean simply: honoring the welfare of my whole human being. The insightful religious educator calls his ultimate authority for conduct his God, regarding his God as his reality, as his truth, as his all. The concept of man as his (her) own individual all, reality, or truth, duly respects this holistic orientation.

It is the wholeness of the individual organism that is responsible for all of its biologically adequate functioning. The psychology of this wholeness is the proper province of the psychologist, constituting as it does the entire scope of his discipline. However, usage has attributed to me as a psychologist little accountability for observing and recording the strictly organic meaning to me as an individual of each of my psychic events. My consequent ignorance about the exclusively psychological lawfulness of my sensation, perception, thought, feeling, and ing to any discipline other than that of my mind for evidence, without introducing observation from any so-called "non-psy-chological" source. I word my research "the psychology of physiology" instead of "the physiology of psychology." I find my psychology is strictly my most comprehensive biological interest, hence its vital process or performance is the ideal subject for study. Since it is exclusively the individual biological functioning of mind with which I am concerned, I have viewed my province of psychology as including investigation of the organic functioning of my mind. No doubt I guide my self here by the fact that my own revered professor of physiology, Dr. John T. McClintock,* observed his oneness in physiology and psychology.

I take pains to assert that my self psychology is certainly not that so-called "scientifically respectable form of study based upon publicly observable or palpable data rather than upon introspective subjective personal self observation." Quite the contrary, its claim to be scientific is based entirely upon its full respect for the truth of subjectivity, for the fact of the internal selfness of whatever exists, for the data of psychic reality only. Thus, it features the individuality of individuality by clearly recognizing, and fully acknowledging, that whatever is, is entirely and only about itself.

Every truth of emotionality is merely and all about itself. Love is all and only about love; hate is all and only about hate; fear is all and only about fear; guilt is all and only about guilt, and so on. Each emotion is its own object, subject, predicate, or whatever can be observed about it. Only the emotion of emotion can account for any and all that is emotional. The language of the psychology of emotion itself must be restricted to whatever is emotional only. How does emotion work? is the issue. Whenever I change this subject to discuss the operation of any other physiological process (visceral, autonomic, physiognomic, hormonic, sensory or motor action, or whatever) I introduce irrelevance. Of "mind" the great neurophysiologist,

^{*}University of Iowa.

readily sets up, and the revealing fact of wholeness is overlooked.

An all embracing psychology of emotion, one comprehensive system of emotionality, including all possible affective experience in its general order, would constitute a unified whole that would of course resolve all so-called conflict, cross-purpose, or antagonism, otherwise regularly imputed to individual human nature. This subject of wholeness is of critical importance on account of its meaning for conscious self identity. Therefore, I score the following consequence of ignoring it: Inability to see my wholeness in my every sensation, perception, feeling, or observation of any kind, means my inability to recognize and appreciate it as entirely and only mine.

Therefore my ability to observe all of my passionate living, my every possible affective activity, as binding rather than breaking my unity is unquestionably the very basis of my satisfying existence, as it is the very foundation of my appreciation for my individual nature. Thus, I observe love of life to be my one grand passion, and every other pleasant or unpleasant feeling to be some aspect or derivative of this ground one. Each such phase of love, such as hate, or fear, or guilt, etc., is therefore a first subject with which my (individual) psychologist has

to deal.

Nearly all of this reported effort to take a fresh look at my emotion has been achieved while I have been aware of my resisting it on one account or another, e.g., as "too far fetched," "too unconventional," "not orthodox enough," "narcissistic," "autistic," and so on. Therefore I find no difficulty in seeing my very own identity in my reader who describes his own self observation with any kind or degree of aversion, such as delirious, unscientific, heretic, and the like. By "taking a fresh look" I have in mind only adding to my already garnered store of self viewing, and not at the expense of depreciating any of my self observation that has been made before.

I considered my self a full-fledged scientist many years before I awakened to this enlightening insight: my every effort to belittle, or disregard, or negate any mental production whatsoever, rather than to honor it as lifeworthy, merely indicates sensibility of any kind (not to mention consciousness) has kept me living a conscious self world of darkness reflecting my conscious self image of lawlessness. After all, my "physiology" is nothing but psychology!

Attempted separation of my psychological interest from my physiological interest has been most costly, appearing to deprive my psychological observation of any demonstrable life source and to deprive my physiological observation of any demonstrable meaning (mentality). No where but in my own living can I ever find the consequence of my conduct and, as Socrates soliloquized, an enlarged view of the consequences of my personal behavior is my only safe morality. As long as my science of psychology seems applicable to "social" affairs it cannot seem to serve me as a method for my study of my individual subjectivity. For the latter all-important purpose I need a discipline designed specifically for respecting the demonstrable truth of the workings of my intact and inviolably whole self.

Truly my science of physiology confines itself to the study of the individual organism, since each physiologist recognizes that any so-called organic tie between one individual and another is impossible by definition. There is one practice of the physiologist that may appear to challenge the concept of the wholeness and allness of the individual, namely, his use of the anatomist's divisa et impera technique. Temptation is strong to attribute to the so-called "part" some possible function that is not derived entirely from the whole organism. This danger is real, and only constant appreciation for the life affirming wholeness of the individual organism can reduce it.

Just as the psychologist may succumb to the temptation to think in terms of more or less than one, as a consequence of his viewing apparent plural and part in his so-called "external" world, so the physiologist may indulge similar illusion from viewing apparent multiplicity and diversity in the human economy of his body. Thus as either scientist I may distract my self from appreciating helpful understanding of the singular nature, the wholeness identity, of truth. Then the notion that I can busy my self about more or less than one concern "at a time"

However Perry, himself, seems incapable of discovering his own conscious solipsism, thus: "I am confident that the nature of mental action is discoverable neither by an analysis of mental contents nor by self-intuition; that it is necessary, in short, to abandon the method of self knowledge altogether and substitute that of general observation." Although to be sure every negation may be demonstrated to be an effort to make nothing out of something mental, nevertheless a self denial such as this one is deserving of closest heed, specifically on account of its explicit reference to "the emotions of sovereignty."

The necessity to make discovery consciously, as one's own self discovery, must lead constantly to life denial rather than life affirmation in the one who merely finds that a discovery has been made by "somebody else." Harvey's wonderful discovery of the circulation of the blood was therefore scoffed at by nearly a whole generation of so-called scientists. Berkeley's idealism must remain only Berkeley's. Freud's self insight must remain only Freud's. Hegel explicitly and consistently repudiated the activity of his own mind in his account of his philosophy. Little wonder he claimed "the State" greater than his self. And on and on, I must honor my truth of my individuality consciously, or dishonor my self unconsciously. After all I am the only one who can, and may find how to, be aware of my self as observer and observed. My every observation is my very own observing. Hence Perry is fully justified in withholding his confidence for the credibility of any discovery he cannot originate consciously as being his own creation. Apparently, however, he does presume that his neglecting the effort to see nothing but his own identity in his self dissatisfying observation (about the insufficiency of self knowledge) entitles him to repudiate the necessity that his study of psychology, as of all else of his living, must be introspective only.

Of reason, Nicholas Murray Butler felt: "The plain fact is that man is not ruled by thinking. When man thinks he thinks, he usually merely feels; and his instincts and feelings are pow-

erful precisely in proportion as they are irrational."

My sense of justice is indispensable for my appreciation of reality. Whatever is, is real, by virtue of its consisting of the all the momentary incompetence of my conscious self respect in that direction

Argumentum ad hominum defends the pride I need to take in my ignorance in order to spare my self admittedly difficult work of extending my conscious self tolerance sufficiently to be able to make sense, rather than poke fun, sneer, contemn, laugh off, etc. My every resort to such declarations as "What you are saying is wrong," "Your account is inaccurate," "You do not know the facts," "You are mistaken," or any similar faultfinding intended to refer to another, serves my need to enjoy self esteem without having to take the trouble to concern my self about my fellowman's self esteem.

Whatever I live with any feeling of dislike I tend to undervalue, simply by unwittingly displacing my feeling of dislike upon that experience I associate with it. I note well that this is the specific process responsible for the illusion of the fateful goodbad (right-wrong, perfect-imperfect, and so on) dichotomy. As all else, each emotion is its own everything. It is its own object, and it cannot "take an object." When I excite my anger, it is all about its self, but I may delude my self that it is about my fellowman. If I suffer pain in my jaw, that pain is all and only its self, but I may delude my self that my tooth aches. And so on, my language can appear to be able to do my thinking for me, "practically well enough." However, confounding my dislike (unhappiness or pain of any kind or degree) with whatever life experience I am not yet able to justify (as sufficiently supported by fact, the force of truth, and hence ordained desirable) is the origin of the (phantom) problem of evil. Only my observing that my every emotion is all and only about its self enables me to recognize, heed and escape illusional "power of darkness" implicit in innumerable respectable names for living, such as progress, melioration, advancement, improvement (and their opposites), everyone of which ignores scientifically demonstrable omnipresent, ubiquitous perfection.

In his Present Philosophical Tendencies (1921) Ralph Barton Perry makes a profoundly consequential self observation, "The religion of an idealist is not a forlorn hope, or a defense of last ditches, but an enjoyment of all the emotions of sovereignty."

movement" invariably results in all of the dire consequences of overlooked individuality in leader and follower alike.

In a book scientifically oriented I can take nothing for granted. Least of all can I assume that my reader will have the faintest feeling for the one and only datum making sense of all of it, namely that it is merely about me. Therefore at the very outset I wish to heed this self-evident truth of truths underlying the factuality of all of the positing that follows, namely, that I solely, am the whole of my subject.

My being all and only "I" does not depend in the slightest degree upon my awareness for that one and only reality of mine. Quite the contrary, there it is whether I choose to acknowledge it or not. One of the consequences of my freedom to notice it or not is that I may tend to spend most of my life without realizing that I, alone, am all of it. I assume that my reader is similarly prone to the indulgence of this illusional selflessness, indeed so much so that he cannot depend upon the feeling of his self awareness for finding his own bearings, but must resort to some form of reasoning for solving the apparent dichotomies or other seeming pluralities obscuring the absolute oneness of his existence.

The scientific researcher has discovered that he cannot conduct his monogenic individuality as if it is split up into seemingly impersonal fragments called notself, otherness, externality, relationships, God, devil, and on and on, without also developing helpful signs and symptoms of this life endangering self unawareness. As a rule he resents these signs and symptoms warning him of his self recklessness, preferring to find ways of relieving his self of these painful self reminders rather than to renounce his unheedful waywardness to favor heedful selfwardness. To this end, he develops his reasoning power at the expense of developing his self awareness power. Rarely can a reasoner be aware that his self must be the only content of all of his reasoning. Reasoning is always motivated by feeling other than that of awareness for the wholeness and allness of self. However, research is helpful for the researcher, and each one must begin it where he can and does. Living now gives sonecessitating its being. Whenever all of the wholeness accounting for an existent is present, then that existent is present. Therefore, whatever is, justly is, for it can be justly accounted for. Heeding that justice inexorably defends its right to be, and that whatever happens to exist is by definition just, it becomes evident occasionally that something must be added to my sense of justice in order that I might live kindly whatever I have to live.

This truth deserves most careful consideration now that the law-and-order principle is being invoked. It must be made clear that by this "law and order" a very special kind of arrangement is meant, namely, a carefully selected version of law and order. Every individual is a law-and-order unto his self. He is the way he is by virtue of the truth of his nature. His development is a just development. However his particular kind of constitutional law and order may or may not approximate that of the law of the land, that is, that of the constitution of his chosen country. If and when it does not he may, and usually does, find that he makes a great deal of trouble for his self pending his developing the possibility of acknowledging, as his own, the law inherent in the citizenship he claims for his own.

During this difficult development he will need all of the kind consideration he can secure for his self. Thus, he will appreciate whatever justice tempered with mercy is available for him. His citizenship training will particularly profit from the absence of any unkindness, of any inconsiderate disregard for the fact that he did the best he could under the circumstances of his not "knowing his way around." This recognition that his law breaking was his limited or shortsighted version of self helpfulness is most insightful, hence most rare. As Shakespeare felt it, "There is some soul of goodness in things evil would men observingly distil it out."

Every original investigator eventually must run the awful risk of seeming to lead a school of followers thereby hypostatizing a so-called impersonal "movement." It is my experience that this unconscious development of everyone devoted to "the

amnesia. My ability to consider any idea or feeling, any mental condition, and find it good self, is my definition of a mature, complete, free, mental act. To attribute any feeling to anyone or anything but itself, as my own, is the source of my "mental trouble."

Insightful Sigmund Freud was foremost in recognizing self as emotional self, and the troubles of self existence as enormously complicated and intensified by the emotional incontinence of one's recognized, or acknowledged, self. Because I am a whole unity, and because I am capable of self awareness, I must either laboriously cultivate my recognition for my completeness and intactness, or develop emotional signs and symptoms ("unconscious motivation") helpfully disciplining me to make the needed self discoveries enabling my arduously awakening to satisfying appreciation for the wholeness and allness of my natural constitution.

My constant need is to orient my every self experience in terms of my conscious self fulfillment, and I need to be able to awaken sufficiently to see that all of my emotionality is psychologically useful in serving this biological purpose. True to

self, is true to life.

Each of my emotions fits my survival in its own specific way, quite as hunger or thirst does. Each emotion is my love duly modified to meet a specific need primarily regarding my functioning of my individuality (exercising my self preservation). For the same lifesaving purpose, every biologically adequate modification of my love meets my special need to protect my recognizable (conscious) individuality (responsible self identity). Without acknowledgeable self identity there can be no supervising "I" to care whether or not (my unconscious) life continues. Nevertheless I may try to use my unhappy emotion, including pain, to reject (and if possible seem irresponsible for) any of my experience that I cannot claim as my own without being "upset" ("disconcerted," deprived of my "presence of mind") by assuming responsibility for it. To illustrate, I may try to use my fear, or anger, hatred, jealousy, suspicion, or the like, really to try to "depersonalize" whatever experience I associate with it, under the guise of seeming to be able called "past-living" its only meaning, not the converse. Knowledge that I cannot recognize right now as my self knowledge is making trouble for me until I can.

First and foremost then, for the purpose of acknowledging just exactly what I am always observing, it is absolutely necessary that I recognize clearly that all of my living occurs only and entirely in my self, whether I choose to call that self my person, or my individuality, or being, or constitution, or nature, or soul, or mind, or spirit, or subjectivity, or whatever. Furthermore, my attaining this truth cannot be the result of my reasoning, but must be the result of my discovery of my self feeling itself. Reasoning is all and only about reasoning, quite as self awareness is all and only about self awareness.

The fact of recognition of self, then, is a concern quite distinct from the fact of self. My "self" is the whole of my all. My "recognition of my self" is merely one function of my self power. The question arises, Upon what does my "recognition" of my self depend? The answer is implied in the question.

My self is a continent self, and whatever of its continence I can observe, contributes to my recognition of my self. In other words, whatever I can sense, or feel, or experience in any way can contribute to my recognition of my self if I wish to take the trouble to notice any of it as being all my self activity. Conversely, however, any of my experience that I do not heed as being my self activity cannot contribute to my recognition of my self but must contribute to my illusion of not-self, of some "influence" alien to me.

There can be no recognizable meaning to my life except that provided by my "taking the trouble" to notice its functioning as being mine. It would help specifically if the word "observation" or "consciousness," were never used except in the felt sense of self observation, or self consciousness. "Consciousness" may be presumed to mean, living with the feeling of personal living, but it is rarely used that way. "Self consciousness" carries more of the meaning of felt personal ontology, of being one way or another and have it matter, or count, in terms of appreciated experience of self. Whatever I live as if it is not-I, right there am I forgetting my self, my only possible form of

occasion during the earliest (foundational) years of my life. Indeed such a refined appreciation of extent of my personal identity did not even begin when I was learning my usage of such words as you, they, he, she, it, and similar terms conveying the implication of not-self. However at such early age I was capable of intense emotional excitements, and I calmed my self helpfully by being able to live each one as if it could apply to "somebody else." At that early age it was a lifesaving service to be able to live my mind as giving me only pleasure, even though I could not consciously claim much, if any, of it as entirely my personal possession. I could not recognize any of my own identity in my mother or father or sibling. Therefore, "I love you," or "I hate you," or "You make me mad," or so on, was the only kind of use of my own language (idiolect) that "made sense" to me.

It was only after I began to discern the vague idea of being an individual that my conscious authority and conscious responsibility for being one, started to weigh even lightly upon my mind. By then my habit of speaking was firmly established so that I tended to go on using my language as if it were not mine, as if it were "shared" by everyone else in common, as if it could somehow be used for "communication," for "getting at" and "being gotten at by" those "around" me.

Such usage of language amounts to a semantic psychosis. Every insightful person is rather dimly aware of it, but "the habit" continues itself. Occasionally sporadic effort is made to renounce comforting verbal addiction but, as with all attempts to "break" a habit, withdrawal symptoms of most discouraging and powerful kind (opposition of "common sense," or "public opinion") set in and "rather than seem so different," "rather than make others uncomfortable," "rather than try to change the world," (and so on), the unhappy linguist settles for his dimly perceived disadvantages of a language-of-self purporting to be equally a language-of-other-than-self. His consequent mental dissociation is signalized by many a symptom counselling him to make his language fit his psychological nature and needs, but by then he has lost track of the biological adequacy of strictly practiced self respect.

to ascribe responsibility for it to some "other person" ("repression").

Above all, every emotion constitutes self interest, self evidence, self realization, self love, self devotion. Once I sense any of my personal identity, of my conscious self continence, the difficult first step to its always difficult revelation is realized. Awakening to any of the truth of my actual wholeness and allness, is ever difficult because it ever entails my assuming full responsibility for the complete care of it. It always seems much easier to feel guilty about any of my living than to feel responsible for it. Nothing can be difficult but living, hence the seeming "popularity" of unconscious living.

My science of self can be ultimately worked up, to the extent that I can difficultly control my emotion by disciplining my conscious self to recognize every passion as a psychologically adequate function of conscious self activity, rather than as an

"attack of involuntary excitement."

In order to be able to develop his self control, for his self control is entirely a matter of his emotional control, every American citizen needs to know that all of his emotionality applies only and entirely to his own living. My disciplining my mind to be able to use my emotionality at will is necessary in order to relieve it of any "attack" significance. Whatever excitement that I cannot thus master, must give the appearance of mastering me.

My study of the organicity of my emotion is to discover the full significance of its functioning wholly in my mental condition: in what way is this or that affect necessarily helpful in this or that intention, tendency, and sequential position of my mind's making? Particularly, why do I find it helpful to deny that my passion is all and only about me, and stirred up by me

to serve my own ever self contained interest?

For example, in what manner does it help me to say, "I love you," or "I hate you," or "I am jealous of you," and so on, especially when I must ever acknowledge that all of my living is always only all about me? The answer is in the correction of the question. The truth is that I never was, nor could be, able to acknowledge the intact wholeness of my individuality on any

in thus consciously freeing his appreciation for the intact and complete wholeness of his personal individuality?

Sometimes I hear the observation offered that each bright United States citizen must be able to notice the shortcomings of his governmental representative both with respect to the internal as well as international interests of his countryman. Abroad I hear the complaint: With all of the professed devotion of the United States citizen to respect for the individual, why does he "freely" engage in so much hostility abroad and at home? Why is his "foreign" fellowman suspicious of him, and even known to turn to communistic rather than democratic governmental devices? A sceptical "foreigner" cries out that he has had his faith shaken in the outcome of the "American Experiment," the application of the high and mighty governmental proposition that individual man is capable of self government. Why not try a political principle that is less difficult to understand, let alone enforce? he asks. You Americans are losing your rightful place in the world as being really and truly interested totally in human individuality, and there is no other human interest, he adds. Can you not see the incongruity in asserting the ideal of freedom as if it can exist apart from unswerving devotion to human individuality?, he almost accuses.

But the United States citizen has tasted conscious freedom, and will not let it go. It is his government's constitutional law that protects his right to achieve his conscious freedom if he will. This achievement however is the greatest attainment that is humanly possible, and naturally it is correspondingly difficult. Therefore it is only the extraordinary citizen who finds the difficult way to work it up and thereby learns its wonderful worth. Meanwhile every other citizen's conscious freedom remains greatly limited. Nevertheless the latter citizen not only prizes his governmental opportunity to further love for his liberty but also senses, however dimly, the danger lurking in surrendering his liberty for the ease provided by some kind of "protector."

The sensibility of emotionality is the whole of it. "Touching"

I readily conceive this language liability as potentially cancerogenous. In fact I am unable to conceive how my claim to more-than-one life, built into my language habit (that is, my language implying "not-self" living), would not favor tumor growth of one kind or another. I can imagine that the necessary usage of a language featuring "not-self" illusion in childhood, might account for the high incidence of tumor then.

My organic approach to understanding my emotion merits my most careful heed, for it succeeds in localizing my emotionality, and all of my concern about it, within the acknowledgeable confines of my own self. This benefit bears repeating over and over again since it conspicuously honors the urgently needed comprehensive view of my self as well as points up the truth that all control is self control.

Devotion to the whole truth of human individuality is of first importance for every United States citizen especially. Effective working of every American ideal depends upon full appreciation for human individuality, and not upon anything else. This measure of man, each one his own world, underlies every person's only possible "free way of life," all by itself.

Freedom is what is meant by the "natural right" of the individual. Every person, United States citizen or not, is absolutely free by virtue of the truth that he is an individual. His discovering that he is free is another matter entirely, involving his willingness to study thoroughly the meaning of the fact that he is an individual. Freedom is not the same as conscious freedom. Cultivation of conscious freedom of every citizen was what was hoped for by each founder of American Government who had taken the trouble to struggle hard enough to achieve it for his self.

Sometimes I hear the statement made that a citizen of another government seems to enjoy as much freedom as a United States citizen can. That appearance may occur whenever this so-called foreign citizen has found out how to make the reality of the inviolable freedom of his individuality a truth that he consciously appreciates. Who can deny that a Plato, or Dante, or Montaigne, or Shakespeare, or Freud, had succeeded

is a term for affect that respects this fact; "feeling" is another. As L. Lavella sensed it in *Dialectique du Monde Sensible* (1921), the feeling of touch is the essence of all sensibility. I am willing to assume that, just as my tactile sense enables my discovery and experience of the body region of my mind, so my every emotion enables me to discover and experience a specific region of the remainder of my mind.

It is most important that I thoroughly understand this sensibility role of emotion for my working up my appreciation for the comprehensiveness of my personal identity, and thus for the psychological meaning of my wholeness and allness. Just as I am able to outline the body extent of my mind, for example by tactile, or kinaesthetic, or visceral, or visual, or any of my sensory living, so I am able to outline the rest of my mind by feeling it and nothing but it, emotionally, and thereby create my conscious appreciation for the intactness and inviolable integrity of it.

Although my sense of touch is acknowledged to be helpful in my finding my way about, not only in my so-called "body" but also in the rest of my so-called "world," nevertheless even my touching is not always recognized, or heeded, as nothing but self touching. Furthermore, my sense of my emotion is felt to be helpful in my finding my way about, not only in the acknowledgeable region of my so-called "mind" but also in those reaches of it I cannot recognize as being mine. Nevertheless, even my sensing and feeling my self emotionally is not always recognized, or heeded, as nothing but self feeling.

For this work describing my conscious personal idealism I define my

- mind as that which feels my living, as my only source and course of self meaning.
 - meaning as the unit of my mind, consisting of emotional experience;
 - 3) thinking as verbalized emotion;
 - emotion as my self defining sensibility for my vitality. It ranges from sensation perception and feeling through

every kind and degree of other conscious (or unconscious) affectivity, mood or passion;

 self consciousness as my feeling of awareness that only my subjective existence is in all of my experience.

My every special sense is some form of self touch, quite as my every emotion is some form of self feeling. When my feeling animates itself quite suddenly I may call my self "touchy," or I may call the affect "touching." Thus my emotionality (including my sensation) provides my lifesaving self orientation enabling me to sense (to feel) the nature and needs of my being. Presence of my ability to feel my being is all that can make any difference to me as to whether I live or stop living.

All consciousness is self consciousness, hence my valuing its life importance.

Self identity is a term indicating that I consist all and only of my self.

Conscious self identity is the product only of my conscious emotional continence.

I give birth to my self with no conscious emotional continence, but in the interest of my continuing living I am obliged to evolve my feeling of total responsibility for any and all of my emotionality.

To that end I distinctify the evolution of my feeling of self consciousness thus:

- 1) mental event
- 2) conscious mental event
- self conscious mental event

4) self world consciousness
 To feel respect for the being (functioning) of the wholeness
 of my self as an individual, I renounce my popular illusion of
 being able to divide my wholeness into so-called "parts"
 wherein I may seem insensible to my functioning wholeness as
 such, 1) in any one of my organs; or 2) in any of my "environment," "otherness," "externality," "objectivity," or whatever.
 If I do not acknowledge my self as my one and only one, I
 must thereby create the illusion of my "disunity," rather than
 the truth of my unity. By using my imagination I can create all

that I sense or feel as my universe, rather than "multiverse" (William James), out of my own self conscious being. I have felt every other life orientation as but testing this full freedom of my mind.

My creating my original feeling of distinct selfhood is essential for my being able to attribute selfhood to my fellow existent. However, further evolution of my feeling of self consciousness is required to enable me to feel my self identity in my you (he, she, or it) quite as in my I. Thus my mental growth completes the full circle: beginning without divisively distinctifying self and not-self; then creating its helpful illusion of not-self, or otherness, involving divisiveness; and finally renouncing this lovable but costly helpfulness to return to uninhibited feeling of functioning of (my) wholeness.

Since I enjoy the sensation of easy living derived merely from unwittingly letting my feeling do my thinking for me, it is imperative that I choose my wordage that will reveal rather than conceal the life affirming truth of my oneness, allness, wholeness, unity, identity. Innumerable are highly respectable, but only nominal, distinctions implying plurality at the expense of feeling individuality, divisiveness at the expense of feeling wholeness, difference at the expense of feeling identity, otherness at the expense of feeling selfness.

My present mental condition is the consequence of the way in which my instinctive self love has developed. Only to the extent that its functioning has been unhindered can I enjoy the whole truth of my marvelous nature.

Hence I elevate my possessive pronoun "my" to its proper prominence as duly prefacing my every other word. Also I favor clearly self honoring terms such as I, mine, me, solipsism, subjectivity, soul, or any evident synonym for my own name.

I can feel my conscious self love facilitating my developing my conscious self identity, and inhibition of my conscious self love inhibiting my developing my conscious self identity.

Love is my self feeling of being alive, the joy of living issuing from my freely functioning constitutional vitality.

When all of the fact about any life event of mine is taken into account, when the whole truth of it is fully felt, it is lived with my conscious self love. In other words, where the whole self truth is evident, conscious self love prevails. Therefore in considering whatever "unlovable," I need to feel distinctly my emotional bias, as such. Over sixty years ago, Sigmund Freud stated that every psychoanalytic treatment is an effort to free inhibited love.* In 1940, Edward Glover scored the importance of observing affect in free association, "Policies about affect require much more attention than they have hitherto received.** I think only what I feel. I feel only what I am. All of the truth of me is always lovable. My every emotion, other than conscious love, is itself a symptom of my inhibited instinctive love ("the return of the repressed").

In inhibited functioning of any kind, self love does not disappear to be supplanted by a self loveless emotion. Rather every emotion is made of nothing but love. All pathology is merely physiology struggling under stressful ordeal. Anger, or grief, or jealousy, or whatever painful emotion, is merely inhibited love struggling under stressful ordeal. Hate is hurt (hindered) love, deviltry is hurt (hindered) divinity, doubt is hurt (hindered) belief, fear is hurt (hindered) safety, guilt is hurt (hindered) innocence.

Demosthenes (384-322 B.C.) felt, "Nothing is more easy than to deceive one's self, as our affections are subtle persuaders." Rather than unwittingly allow my words to "do my thinking for me," in my effort to make them say what I want them to say I become acutely aware of the necessarily individualistic style of my speaking and writing. And nowhere do I feel greater difficulty in asserting and upholding my conscious idiolect than in my choice of terms defining emotion.

^{*}Jensen's Gradiva (1906), Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-), 1X, 90.

^{*}An Investigation of the Technique of Psycho-Analysis, ed. Edward Glover with the assistance of Marjorie Brierley (Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Co., 1940), 67.

To illustrate with the terms emotion and feeling, I am familiar with the usage of the word "feel" to cover emotion generally. Thus, I say I "feel" touch, pain, hunger, weariness, boredom, weakness, strength, violence, ambition, anxiety, sadness, guilt, belief, anger, jealousy, hope, responsibility, imagination, belief, understanding, inventiveness, sensitiveness, moodiness, temperament, devotion, inspiration, ecstasy, or whatever. I can also say quite interchangeably, "I emote feeling" and "I feel emotion." Furthermore I appreciate the essential quality of feeling, itself, to be emotionality. For instance, I am happy to be able to feel sad, hateful, touchy, tired, or whatever. Nevertheless, I may tend to overlook the essential emotionality in verbalizations such as I "feel" tense, ached, stiff, awkward, unsteady, empty, full, sober, numb, irritable, rested, willing, and the like.

My theory posits my emotion of perfect love as being all that I can ever experience, despite all appearance to the contrary. On that account I wish to feature perfect love's underlying identity in its innumerable different forms, such as hate, privation, impotence, despair, abomination, and every other seemingly life depreciating or negating force.

Therefore, in the interest of my conscious unity I use the term emotion to subsume every kind of excitement, including sensibility such as sensation or consciousness. Uninhibited functioning of my power creates my sensation of primary joy of living, quite as inhibited functioning of my power alters my sensation of my primary lovable being to its form of ache or pain.

Although a stronger emotion may seem to be able to exclude the presence of a weaker one, such prohibition really serves as preservative and emphasis in the repressed emotion.

Substantial relief from my unhappiness (including pain) is secured only from my gradually discovering that it consists entirely of helpfulness of my own nature, that it is truth of my own existence, that I am able to live only by it and through it.

The strength of my feeling of belief in the truth that I am develops from the extent to which I have worked up my feeling

the basis of my devotion to all fact, truth, reality. My acknowledging that whatever is, Should Be, is indispensable for my acknowledging the lovableness of every seemingly unlovable (painful, unhappy) self experience.

My consciously feeling merely my own experiential existence in all of my emotionality relieves it of any "attack" significance, revealing it as my will.

of conscious self identity. My reverence for my own being is

PERSPECTIVES

Man-Making
We are all blind until we see
That in the human plan
Nothing is worth the making if
It does not make the man.
Why build these cities glorious
If man unbuilded goes?
In vain we build the work, unless
The builder also grows.

Edwin Markham

This study of the biological intelligence inherent in every kind of feeling is published chiefly that it might prove inviting to similar attempt of my fellow scientist who may be ready for this positive, fresh look, treatment of the sagaciously informative nature of every kind and degree of emotional excitement. My understanding of emotionality is not only that it consists of intelligent activity but also that it alone possesses this sensible capacity of instinctive vitality. In other words, my traditional division of mentality into affective, cognitive, and conative powers has obscured the truth of the wholeness of my mind, creating illusional separation necessarily concealing overall mental intelligibility. As I find all of the fact in each feeling, however faint or fierce its passion, I can see nothing but excellent judgment in it.

As my task proceeds my conviction grows that it is essential to explore the reasonableness of any and all emotional excitement. Conscious vitality is derivable from noticing that all so-called physical force is nothing but mental power. Whatever is mental, is felt to be mental. For me, emotion is "the meaning of meaning."* In other words, I feel every mental power consists of energy of the nature of emotional tension or excitement

^{*}C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1945).

of a specific kind and degree. The assumed obsolescence of passion in the ideal scientist reveals not only the illimitable extent of the imagination but also the indomitable power of the inconspicuous emotion motivating such wishfulness.

The very connotation of "person" or "personal" consists of either conscious or unconscious emotionalized selfness. My pure consciousness itself is felt personal identity. Without this personal sensibility of feeling, every sensation, perception, idea, or observation of any kind must appear to negate the truth of the wholeness of my individuality. With all due honor to my beloved Thoreau, I can neither "kill time without injuring eternity," nor consume space without injuring infinity.

A psychology of the passions must either support or refute the unity of my conscious wholeness. My attitude towards any of my living, such as my belief in my truth that every act of mind is an act of my wholeness, is strong only to the extent that it is made of passion.

It has been customary for me to attribute folly rather than wisdom to my emotional living chiefly on account of my experiencing it as if it might apply to "somebody else." Thus, I can softly assume, "The trouble is not with my self control, but rather with the unreliable nature of my feelings." Indeed, instead of attributing wisdom to all emotional living, my philosopher, psychologist, or physiologist, has tended to follow the traditional orientation that the one excludes the other. Hence, his interest in studying each affect from the standpoint of its sensibily contributing to wise living is difficultly aroused.

This work uses such words as emotion, passion, feeling, affect, mood, temperament, sentiment, sensibility, freely in the sense that each one names either an uninhibited pleasing, or inhibited unpleasing, self activity. My agony of inhibited self experience is created by my unreadiness to revere the truth (fact) in it. Growing the wakefulness to the true greatness of self that subsumes such truth (fact), develops my negative unpleasure into my positive pleasure, or ecstasy, of freely observable mental wholeness and unity. Nothing is more practical for me than my precious power to steer my whole individuality, with appreciation for my serene sensibility in my con-

sciousness for its wholeness. My disciplining my mind in feeling responsible for all of my self's living is my sure source of neaceful existence:

A work of art or a human life, viewed in its entirety or with respect to any element in it, may be said to have integrity when it attains, first, a measure of wholeness, and second, when it achieves a degree of recognizable individuality.*

In 1938, in England, Sigmund Freud makes these notes: "A sense of guilt also originates from unsatisfied love, like hate. In fact we have been obliged to derive every conceivable thing from that material: like economically self-sufficient states with their Ersatz (substitute) products."** On the same day (August 3) he writes: "The ultimate ground of all intellectual inhibitions and all inhibitions of work seems to be the inhibition of masturbation in childhood." I make each of these profound observations of greatest consequence my very own and consider it most important for my text.

Freud observed psychic energy as instinctively emotional, either love or modified love. I have discovered unitive value for conscious wholeness in this comprehensive view. My experience reveals meaning to be the unit of mentality. "Meaning" itself is basically a synonym for emotion. To conceive of a meaning without any emotional force is to attempt to make something out of nothing. Quite as W. B. Cannon felt, emotion energizes the organism.

Emotional excitement compels awareness, or attention, so that my consciously acknowledged presence of over-all self control may be difficult or impossible to maintain while I am experiencing a "stormy" passion. This truth has led my "objective scientist" to favor what he names dispassionate thinking which, taken literally, must signify: meaningless thinking. My

^{*}James Gutmann, "Integrity As A Standard Of Valuation," J. Phil. XLII: 8

^{***}Findings, Ideas, Problems" (1938[1941]). The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press 1953-) XXIII, 300. Hereafter referred to as Standard Edition.

nature is being expressed either with or without my recognition. If I can duly acknowledge its presence I can ultimately develop my power to use it, at will, in my acknowledgeable service. Otherwise I must seem to subject my self to my own excitement and, as already described, appear to be controlled by (rather than to wilfully control) so-called fits or spells or attacks of emotionality.

My every unhappy (painful) feeling is appropriate for my mental condition. Searching self observation shows that it occurs whenever I am unable to live with love for my wholeness whatever self experience I may be creating (whatever I find "happening" that is overwhelming to my conscious self identity). Thus, crudely felt, my anger is always with my self incontinence for not being able to lovingly appreciate my own mental action; my guilt is always with my rejected self for refusing responsible appreciation for my own innocence; my fear is always with my endangered self for my inability to safely appreciate possibility of risk to my wholeness; my jealousy is always with my distrusted self for inability to faithfully credit my whole self possession; and so on.

If I cannot consciously acknowledge my self as the only source aim and subject of my every emotion, then I must attribute "impersonal" meaning to that feeling of mine and I cannot feel any responsibility for it or authority over it. Thus, I may dream away my own reality in such living as, "She is mad," or, "He is unhappy," or "guilty," or "untrustworthy," or "envious," or whatever. In other words any feeling whatsoever that I attribute to anyone but my self alone, is my very own precious emotion which I must be able to acknowledge as mine in order to be able to realize that my "other one" is entirely of my own living.

It pays me to feel my anger as applying only to me, whenever I am neglecting to live my fellowman as really mine. It pays me to feel my unkindness when I am not living my self kindly. Similarly it pays me to feel my guilt, shame, contempt, anxiety, jealousy, or any such psychic pain as an invaluable sign that I am conducting my mind without full appreciation that it is only my own living that can create my "other one."

The functional power of wholeness dawned upon me, in the sense of my discovering it in my evident self experience, after I began my intensive research in neurophysiology with Dr. Samuel T. Orton and Dr. Lee Edward Travis* in 1925.

My any and every so-called unkindness is always traceable to my lack of imagination. For purposes of devising my personal identity as comprehending my world, my widest possible scope of imagination is indispensable. For my freely functioning imagination such a judgment as "sheer absurdity" or "nonsense" is lovably renounceable. My increasing self experience recognizable as such opens up new worlds to my conscious imagination. I can never experience any meaning but the imagining of my own mind. "I cannot imagine it," describes a limitation of my mental competence.

My mind orientation is that every mental force or event is all and only about itself, and that any appearance that it can have of any "relationship" with another mental force or event is purely illusion or delusion. Clearly this way of viewing mind, namely, that mind is uniquely individual and consists only of individuality, necessitates the idiolect of my personal language honoring the truth of my absolutely inviolable individuality. Not only does it exclude any so-called common sense analysis of emotion but also any analysis based upon any common sense use of language, including particularly any so-called "impersonal" language of science.

A certain philosophy, or systematic psychology, of mind was provided by Protagoras (Fifth Century, B.C.) when he first systematized language into a grammar, followed by Gorgias when he first developed rhetoric. Ever since such effort at development of a system of psychology my fellowman has tended to divide his mind by means of his language into "parts of speech" of one kind or another. Not only in speaking and

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Sec, Lee E. Travis and John M. Dorsey, "Mass Responsiveness in the Central Nervous System," Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, XXVI (July, 1931), 640-646.

writing but even in thinking there remains this tendency to fixate mental processes in the name of mental order.

I find that my conventional language is mostly devoted to supporting illusions of space in its preposition; of fixation in its noun; of motion in its verb; of time in its past and future tenses; of self belittlement in its peroratives and melioratives; of plurality in its "collective" noun or fraction; of mechanics, externality, and objectivity rather than subjective ideality in innumerable terms; of depersonalization rather than respect for individuality; and so on and on. My individuality, including its every individuation, is the ultimate unit of my experience.

I opened my way to enjoy the benefit of great economy in my expenditure of effort when I first recognized my power of observation as being entirely self observation. Until then I was inclined to rely heavily upon "reasoning" for my attainment of my understanding, for my working up any explanation of my experience. For example, as a scientist I place my trust in my data. However do I regard them as a reliable basis of "externality" for my "reasoning," instead of respecting them as my indispensable mental processes for my imagining?

To be sure, as all else of my mental activity, my self awareness is an emotional experience quite as my "reasoning" is. Most consequential difference lies in the fact that my self awareness contributes to the preservation of my conscious self continence whereas my reasoning, being all and only about itself, consists of all kinds and degrees of "rationalization" of my unconscious emotionality. By "rationalization" I mean unconscious wish fulfilment disguised respectfully as conscious logic. As a psychiatrist I must recognize and control my "reasoning" quite as being my preferred form of paranoia.

The greater my dependence upon my reasoning the less my appreciation for my imagination. As Arthur H. Compton observed in The Freedom of Man (1935) "probably not even in art is the imagination applied as effectively as in science." Imagination is necessary for the constructing and "venturing of opinions or guesses. . . . It is by making many hypotheses and testing their consequences that all the important generalizations of science have been reached. It is rare indeed that the first formulations are found to be adequate."

What makes me cling to any established way of thinking of mine is the emotional content of it. Lovingly renouncing my habit of letting my vocabulary do my thinking for me, or allowing my memory to exercise authority over my self observation, or permitting any emotion to pre-empt my conscious self observation, or whatever other comforting illusion, involves my undergoing "abstinence symptoms" of anxiety. depression, insecurity, and so on, just as does my effort to free my self from any other addiction such as use of narcotic. Yet, as W. Heisenberg (The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory, 1930) perceives about reasoning: "The resolution of the paradoxes of atomic physics can be accomplished only by renunciation of old and cherished ideas. Most important of these is the idea that natural phenomena obey exact laws,-the principle of causality."

Only after much profiting from my awakening to the power of my self observation could I appreciate the full extent to which I find and free my self with my self awareness and blind and bind my self with my logic, reasoning, or judgment,

"about" my self.

Now that I have discovered how I lull my self to sleep with my reasoning, how I seek comfort in the logical, or rational, or reasonable, I can also see how I can use this function of my mind to escape from the shocks and shakes of confronting my self with the truth that I am whatever mental activity I happen to be growing, that I am whatever experience I happen to be living, and that I wish to be whatever I am.

Being an individual life I am but one growing self. Therefore, I must either create my experiencing nature or die. However I may not have to acknowledge, own up to, my experience that I create. In fact, consciously disowning any of my living with my dislike is made easier by the fact that I originally developed my mind with little or no recognition of (including appreciation for) the truth that all of it consisted of nothing but my very own human being.

The consequence of ignoring my self identity is my constant

striving to "think enough of my self" to maintain biologically adequate self esteem. It is most deserving of my awareness that I, as a self acknowledged person, can be interested in preserving my existence just to the degree that I estimate it as worth living.

Although all I can ever experience is my wishful self assertion, nevertheless, on account of seldom respecting that fact, I find my self ever striving to enjoy this feeling of self functioning. Then I try to "prove" my self by craving to have my fellowman behave as if he can respect me, as if he can be con-

scious for me rather than for his own being.

My self consciousness amounts to my life affirmation. All of my interest in living is the product of my self appreciation. Despite appearance to the contrary, nothing can be of any interest to me whatsoever, except my living. All of my search for success can be rewarded only by my going on living my self. My conscious self love therefore is my life affirmation, my one possibility for profit of any kind.

Martin L. Reymert, Director of the Mooseheart Laboratory for Child Research, offers a heartfelt consideration; "The fact that science has been so conspicuously slow in trying to dissipate the fog of the emotional states may have its general explanation primarily in the fact that man has always been reluctant

to undertake the study of his own real self."

The following law of my psychological nature merits my closest heed, for implicit in it is the sure solution for all of my so-called social ills, including "crime" and "war": I can love my fellowman only as my self, and only to the extent that I can love all of my self. My respect for anyone of my world varies directly with my love for all of my self. Just as I cannot care what happens to any existence of mine except to the extent that I can personally appreciate its true worth as my own living, so I cannot care what happens to my fellowman except to the extent that I can see my precious personal identity in my living of my fellowman. My cultivation of this comprehensive love for all of my living is essential for every kind of my peacemaking, including all of my healing. My living of love is the basis of my wish to live.

To illustrate, if I am angry my awareness is about my anger rather than about my living of my whole being; if I am sad my awareness is about my sorrow rather than about the comprehensiveness of my life; if I am afraid my awareness is about my fear rather than about the whole truth of my individuality; if I am "suffering pain" my awareness is about my pain rather than about its potential helpfulness in extending my mind's awareness; and so on. My interest in each of the so-called "facts of life" is maintained at the cost of my neglect of the ever satisfying and sanifying fact of my life itself. Any stronger emotion is the force that obstructs the view of the ever potent fact of the self's wholeness and allness.

The scientist, behavioral or whatever his alleged approach to his psychology, mostly uses the term "self" to name the individuality of human being. Linda Viney interestingly traces the lineage of current concepts of self, beginning with divine Plato:

The soul, as described in the Phaedo, as the initiator of activity, conscious, lifegiving and immaterial, later appeared as the center of self psychology devised by Mary Calkins. . . It is St. Augustine (354-430 A.D.), however, who provides the first glimpse of introspection into a personal self. . . "in the vaste court of memory, For there are present with me heaven, earth, sea, and whatever I could think on therein. . .""

In her summary Viney states,

Few writers have chosen to view self as the organization of characteristics making up the individual or personality, although recently it is possible to name Heinz Hartmann as doing so.

All love is necessarily self love, quite as all consciousness is necessarily self consciousness. Conscious self love is expressed in every kind and degree of pleasurable psychological functioning that accounts for the individual's satisfying "life experience." Thus all happy feeling may be accounted for consciously

^{*&}quot;Self: The History of a Concept." J. History of the Behavioral Sciences, V:4, 349-359.

as life affirming because it consciously contributes to upholding the evident value of being an individual, through exciting appreciation for the fact that life is worth living. My wish to live, is my wish of wishes.

The basic importance of unhappiness, including pain, is that it indicates an individual is not making his self consciously

happy or pleased in his psychological functioning.

Just what is the special distinction in psychological functioning that associates it with either a happy or unhappy conscious feeling?

This statement of the question contains some helpful hints as to its answer.

In the first place, conscious self identity is involved. Certain responsible felt authority for being an individual is necessary for the making of a decision as to whether life experience includes pleasure or pain. This requirement focuses consideration upon the study of the kind of experience that might affect the status of one's conscious personal identity. Certainly any kind of living that might endanger the functioning of an individual's appreciation for the worth of his very existence is vitally meaningful. A next conception concerns the discovery that too much or too little excitation in the form of meaningfulness not only may disturb but may eclipse an individual's sense of his personal responsibility for his life, so that he may lose his conscious presence of mind in varying degree from feeling embarrassed by excitement to becoming unconscious (fainting, focally to lose his consciousness for but one of his senses, or generally).

The fact that I must create each meaning of my self experience in, by and of my own mind carries far-reaching implications. To illustrate, by and of my own mind I create my every meaning of a so-called material order just as I create my every meaning of a so-called spiritual order. In thus giving birth to so-called mental events in quite the same sense and with quite the same substance that I give birth to so-called physical events, the truth of the underlying identity of my mind as constituting each eventuation disposes of the phantom problem created by my imagining the duality: mental and physical.

Perhaps the most important implication of the truth that I am all of whatever I live, that I am my own mind's every meaning, is the persevering desirability that I work up my ability to live with love whatever and all that I am. There can be no idea or feeling or meaning of any kind about any or all of my self-world experience that I can safely misprize as unworthy of me, for that would be tantamount to judging my own living as being undesirable. This means that I do well to renounce saying "No" to any thought or feeling or event of any meaning whatsoever. "Argument" is based upon the illusion of plurality, rather than upon self consciousness.

With my development of my conscious self identity, I found my self more and more involved in the most important concem: What is truth? I learned what is true is real. However, as in my first awakening to all of my mentality, I seemed to be confronted with an illusion that supported the idea of plurality rather than individuality. I refer to my illusion of pairs of so-

called "opposites."

For example, virtue seemed to have an opposite in vice; good, in bad; right, in wrong; true, in false. I had no way of realizing that I could accurately attribute the wholeness of individuality to anyone or anything of my world only insofar as I could succeed in accurately observing the wholeness of my own individuality. All classification disregards the reality of subjectivity, in the interest of creating the fiction of objectivity. I could not, as a child, realize that all classification is made at the expense of recognition of the wholeness (allness) of individuality. Classification is an attempt to use the illusion of "separation" (of one individual from another) to achieve an aggregate, at the cost of appreciation for the existence only of integration everywhere. I renounce every so-called "broad generalized statistical view" as having value at all except as a meaning in the mind creating it.

This comprehension of the ubiquity of the truth in all of my living is of tremendous importance, especially on account of the enormous power of suggestibility or "alien" influence, power acceded to "external authority" by the mind impoverished of its own conscious authority. To the extent that I am

unconsciously suggestible I am not aware that all of my authority is my own. Then I lack conscious self trust but delude my self that I can trust "somebody else." Thus the mental condition of autohypnosis prevails. Also my loved and trusted but consciously disowned power can become sufficiently dominating to have life-and-death motivation for me. My adventure of living is ever a struggle for which I need all of the conscious self possession I can awaken and mobilize. I am constantly undergoing organic ordeals challenging the very best order of self interest I can achieve. I cannot afford vagueness as to my whole self's identity.

I was unable to create for my self a convincingly accurate appreciation for the meaning of Truth until I awakened to my self's realization that Truth is universal. Whatever is, is true, truly is. Prior to this self observation I obscured my meaning of Truth by upholding the dichotomy True-False thus maintaining the illusion of duality at the cost of perceiving my

Truth's inviolable unity.

The reliable authority for behaving in a biologically adequate manner is the reality of one's self, the existence of which is all that can be established by scientific investigation. Each scientist's science is the product of his own conscious, or uncon-

My finding that I live only in my desires, my most recent scious, self observation. insight, highlights my need for due comprehensiveness of my emotional potential. Only by extending my self love to recognize further my self identity can I restore my conscious supremacy of my spirited (willing) self. To become self conscious is to generate my conscious reality. Thus his Descartes and Locke, each a forerunner of conscious life idealism, prepared the ground for my George Berkeley, founder of his declared self idealism. Original contributors to this conscious self doctrine were Nicolas Malebranche, John Norris and Robert Collier. Berkeley made it classic in his Principles of Knowledge (1710).

I can attribute emotion to my self only insofar as I can consciously observe (feel) my identity. Therefore I must attribute my emotion to my fellow creature to the extent that I cannot recognize my identity in (my) him. Thus I may observe, "He is angry," "She loves me," "He is jealous," or "She is guilty," or on and on, ignoring the plain (but momentarily lived with dislike) truth that only I can live any of my living (in this instance, my emotion). All of my so-called "not I" living consists of this unacknowledgeable emotionality of mine. I am whatever affect I can feel, whatever I wish or fear.

The etymological meaning of the name Sanskrit is "made together" (cf. "religion"). The Sanskrit word for "I-maker" is aham-kara, meaning "ego feeling" or "self awareness." Self-feeling consciousness is the emotion that confers the life affirming meaning of individuality, of I am-ness. My conscious personal identity consists of all of my emotionality in which I can acknowledge my self love, my life desire, soul of my own. When I imagine an entity I call "my fellowman," and can feel my identity in this specific energizing of my mind, I satisfy my desire for conscious intact wholeness, absolute and inviolable.

Each emotion focuses and intensifies specific unity in the person experiencing it. Living with extending conscious appreciation for that living creates satisfying observation of growing selfness, called pleasure. Living without extending conscious appreciation for that living contracts satisfying observations of growing selfness, to avoid unpleasure or pain. Greatness derives its power to please from its resemblance to allness or wholeness. Smallness can displease through being associated with the shortcomings of incompleteness.

If I were to attempt to describe a synoptic view of my pres-

ent mental condition, it would go somewhat like this:

Life is a unique form of self contained self activity described as organized emotional individuality. Its several emotions (derived from self love, or life enjoyment) are forms of will (wish) expressed in action such as thinking, doing, feeling, being or becoming, knowing, sensing, perceiving, attending (living consciousness), or whatever constitutes mind's experiencing its self consciously or unconsciously. All biological activity is emotional functioning consisting of living either pleasurably or unpleasurably. Mind is a name for this individualized emotionality. Body is a name for mind imagining

itself as being observable material. My self love, my mere joy of living, is my instinctive primary feeling or passion.

I live with conscious love every experience making me enjoy certainty of my unity (wholeness, sameness, identity). I live with conscious hate every experience making me endure uncertainty of my unity. Substantial identity of my love "and" hate is discoverable in elaborating the truth that each serves the one purpose of furthering my survival. I can find love in my hating as well as hate in my loving.

My awakening to see my mental production from the standpoint of the true unity, rather than apparent plurality, of my emotional power enables my recognizing the truth that every process of my mind is of meaning only for my self, that all of my living is entirely and only about me. Thus, I find that there can be nothing of value about me as an individual except my individuality; that I cannot live expression or impression of any kind but of my very own nature; that all I ascribe "elsewhere" must be nowhere but here in my own nature. Specifically, I must ignore my own nature in order to be able to claim any appreciation for some other nature, e.g. divine, diabolical,

human, animal, physical.

My discovering the realistic, comprehensive nature of my individuality rescues me from my undisciplined violent desires to "make somebody else" responsible for any of my own mind's creations, such as whatever I must live with panic of dislike, e.g. war, murder, crime, riot, mob, injustice of any kind. By "panic" I refer to any emotion that appears to subject the wholeness of my being selectively to itself, thus seeming to pre-empt every other self activity from my conscious living. To illustrate, I even describe such a panic as my being "in it" rather than as its being in me, thus, "I am in a depression," "I am in love," "I am in an anxiety state," or "I am in a fit of lealousy," or rage, or whatever. It becomes understandable that ancient man identified each of his passions as a spirit, personifying (and thus apparently objectifying) divine love or diabolical hate as extraneous to him but operating in him.

The hope of my life lies in my deeper investigation of the leading role of my emotion in obscuring or disclosing my allness and wholeness, and thereby contributing to my reaching an accurate measure of my individual individuality. Why my seeming love for "another" always has such a strong force is that it was the only way my self love could function during my earliest formative years. During that time my love in my all powerful parent took over (excited me) without my being able to claim responsibility for that much of my living.

I discover that I live only in my desires, including my wish to live, itself. I surprise my self by seeing that all of my living to which I have given dispassionate or unfeeling names turns out to be nothing but one kind of emotion or another. Whatever I live is an expression of some kind or other "passion in living." It startled me at first to notice that my every word, to wit, certainty, reality, conviction, belief, liberty, interest, imagination, nationality, country, fact, truth, intellect, will, sensation, learning, attention, consciousness, insight, objectivity or whatever,—each one, names an emotional nuance without which it would be meaningless.

I observe all of my creativity to be the product of my living in my desire, beginning with my obvious creation and development of the love-made body of my mind. I conceive my every element, every individuation of my individuality, as craving its self, its continuing existence.

Conceivably, also each emotion of my body, as of the rest of my mind, works up its own capacity for functioning by entering into the formation of visceral and parietal power centers, each one subserving my wish to live. My study of embryological development supports this consideration of self purposefulness, namely, growth of biological patterns obviously devoted to sustaining individual needs (nature). My Charles Darwin's insightful interpretations of individual power centers (such as fang, tusk, tooth, taste, odor) helped him to understand emotion for its creative force.

Sigmund Freud, most understanding about being awake and being asleep, quotes Charles Darwin's "golden rule" for coping with his resistance to honoring truth he first could not, "namely, whenever a published fact, a new observation or thought came across me, which was opposed to my general results, to make a memorandum of it without fail and at once; for I had found by experience that such facts and thoughts were far more apt to escape from the memory than favorable ones."

This "golden rule" becomes fully appreciated for its marvelous helpfulness once I realize the benefit to my self in being able to honor as lifeworthy any and every view my mind may be capable of creating, quite independent of any kind of unpleasing affect I might be inclined to associate with it. Thus, the overriding truth of any or all of my life experience is never merely what it may appear to be by virtue of the emotion I may momentarily feel in it. Rather its all important being lies in that it constitutes my living, itself. Whatever I live, I live by. In this most meaningful sense, no one of my mental activities (thought, emotion, ideal, sensation, view, or whatever) is more or less important than another since each one consists of the same existence, my own living. Once this mind orientation is attained, and always through the same arduous extension of my conscious self identity, I can no longer feel the least bit safe in disowning any of my experience in the name of "not my self," or "too painful to consider," or hateful, or unworthy, or unimportant, or unorthodox, and so on.

Munificence of my American "millionaire" fellowman stands ready to support leadership in disclosing the open secret of civilization, namely, that the only possible way to serve humanity is to be found specifically and only in each individual's consciously (willingly) disciplining his own potentiality for serving his very own humanity. Discovery of this all-including value of human individuality is an absolute prerequisite to discovering the only trustworthy basis for lasting peace. There is no peace on illusional earth, only peace in conscious self worth. My only loveworth value in "otherness" (the people, democracy, unselfishness sociology) must be reached through appreciation for my whole-minded human individuality. The just law of anything is simply an accurate statement as to how it best works its self. The law of human individuality is an accurate statement of its essence, namely its intact integrity, its

continent vitality, its united wholeness. The unity of my creative emotionality is just as certain as the unity of my creative self. My whole being consists of this self evolving identity.

Lacking this all-embracing self-wholeness insight I find my self prey to no end of cherished illusion about being able to experience something foreign to me. Surely when I cannot observe my producing any of my experience within me (through my passion in enjoying my identity) I can be tempted to try to explain it as originating outside of me. My ignorance of my own mental power leads me to attribute my own experience to a source "outside of me." For instance, as a child I seldom if ever held my self responsible for my night dreaming. Then I was incapable of realizing that my own mental creation is all that can be scientifically or otherwise known by me. Regularly I find my fellowman speaking of his dream of his "departed" one quite as if it were an apparition instead of the product of his own desiring, using the life-negation "absence" to account for the life-affirmation "presence."

Quite as I "hear voices" and "see visions" in my dreaming, all vividly real, and discipline my emotionality to be able to recognize such experience as produced by my own understandable wishes (including fears), so I can appreciate my "bereaved" fellowman's need to create his own convincing evidence of his continuing to be able to experience his loved one, who obviously can never be "gone" in his lifetime. "Out of present sensation or perception," does not alone constitute being "out of mind," however "popular," the concept of death as being an illusion of the motion of "departing" may be. Little wonder the phantom problem of "spiritual materialization" seems unsolvable. All of my "apparent matter" is unapparent

"Spiritualism" based upon the affirmation that the dead can "communicate" with the living is an ever-recurring "popular" concern. James Harvey Hyslop* is reported as saying about the appearances of the forms of persons after death, tests hav-

^{*}Professor of Psychology, Columbia University, writing in Harper's Magazine, April, 1900.

ing ruled out the hypothesis of chance as an explanation of such phenomena; "Between deaths and apparitions of the dying person a connection exists which is not due to chance. This we hold as a proved fact."

My daring to conceive the wholeness of my mind, enabled by my finding out the intact unity underlying the rich variety of my emotion, furnishes me with most abundant evidence of the biological utility in honoring the inviolable integrity of my creative (self creative) human being. I am my beloved one. Whenever I must live his (her) so-called death, that cannot mean that I can no longer live all of his (her) living that I previously created. Indeed I must go on living whatever I have become, either consciously and thereby appreciating my wholeness, or unconsciously and thereby esteeming my "apparitional" excitements.

Especially whenever I wish to try to take "a fresh look" at any interest of mine, I feel keenly the need for a true vocabulary honestly naming my own acknowledged mind. However I shall proceed, wording my self viewing as best I can. If I give my mind its head and thus let it go freely, I can readily imagine that it is each of my ruling passions which, in turn, evolves my needs (that is, my nature); that my being is the development of its self love, just as every individuation of my being is the development of a modification of its self love. I can imagine my constitution to be a unity of some such creative powers of mine acting through organs and systems I name unstriped muscle, glandular secretions, autonomic nervous system, central nervous system, skeletal, muscular, cutaneous development, and so on. I am what I want; I want what I am.

Thus I can account for each of my functions as evolved specifically to meet some certain need of mine. I do not separate out instinct for some "special" constitutional worth, for I regard whatever is lived to be instinctively lived. All of me is regard, none of me is "acquired," My every act is instinctive, instinct with my vitality alone. Alexander Pope soliloquized:

Seek then the ruling passion; there alone The wild are constant and the cunning known; The fool consistent and the false sincere, Priests, princes, women, no dissembling here.

Every consciously self enlightened one appreciates the M.D.'s realization that his patient's emotional control is his strongest aid, that his seemingly being ruled by splendid indifference, or blind hope, is not as strengthening as is his consciously coping with his fear and despair. In every conscious emotion there may be recognized, however slightly, its perceptible "opposite." The feeling of hope is moderated by its being consciously experienced against its background of despair; the feeling of despair is moderated by its being consciously experienced against its background of hope; and so on. Conscious emotionality is all that can be consciously controlled, and it becomes controllable through this moderating effect.

Whatever I create is my subjective product of my vital energy forming my existence. I grow my self in the direction and to the level of the kind of self devotion I activate, each of my emotions a creating, shaping, force effecting the orientation of my self condition. I cannot practice a self pained way of life without evolving its creative form in my self functioning generally, any more or less than I can discipline my self in life appreciation without its holistic shaping of my self world. Is the scientific research man already born capable of taking his mind (emotion) seriously enough to try to evolve psychological theory based upon demonstrating his organic functioning to be the evolved construct of vital energy providing for his biological needs? Such seemingly casual questioning becomes most earnest as I consider that the source of my ethic, or religion, is in my functioning of my mind.

For developing my gratifying conscious self knowledge, and its associated access of will power, I find it most helpful frequently to originate as my own Immanuel Kant's self discoveries, particularly his observation about his mind's every image being the product of its "empirical faculty." This devotion to the unity of his subjectivity enabled his observing that Copernicus could not have made his discovery had he not "ventured on the experiment—contrary to his senses but still just—of look-

ing for the observed movements not in the heavenly bodies but in the spectator." I have no possibility of conscious self knowledge to the extent that I assume that my knowledge is not native to my being, that it originates from outside of me, that I "acquire" it from a page, or a person, or a people. So-called "acquired knowledge of the ages," as the personification implies, must be recognized by me as my own painfully delivered mental product before I can claim it as my conscious self knowledge.

Taste for enlarging self consciousness, although most difficult to grow, as might be expected is correspondingly most rewarding. This specific "taste" is the working up of a liking for experiencing a new dislike as a preliminary to discovering its lovable self helpfulness. Although plain to see, it did take my Freud to discover the "popularity" of distaste ("resistance") in this kind of self disciplined self development. Hence Freud's "unpopularity;" hence the extreme demand for "popular" writing assuring the reader of the biological adequacy of his status quo, only. However, only that which increases my appreciation for the accurate extent of my self, is that which can increase my appreciation for the wholeness of my individuality. Whatever I "want" is my personification of my self love, to wit, my food or drink is my personification of my hunger or thirst. As Goethe stated it, I exist for what I can accomplish in my self.

INTIMATIONS OF CONSCIOUS EMOTIONAL CONTINENCE

My humanity is a continual self mastery Frederick Nietzsche

I refer here specifically to unique studies of emotion helping to reveal it as the ground root from which I find my entire mental life growing itself. It seems expectable that just such rare effort may most comfortably be overlooked. Therefore I wish to make the most of its vital importance for honoring the absolutely inviolable integrity of my mind.

In his Preface to David Rapaport's feelingful, including thoughtful, monograph, Emotions and Memory,* Gardner

Murphy comprehensively records:

Language, common sense, and the great tradition in Western philosophy, have agreed that thoughts and feelings are two independent entities, or indeed two entities starkly opposed. The evolutionary theory, bringing in its turbulent wake the philosophy of James and Dewey, has offered us, in rebellion against the tradition, another period of effort to find in thought and feeling two inimately related, perhaps only relatively distinguishable aspects of one continuous struggle to adapt to the environment. Psychoanalysis, talking a different language but saying the same thing, has mademany doubt whether "pure" or "cold" intellectual process exists, memory, judgment, logical analysis express the same ultimate dynamics that appear in our cravings, our aggressions, our acts of self-defense.

Psychologist F. A. P. Aveling** daringly asserts:

The subject matter of Psychology is for you your known experience, and for me mine. . . Now, this is the standpoint of what is known in Philosophy as Solipsism; and it revolts us precisely because it is

***Psychology," The Mind, ed. R. J. S. McDowall (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927) pp. 79–108.

^{*}The Menninger Clinic Monograph Series, No. 2 (New York: Science Editions, Inc., 1961). p. ix.

so far removed from "common-sense"... No mind other than each individual's own is open to his inspection... the data of my own immediate experience are the only data I have from which to construct the science of Psychology... There can be no doubt of a fact apprehended with insight... The basic fact, then, of the Psychology which is the private and unique possession of each one of us—of that Psychology which alone makes all science and philosophy possible—is this: —I, conscious of my existence as a knower, know something... I, always self-conscious, know and will and feel.

Karl von Linné (Carolus Linnaeus, 1707-1778), devised the name Homo Sapiens for man. It is man's conscious self feeling that enables him to distinctify his emotional continence and incontinence.

I like to appraise the worth of any of my experience on the basis of how it contributes to my appreciation for the wholeness of my being. It is my very own living that creates the relentless realism of my mind's consciousness. It is all very well to extol the logical as long as it is clearly understood to be the ontological, or to honor the reasonable as long as it is clearly understood to be the organic individual, or to uphold the psychological as long as it is clearly understood to be the biological. And all of my living that I can discover is made meaningful only by its emotional excitement.

Whatever is not grown by the individual cannot exist in him. With this perspective, my consciously internal sanction of all of my activity, I have undertaken the study of my emotionality, all the while also trying to be alert to my Sydney Smith's passionate

prayer, "Short views, for God's sake, short views."

I keep asking my self just how my emotion clarifies or obscures my ongoing recognition (acknowledgeable valuation) of my conscious self realization, including my continuing self fulfillment. To my great concern my reply is ever the same: my self awareness is one kind of feeling and my every other emotion is another kind. Only my feeling my self observation, as such, can contribute to my appreciation for the power of my living being. To be sure, I consider my feeling of my self awareness to be my most comprehensive emotional experience, ever augmenting

my feeling of well being, ever providing order for my other passions. I must be my only lawmaker for my living. In Leviathan (1651) Thomas Hobbes recorded:

The desires and passions of man are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them; which till laws be made they cannot know, nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it.

Conscious self authority is the only possible source of self consciousness. It is founded upon conscious self love, the safe and sane power enforcing conscious self discipline. The way I live my emotion furnishes the pattern of my personality. My educating my self to conscious government in my passion is indispensable to my developing due appreciation in my every process of law and order. William James made the profound self observation: "In its inner nature, belief, or the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions than to anything else,"*

Needed most for my conscious self education (discipline) is my language of conscious self, my language of sanity, my idiolect. I find that I must translate nearly all that I read or hear from a language clearly and firmly established to enforce the meaning of illusional otherness to my own consciously self naming idiolect. Although the following historical sketches do illustrate this hysterical tendency in my so-called common English, nevertheless each author is selected on the basis of how much he could recognize and renounce his illusion of objectivity (otherness). Only the man who is conscious master of his language is free from unconscious enslavement to his prevailing power of authority that he has never recognized as wholly his own since his early living of his parent.

Ferdinand Brunot, French Professor and linguistic psychologist at the Sorbonne, repeatedly records his conviction about the power of language to function as a psychic straightjacket:

^{*}Principles of Psychology (New York: H. Holt & Co., 1890), II, 284.

"Incomprehensible abstractions, pretentious yet for the most part empty definitions, false rules, indigestible lists of forms, one has only to turn over a few pages of any text book to find variegated specimens of these sins against reason, truth and education."

As every philologist knows full well, Brunot's description also fits perfectly the built-in "otherness" illusions of the English language.

John Locke noticed, "Men content themselves with the same words as other people use, as if the very sound necessarily carried the same meaning,"

And John Stuart Mill minded the potential inadequacy of his wordage:

The tendency has always been strong to believe that whatever receives a name must be an entity or being, having an independent existence of its own: and if no real entity answering to the name could be found, men did not for that reason suppose that none existed, but imagined that it was something peculiarly abstruse and mysterious, too high to be an object of sense.

A brief history of Western man's inspiriting and consoling feeling for the wholeness of his existence is in order in a work devoted to the emotional nature of that indivisible being. Even ancient man considered mental distress to result from passionate violation of this moral principle, self reverence. Plato (428-348 B.C.) is regarded as the first to attempt a generalization of a law of pleasure and pain. He felt pleasure to be only the removal of pain, thus honoring oneness.

In "Parmenides" Plato points out the power of emotion to influence classification, thus subjecting observation, judgment, and reasoning to its own service. He has Parmenides—the advocate of Oneness of individuality—inviolable by the "transitory and variable appearances of the sensible world," comment: "You are still young Sokrates:—you still defer to the common sentiments of mankind. But the time will come when philosophy will take stronger hold of you, and will teach you that no object in nature is mean or contemptible in her view."

Plato notices how "the opinions of men" are the product of emotionally undisciplined mind, the consequence of "the associating influence of a common emotion." Thus a "large proportion of objects in nature come to be regarded as unworthy of any serious attention, and fit only to serve for discharging on them our laughter, contempt, or antipathy."* My truth is: I help my self with any one thought or feeling quite as much as I do with another thought or feeling.

In his *Philebus*, Plato's clarifying treatise on emotion, pleasure is observed to be an end. In his *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* Plato considers Goodness and Beauty attainable only under the excitement of Love, through agitation of mingled pleasure and

pain.

Greek medicine was an outgrowth of philosophy. Hippocrates (460-377 B.C.), called Father of Medicine, based his idea of reality upon individuality and observation. His appreciation of mood and emotion was profound. He proclaimed, "The physician is the servant of nature, and the patient must combat the disease as well as the physician." Facies Hippocratica, the agonal face of a dying man described in his Prognostics, remains today a recognizable sign of the emotion of the moribund patient.

The Aphorisms of Hippocrates, generally considered his most valuable productions, illustrate appreciation for emo-

tional power:

Life is short; art is long; opportunity fugitive; experience delusive; judgment difficult.

Neither fasting, nor fulness, nor any other excess, is advantageous.

They who are diseased in any part, and do not commonly experience pain, are diseased in mind.

Diseases produced by repletion, are cured by evacuation; and if by inanition, by repletion; and with respect to other diseases, by their opposites.

^{*}George Grote, Plato, Vol. III (London: John Murray, 1885).

In every disease to possess a sound mind, and to receive freely what is administered, are favorable omens; but the contrary unfavorable.

Of two pains existing at the same time, but not in the same place, the stronger obscures the other.

If fear and sorrow remain for a long period, they denote the approach of melancholy.

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) asserted pleasure to be the concomitant of the unimpeded energy of a natural power, faculty, or acquired habit. As philosopher Irwin Edman worded it, Aristotle's treatises amount to man's "first encyclopedia." Speaking of the young, Aristotle observes:

From their tendency to follow their emotions they will not study the subject (political science) to any purpose or profit, as its end is not knowledge but action. It makes no difference whether a person is young in years or youthful in character; for the defect of which I speak is not one of time but is due to the emotional character of his life and pursuits. Knowledge is as useless to such a person as it is to an intemperate person. . . the final good is self sufficiency, that which, taken by itself, makes life desirable, and wholly free from want, and this is our conception of happiness. . . the function of Man . . as an activity of soul . . . performed in accordance with its proper excellence . . in a complete life.*

Aristotle's Principle of Identity (or non-contradiction) constitutes the fundamental law of reality of self or individual: "The same thing cannot at once belong and not belong to the same object in the same respect." The identity of one (man or thing) with one's self is the necessary condition of its being.

Claudius Galen (130-200 A.D.), whose work in physiology and medicine remained the standard for more than a thousand years, depicted his physiology in his philosophical views, depending largely upon the ideas of his Aristotle and Hipporates. His united trinity serving and ruling the body he named

rational, irascible, and concupiscible (On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body). The rational provides sensation and motion, and presides over reason and thought; the irascible controls the passions and is the vital force; the third, also known as the vegetative soul, is in charge of nutrition. Galen asserted, "But if I had not devoted the whole of my life to cultivating both the medical and philosophical points of view, I should have done nothing much."

In the Platonic tradition Plotinus (204-270) found that the body is the soul's instrument and, in the Aristotelian tradition, that the soul is the body's form or act. He observed essential human nature, or self, is never a composite (body and soul) but ever a soul. His last words urged, "Strive to bring back the god in yourselves to the divine in the universe." This self conscious

genius discovered:

What soul could contain Evil unless by contact with the lower kind? There could be no desire, no sorrow, no rage, no fear: fear touches the compounded dreading its dissolution; pain and sorrow are the accompaniments of the dissolution; desires spring from something troubling the grouped being or are a provision against trouble threatened; all impression is the stroke of something unreasonable outside the Soul. . . . The Soul takes up false notions through having gone outside of its own truth by ceasing to be purely itself.

His description of the consciously whole man as a Proficient, a Master in Dialect, is a beautiful account of insightful man "presenting all things as Universals and stripped of matter for treatment of the Understanding."

Plotinus' definition of Happiness is so biologically sound, I quote extensively from the Fourth Tractate of the first

Ennead.*

What then is happiness? Let us try basing it upon Life. . . . If mere Being is insufficient, if happiness demands fulness of life, and exists, therefore, where nothing is lacking of all that belongs to the idea of life, then happiness can exist only in a being that lives fully. And

^{*}Trans. Stephen MacKenna (New York: Pantheon Books, Inc.).

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^{*}The Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, Works, Vol. VIII, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908).

ness harmonious with the real greatness and wholeness of his individuality. One's search for truth is immeasurably advanced by realizing where to look for it, where only it can be found, namely in one's own living of it.

John Scotus Erigena (ca. 800-891) united true philosophy and true religion. He claimed that "we cannot know what things are in themselves, but only what they appear to us to be. . . . reason, supported by its own intrinsic force needs no confirmation from authority. . . . through the senses we arrive at intelligence. . . ." Scotus' work Division of Nature contains his feeling about mentality. It is based upon his interpretation of Plotinus, especially upon principles of ontology.

Roscellinus (ca. 1089) based his metaphysics upon individual perceptions of the individual mind. He claimed all general ideas (such as humanity, beauty, goodness, life) to be nothing but simple abstractions of the given mind, having no positive existence independent of it.

St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) composed a treatise, the Grammarian, recording a rational view of all ratiocination.

He enjoyed profound conscious introspection.

Peter Abelard (1079-1142) in Introduction to Theology reported his pupils' demands for "some philosophical arguments. . . . fit to satisfy their minds. . . . for no one can believe that which he cannot comprehend." He cultivated the science of his mind, consciously observing the irrelevance of one thing for another.

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) found his study of Aristotle to be self helpful, conceiving soul to be the "principle" of body's life. He used his mind for the conscious search for truth, for experiencing final good in which human feeling finds happi-

ness:

Evil is nothing else than a privation of that which a thing is naturally apt to have and ought to have. But a privation is not an essence, but a negation in a substance. . . . Everything most of all desires its own last end. But the human mind is moved to more desire and love and delight over the knowledge of divine things, little as it can discern about them, than over the perfect knowledge such a one will possess not merely the good, but the Supreme Good. (The Good, as a Divine Hypostasis). . . The Proficient lives within. . . . is present to himself: his pleasure, his contentment, stands, immovable. Thus he is ever cheerful. . . In the Proficient there is The Self-Gathered which, as long as it holds itself by main force within itself, can never be robbed of the vision of the All-Good. . . To put Happiness in actions is to put it in things that are outside virtue and outside the Soul; for the Soul's expression is not in action but in wisdom, in a contemplative operation within itself; and this, this alone, is happiness.

St. Augustine (354-430), convert to Christianity, found helpful the *Enneads* of Plotinus. His identification of the good life with the divine nature of self development, begins with the soul's certainty of itself and culminates ultimately with perfect knowing and perfect felicity:

When the mind has been imbued with the first elements of faith which worketh by love, it endeavors by purity of life to attain unto sight, where the pure and perfect in heart know that unspeakable beauty, the full vision of which is supreme happiness. . . And in the universe, even that which is called evil, when it is regulated and put in its own place, only enhances our admiration of the good. . . . Just in the same way, what are called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good. . . . Wherefore corruption can consume the good only by consuming the being.

And how much human nature loves the knowledge of its existence, and how it shrinks from being deceived, will be sufficiently understood from this fact, that every man prefers to grieve in a sane mind, rather than to be glad in madness. . . in men who are justly loved, it is rather love itself that is loved; for he is not justly called a good man who knows what is good, but who loves it. . . . we love in ourselves the very love wherewith we love whatever good we love.

The scholastic metaphysician's contribution to his self understanding was particularly great on account of his consciously directing his devotion to his subjectivity. This same conscious self orientation enabled his cultivating helpful mind conscious-

^{*}Enchiridion and City of God, respectively,

lar school of thought or a conscious radical individualist minding his own private, personal world of his own creating.

Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) wrote sublimely of his nature. He is considered the supreme example of integral Christian humanism.

God is one. . . . all things come from God; they all participate . . . in the divine nature MAN is the most eminent. Upon him God has bestowed more of his own nature than upon any other creature. . . . God has made nothing in vain; and if there exists a collective of men, it is because there is one aim for them all, and one work to be accomplished by them all. . . . Mankind must be one, even as God is one.

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) divided the mind into Memory, Imagination, and Reason, calling Reason "the first creature of God." He maintained that his fellowman has no strong innate desire for the exercise of reason. His treatise On the Advancement of Learning contained an outline of all science then known. His ingenious Novum Organum, the labor of thirty years, aimed at trying "whether I can get help in one intended part of this work, namely, the compiling of a Natural and Experimental History, which must be the foundation of a true and active philosophy." He referred to his "inductive method" of depending only upon all facts for any understanding. Such "inductive method" was, and continues to be, directed by the scientist towards understanding "physical science," rather than consciously feeling his own mind.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in his Elements in Philosophy explained human nature in terms of its passion: appetites and aversions. His understanding of emotion was functional:

Appetite and aversion are simply so called as long as they follow not deliberation. But if deliberation have gone before, then the last act of it, if it be appetite, is called will; if aversion, unwillingness, . . For the same deliberation, whilst it inclines sometimes to one, sometimes to the other, is from appetite called hope, and from aversometimes to the other, is from appetite called hope, and from aversion, fear. For where there is no hope, it is not to be called fear, but hate; and where no fear, not hope, but desire. To conclude, all the

that it has of the lowest things. . . . There is a natural desire in all men of knowing the causes of the things that they can see. . . But the first cause is God; and the last end of man, and of every subsistent intelligence, is called blessedness or happiness. . . . Happiness is the perfect activity of the human intellect. . . . The best rule in any government is to provide for everything under government according to the mode of its nature: just administration consists in this. . . The good of the whole takes precedence of the good of the part. . . The last end of every creature is to attain to a likeness of God: Therefore it would be contrary to providence to withdraw from a creature that whereby it attains to divine likeness. But a voluntary agent attains the divine likeness by acting freely, as it has been shown that there is free will in God.*

For five hundred years each scholastic philosopher or divine furthered mind appreciation and sought freedom of intellectual discussion as best he could.

Duns Scotus (ca. 1265-1308), the subtile doctor, observed that immutable science must rest upon real and absolute ideas,—and not upon the "external world."

Jean Charlier de Gerson (ca. 1363-1429) called attention to the error of the Realist in trying to establish metaphysics upon the nature of the existent apart from the mind; and to the error of the Nominalist in establishing verbal distinctions of little or no substantial truth. Gerson discovered mystic theology to be more substantial than the speculative theological teaching of the Schoolman, the former accomplishing all that the latter continually intends. In a specific sense Gerson's conscious subjectivity seems identical with mine, namely, his basing his science, not upon popular "physical" experiment or argumentative experience, but upon private personal, individual living, upon the inward feelings and emotions which the scientist of his mind (or soul) creates,-his other so-called dispassionate, impersonal science proving to be exercise in life depreciation. A student might become scholastic easily and safely, solipsistic only difficultly and dangerously.

Under other names, however, as might be expected each scientist today continues to consider his self a joiner of a popu-

^{*}Summa Contra Gentiles

is not idea mentis except in so far as it is idea affectionum corporis.

What I live with pleasure I strive for and that willingness is called love, joy, desire, or pleasure; what I live with unpleasure that unwillingness is called hate, fear, grief, or some other unhappiness.

Spinoza finds the source of eternal happiness to be in under-

standing of the necessities of living.

John Locke, M.D. (1632-1704) perceived that it is the nature of man to pursue happiness, and he prescribed piety as a hold upon the passions. Political philosophy similar to his was appreciated by Thomas Jefferson in the latter's authoring of the Declaration of Independence. As an authority on all questions of psychology and theory of knowledge, despite the remnants of dualism in his concepts of sensory experience, his views remained practically unchallenged throughout the first half of the eighteenth century. "Reflection" is a term for the mind's knowledge of its own activities, and many a philosopher following Locke succeeded in seeing no distinction between sensation and reflection, as far as sensation's being purely a mental event is concerned.

George Berkeley (1685-1753) identified his absolute idealism in his profound formula, esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived). The perceiver is the creator of his perception, his reality being the product of his mind. This pure solipsism fully honors the wholeness, allness and oneness of human individuality. However, its comprehensiveness requires the greatest conscious self tolerance, and hence is rarely advocated as being the whole truth of human nature. My mind's capacity for conscious self responsibility varies directly with my conscious realization that it is all and only mine. Only solipsistic mental orientation can duly observe its real subjectivity. Bishop Berkeley worked up this life view esteeming the truth of his inviolable individuality by the time he was twenty-three years of age:

The perceiving being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. . . . I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and passions, called passions of the mind, consist of appetite and aversion, except pure pleasure and pain, which are a certain fruition of good or evil; as anger is aversion from some imminent evil, but such as is joined with appetite of avoiding that evil by force.

René Descartes (1596-1650), through his self examination, heeded that his own mind contained its own principles of truth, certainty, reality. For controlling his living, his endeavor recorded in his Discourse On Method (1637) was

always to conquer myself rather than fortune, and change my desires rather than the order of the world, and in general, accustom myself to the persuasion that, except in our own thoughts, there is nothing absolutely in our power; . . . and this single principle seemed to me sufficient to prevent me from desiring for the future anything which I could not obtain, and thus rendered me contented; . . and thus making, so to speak, a virtue of necessity, we shall no more desire health in disease, or freedom in imprisonment, than we now do bodies incorruptible as diamonds, or the wings of birds to fly with. But I confess there is need of prolonged discipline and frequently repeated meditation to accustom the mind to view all objects in this light; and I believe that in this chiefly consisted the secret of the power of such philosophers as in former times were enabled to rise superior to the influence of fortune, and, amid suffering and poverty, enjoy a happiness which their gods might have envied. . . . over their thoughts they acquired a sway so absolute, that they had some ground on this account for esteeming themselves more rich and powerful, more free and more happy than other men who . . . can never command the realization of all their desires,

Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza (1632–1677), an independent feeler of rare wisdom, honors wholeness in his definition of his fundamental notion substance, thus, "By substance I understand that which exists in itself, and is conceived by itself, i.e., that which does not need the conception of any other thing in order to be conceived." In his Ethics he states: "By pleasure I . . . understand an affection whereby the mind passes to a greater perfection; and by pain an affection whereby it passes to a lesser perfection."

Spinoza observes the *identity* of the mind and its so-called "body image," asserting that the mind does not know itself, it

imagination and feeling from the weak role ascribed to them by the objective scientist: "Feeling no longer needs to justify itself before the tribunal of reason; on the contrary, reason is summoned before the forum of sensation. . . The individual subject can of course never presume to be a judge of things, but he is the only possible and the only qualified judge of his own states of being."*

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) credited his David Hume with awakening him from his dogmatic slumber wherein he indulged the orthodox view of "cause" and "objectivity." He "separated" reason from passion, antithesis characterizing the view of his contemporaries. In Critique of Pure Reason (1781) he described his mind's effort to impose its own laws upon its "external" natural world. A consciously great scholar, Kant observed sensation to be subjective, and held all of an individual's experience to be the activity of his own organic nature.

Kant sagely renounced Descartes' implication of a twofold consciousness, one for self and one for objects of the world (thus distinguishing a separation of subject and object). However Kant's doctrine that there are affections of one's sense in relation to which one is purely receptive, again introduces the illusion of a measure of one's reality other than one's own subjectivity.

Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) enjoyed his living, thus, "Nature intended me for the tranquil pursuits of [knowledge], by rendering them my supreme delight," but, "the enormities of the times in which I have lived have forced me to commit my self on the boisterous ocean of political passions." However he asserted, "Peace is my passion."

Jefferson translated his emotional tolerance into insightful literature, including his American Declaration Of Indepen-

dence. Historian Bernard Mayo states:

His voluminous writings reflect the Enlightenment in his passion for universal knowledge, for scientific experimentation, for cultivation

 ^{*}The Philosophy Of The Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951).

straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another. . . . But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence of my will.*

Berkeley's friend Samuel Johnson, first president of King's College, New York, "incorporated Berkeley's idealism into his text book, *Elementa Philosophica* (1752), published by Benjamin Franklin—the first American text book of philosophy."**

Julien Lamettrie, or La Mettrie (1709-1751), asserted that all the actions of the human being can be explained mechanistically. Fifty years later physician Peter J. G. Cabanis (1757-1808) upheld the same idea, describing the mind as a function of the brain. He advanced the so-called physiological method of psychology.

Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) insisted on the essential role of emotions in human experience, in man's true self. He considered the educator's role to be that of preserving his inherent right of individuality.

Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780), Abbé of Mureaux, reduced all mental operation to sensation. An ideal-

ist, he posited soul as the bare capacity for sensation.

David Hume (1711-1776) conceived of the individual self essentially as a stream or drift of mentality without permanent identity. He asserted that one's sense of duty always follows the common and natural course of his passion. He took a strong position against placing too much faith in the power of reason, quoting Cicero, "All men are capable of judging by the help of an inward sense, tho' unacquainted with rules, whether the productions of art are good or bad." After separating aesthetic taste from the logical process he advanced to upholding the power of sentiment to reveal the true nature of self experience. As insightful Ernst Cassirer points out, Hume rescued

^{*}Of The Principles of Human Knowledge, Part First, 2, 28, 29.

^{**}Irwin Edman and Herbert W. Schneider, Landmarks In Philosophy (New York; Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941), p. 2.

ested in just how I am ever able to take such notice, and ask my self just what process enables my unconscious mental functioning to appear as if it might be conscious. I imagine in the beginning of my mental development I am unable to experience any of my unconscious living as if it is observable (can be felt). All of my mentality is as inaccessible to my awareness at first as is now any other of my organic functioning such as my digestion, or metabolism or growth or biochemical development, and so on. How and why does it happen then that certain biological functioning of my organic unconscious mind includes a special process named consciousness which has the power of somehow seeming to be other than its power of perceiving, quite as my perception seems able to represent experience other than what it is itself. The closest analogy attempting to explicate this seeming magic is reflection provided by a mirror.

In all of this psychological approach to the understanding of emotional functioning there can be found the immeasurable advantage of the absolute necessity to restrict every consideration to its meaning for the given individual. Any other extension of psychological technique fits Henry Thoreau's terse description of the technology of his day: improved means to an

unimproved end.

George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) defined self consciousness as: reflection of the mind on itself: "Two things must be distinguished in consciousness; first, the fact that I know, secondly, what I know. In self consciousness these are merged into one; for Spirit knows itself." Of passion he wrote in The Philosophy of History: "We may affirm absolutely that nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion." However, Hegel "separated" the "Idea" and "passion," considering that passion is in the first instance the subjective, and therefore the formal side of energy, will, and activity-leaving the object or aim still undetermined."

Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795-1878), Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887) and Herman von Helmholtz (1821-1894) studied sensation "scientifically" (that is, "objectively") developing the discipline called psychophysics.

William Hamilton (1788-1856) was Professor of Logic and

of the arts, for all the multitudinous aspects of human relations. They have been called the richest treasure-house of information ever written by a single man. . . . He fully, and passionately subscribed to the view that what happens to American education will eventually happen to the American nation.*

Failing to win approval for his plans for eliminating "slavery" of his "suffering brethren" Jefferson foresaw the dire consequences, warning, "human nature must shudder at the prospect."

Antoine Claude Destutt, Comte de Tracy (1754-1836), self responsible French philosopher and economist, invented the term "ideology" in the course of his study of the psychology of man. His ideology was frankly biological: to think is to feel. He considered sensation to be the basis of mental life, accounting for perception, memory, judgment and will. He identified will with the feeling of desire, therefore a variety of sensation. His reverence for the individuality of the individual was profound, thus extending "humaneness" to its proper meaning as all that the human individual can experience, or sense. He invented a general grammar based on insight,-thus, by "ego" he meant "the feeling of effort associated with the activity of will." He regarded happiness as the product of "the free exercise of the faculties, in the feeling of force and ease with which one puts them into action."** Thomas Jefferson esteemed his de Tracy most highly for this devotion to conscious self realization.

Certainly this psychic orientation, that nothing is knowable about the existent unconscious mind apart from its activity that is made knowable by the activation of its function of awareness, makes an entirely new set of demands upon every student of human nature.

To illustrate, instead of taking for granted, or assuming as "given," any of my activity that I can observe, I am now inter-

** Destutt de Tracy, A Treatise in Political Economy, trans. Thomas Jefferson (Georgetown, D.C.: Published by Joseph Milligan, 1817).

^{*}John M. Dorsey (ed.), The Growth of Self Insight (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1960), p. 7.

power." He quotes Kant at length:

There is no permanent pleasure to be reaped except in labour alone. The pleasure of toil consists in a reaction against the pain to which we should be a victim, did we not exert a force to resist it... Were our joys permanent, we should never leave the state in which we are, we should never undertake aught new. That life we may call happy, which is furnished with all the means by which pain can be overwhich is furnished with all the means by which pain can be overcome, we have in fact no other conception of human happiness. Contentment is when a man thinks of continuing in the state in which he is, and renounces all means of pleasure; but this disposition we find in no man.

Whatever a human individual is, is thereby being expressed. It is man's inherent wisdom, will, and pleasure to employ the forces of his nature. His unhappiness derives from his living in any way that ignores or withstands the freedom of his wholeness. Just as Ralph Waldo Emerson felt: "If he is sick, unable, is mean-spirited and odious, it is because there is so much of his nature which is unlawfully withholden from him."

Hamilton's Discussions on Philosophy and Literature* is replete with insightful observations honoring the meaning of wholeness and emotion:

For truth is one; and the end of philosophy is the intuition of unity.

Consciousness is to the philosopher, what the bible is to the theologian.

To create, is not to make something out of nothing, for that is contradictory, but to originate from self.

Aristotle, Descartes, Locke and philosophers in general have regarded Consciousness, not as a particular faculty, but as the universal condition of intelligence.

The formula I know that I know adequately expresses consciousness.

^{*(}New York: Harper and Brothers, 1868).

Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh from 1836 to 1856. A conscious self practitioner of philosophic genius, he compared consciousness "to an internal light, by means of which and which alone, what passes in the mind is rendered visible." He defined consciousness as the recognition by the subject of its own acts, or affections. He saw mental modifications, as did Kant, in three great categories: Knowledge, Feeling (pleasure and pain), and Will (also, Desire).

Hamilton pointed out:

Prior to Descartes, there was no psychological term in recognized use for what, since his time, is expressed in Philosophical Latinity by conscientia, in English by consciousness. . . Plato and Aristotle, to say nothing of other philosophers, had no special term to express the knowledge which the mind affords of the operations of its faculties, though this, of course, was necessarily a frequent matter of their consideration.*

This great self observer insightfully selected three principal facts to be heeded with consciousness, each one revealing the wholeness of wholeness: 1) Self Existence, 2) Individuality or Mental Unity, and 3) Personal Identity. He describes the conscious mind as being at once the observing subject and the object observed.

Hamilton divided emotion into two classes: "the Higher and the Lower,—the Mental and the Corporeal,—in a word, Sentiments and Sensations." He distinctified feeling as being "nothing but what is subjectively subjective, there is no object different from self,—no objectification of any mode of self."

Hamilton selected the Aristotelian explanation: through the exerting of his powers, man is subject to pleasure or pain, "Pleasure is a reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power, of whose energy we are conscious. Pain, a reflex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a

^{*}Lectures on Metaphysics, Edinburgh, 1858. Hamilton's profound and fundamental views were hailed as creating "a new era in mental science." Sigmund Freud was born on the day Hamilton died, May 6, 1856.

Francois Delsarte (1811-1871) insightfully applied aesthetics, coordinating feeling in body movements with the spoken or sung word.

Claude Bernard (1813–1878), French physiologist, practiced his comprehensive view of the wholeness of the individual. He asserted, "What we call the normal state is a purely mental conception, a typical ideal form artificially distinguished from a thousand divergences betwixt which floats incessantly the organism in the midst of its alternating and intermitting functions." He hoped "some day the time will come when the physiologist, the philosopher and the poet will talk the same language and understand each other." He considered conscious emotional control to be basic for his scientific orientation.

Søren Aaby Kierkegaard (1813-1855), Danish theologian and philosopher, devoted the last years of his short but shining career to the development of his self insight, discovering and appreciating his divinity wholly in his self orientation. He believed human living to be entirely a private matter of the individual soul. Of his emotionality he wrote:

Faith is the highest passion . . . spirit is inwardness, inwardness is subjectivity, subjectivity is essentially passion . . .

Passion is subjectivity, and does not exist objectively.

Love is a determination of subjectivity, and yet real lovers are very rare.

Passion is the culmination of existence for an existing individual—and we are all of us existing individuals.

The infinite passion of inwardness.

The understanding of passion constitutes the true inward relationship to God.*

Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), founded the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig, in 1879. He claimed that a feeling can be

^{*}Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), pp. 33, 118, 176, 179.

Memory is an act of knowledge existing only as present (not "past"), hence a variety of consciousness.

Different sentiments (sensations) are different modifications of the mind

The mind, or soul, that perceives, is one immaterial indivisible existent.

Without the intervention of feeling, the cognition stands divorced from the conation, and, apart from feeling, all conscious endeavor would be altogether incomprehensible.

If the nature and influence of the feelings be misunderstood, the problems most important for man are reduced to insoluble riddles.

Eminently deserving works on the wholeness of individuality are not "ushered into the world" with those adventitious recommendations which might secure their intrinsic merit against neglect. [my italics].

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) considered his reality to consist primarily of will, the tension of desire, hunger, lust, immediately living urgency for fulfillment or frustration. In The World as Will and Idea (1819), he insightfully describes how will alone gives man the key to his own existence:

Thus between desiring and attaining all human life flows on throughout. The wish is, in its nature, pain; the attainment soon begets satiety: the end was only apparent; possession takes away the charm; the wish, the need, presents itself under a new form; when it does not, then follows desolateness, emptiness, ennui, against which the conflict is just as painful as against want. That wish and satisfaction should follow each other neither too quickly nor too slowly reduces the suffering, which both occasion to the smallest amount, and constitutes the happiest life. . . . Excessive joy and very often keen suffering always occur in the same person, for they condition each other reciprocally, and are also in common conditioned by great activity of the mind. . . . Consequently we might avoid them both if we had sufficient control over ourselves to survey things always with perfect clearness as a whole and in their connection, and steadfastly to guard against really lending them the colours which we wish they had [my italics].

vation of the physical world" and self observation as fundamentally the same. He considered G. T. Fechner (1801-1887) to be "the originator, the creator of psychophysics." Titchener was aware of the emotional process as being the most intricate, confused and controversial field in his discipline of psychology. He observed the affective process as reducible to pleasant or unpleasant feeling only, objecting to the James-Lange theory which accounted for emotion without recognizing this specific separate affective element.

The difficulty in defining emotion was thus described by M. F. Meyer, "The Whale has a twofold distinction among the fishes: first, when seen from a distance, it looms large among them; and second, on close examination, it is found to be no fish at all."*

Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) based his psychology on his metaphysics. He claimed, "The soul is a simple substance, not only without parts, but with no plurality whatever in its quality." His psychology consisted only and entirely in elaborating the "facts of internal perception.** He asserted that feeling (affection, desire, passion, or emotion of any kind) does not constitute a separate category opposed to ideas.

Rudolph Hermann Lotze, M.D. (1817-1881) published his Medical Psychology in 1852, "a psychology of the soul." He felt that the ideal psychology would consist in its becoming pure ontology. He assigned great importance to the individual's

unconscious mind.

Theodule Armand Ribot (1839-1916) tried to view mental life in the light of the new physiological psychology.*** I note his extraordinarily great appreciation for the unific power of omnific consciousness. "Feeling, in its most general sense, is the basis of psychic life." "Too much reasoning: this is the impression that the old psychology makes upon the disciples of the new." "Psychology is connected again with the laws of life

^{*}See "That Whale among the Fishes—the Theory of Emotions," Psychol. Rev., XL (1933), 292-300.

^{**}Psychology als Wissenschaft (Hartenstein, 1825).

^{***} Psychology of the Emotions (London: W. Scott, Ltd., 1897).

localized somewhere within the tridimensional system bounded by the extremes of pleasantness and unpleasantness, excitement and quiescence, or strain and relaxation. The mind-consciousness of this great scientist deserves careful consideration. He asserts "the oneness of composition in all mental phenomena":

The attempt sometimes made, to distinguish psychology proper from the physiological psychology, by assigning to the first the psychological interpretation of inner experience, and to the second the derivation of this experience from physiological processes, is to be rejected as inadmissible. There is only one kind of causal explanation in psychology, and that is the derivation of more complex psychical processes from simpler ones. . . The full-grown science tends to unity. And observation itself necessarily conducts to unity in psychology. But the agent of this unity is outside of consciousness, which knows only the results of the work done in the unknown laboratory beneath it. . . Ultimate analysis of psychical processes shows that the unconscious is the theatre of the most important mental phenomena. The conscious is always conditioned upon the unconscious . . .*

Wundt asserted early that in every feeling, in every emotion, there is an instinctive cognition. Feeling rests unconsciously upon the processes that constitute cognition in consciousness. He observed, if the individual appeals to his consciousness only, he discovers little. One needs to know by what unconscious processes his full-grown consciousness was formed, in order to be able to deduce the motives of his action.

Along with a number of American psychologists who studied in Wundt's Leipzig laboratory (devoted to the "new physiological psychology") was the Englishman, Edward Bradford Titchener (1867–1927). He brought to Cornell University his mind consciousness and devotion to the whole individual, cultivating an experimental psychology pure of metaphysics and common sense. Like Wundt, however, he was interested in "the generalized human mind," rather than in his own particular individual mind. Nevertheless his specific method of work, an important concern with him, was introspection, and he regarded "obser-

Outlines of Psychology, 3d rev. English ed. (Leipzig, 1907).

In Introduction to Psychological Theory (1887) Borden P. Bowne (1847-1910) could record:

The doctrine of the feelings is the most confused part of psychology, and has been least developed. . . . Nothing is so real as feeling, nothing is so hard to define. . . The perception of the quality is the accompanying state of the sensibility. These are the two elements which, under the names of perception and sensation, Hamilton declared to vary inversely each as the other. . . We might then define feeling as the state of consciousness which consists in some form of pleasure or pain.

In 1894 James Rowland Angell (1869-1949) and John Dewey (1859-1952) came to the University of Chicago where each one worked on the study of the mind from the standpoint of its individual biological functioning. Each devoted his attention to mental activity as being a process, an operation, a biologically useful event. Dewey's "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" (1896), marked the beginning of "functionalism" as a definite "movement."

In England, James Ward (1843-1925), in his famous Encyclopedia Britannica article "Psychology," emphasized the activity of the self, or subject. G. F. Stout (1860-1944) supported a Kantian view, proposing three ultimate models of being consciously active: cognition, affection, and conation.

In 1901 Salvarona (Henry Guy Walters) published *The Wisdom of Passion*, or, *The Motives of Human Nature*,* which he described as "an entirely new view of the Human Passions." This richly imaginative work reflects great intuition and erudition. It presents a unitary monistic concept of emotionality as being the subjective possession of the individual, hence most worthy of being studied from this viewpoint of its wholeness and unity. Understandably the author's unfailing reverence for human individuality combined with imagination that allowed him to consider so-called abnormal views of spirit, met with tremendous resistance in his world, but being wise to

^{*(}Boston: Mystic River Book Co., 1901).

and with its mechanism. This does not, as is unreasonably said, give psychology over to physiology. . . . Between the science of the phenomena of consciousness and physiology there is the same relation as between the latter and the physico-chemical sciences."

Ribot refers to Horwitz' book Psychological Analysis Upon Physiological Bases (1st part, Halle, 1872; 2nd part, Magdeburg and Halle, 1875 and 1878). Horwitz employed the physiological method, and he assigned to feeling the leading role in psychic life: "feeling is psychic activity in its simplest, most elementary, and most general form, and this activity is point of departure for all other psychic processes." "The essence of feeling is self-conservation. . The idea, accompanied by a feeling, is changed into a desire corresponding to this feeling; otherwise, nothing takes place."

Ribot also refers to naturalist G. H. Schneider's describing feeling as the basis of psychic life, and the origin of feeling as rooted in animal life. Schneider saw that pain as well as pleasure is of positive value. The whole question is to know how each functions.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1849–1900) regarded the individual's triumphing "will for power" as the motivation in human evolution.* He personified this passionate self force as Dionysian and considered it to be opposed by the Apollonian striving for balance, measure, tolerance, endurance, harmony. His "Yessayer" lives all of life affirmingly. He attributes divinity to "evil" because only by means of enduring such blessing-indisguise can one develop the strength to cope evenly with most extreme suffering. By becoming strong the vital individual cultivates his greatest social value. A poet with a reformer's bent, this brilliantly conscious individualist found behind logic and reasoning "physiological demands for the maintenance of a definite mode of life." He considered all philosophizing to be a sort of "involuntary and unconscious autobiography."

Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883–1884); Beyond Good and Evil (1887); The Twilight of the Gods (1888).

the stronger the conviction. As Sigmund Freud felt this truth, "What is alone of value in mental life is rather the feelings. No mental forces are significant unless they possess the characteristic of aroused feelings."

Sanely I must realize that whatever I believe cannot create either belief or disbelief in my reader. Hume's taunt at his Berkeley, that the latter's philosophy admits of no refutation and produces no conviction, merely remarks the obvious truth of the absolute oneness of the individual mind. As an insightful student of my mind I must conceive it, my every idealist must, as an absolute self presenting whole untainted with any possible objectivity.

Salvarona calls attention to the utterances of one great man after another (Plato, Jesus, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, Emerson, Darwin, and so on) as indicating the law of emotion to be the law of life. He asserts, "From birth to death my identity changes from a gluttonous infant to a coward, or a rake, a saint, or a philosopher, to the extent that my Passions of Wonder, Fear, Sex, Hunger, or Moral Adoration become (at the times of the change) the governing Passions of my existence. Change of Passion is change of identity." His masterful use of irony in exposing the absurd in any claim for a so-called non-psychological physiology deserves the toleration of every mind-conscious reader.

Seeking historical accounts of previous efforts to evaluate the systematic helpfulness of all affectivity, I encountered a most remarkable book, The Science of Emotions by Bhagavan Das.* It is written with the insight that conscious self knowledge is:

the only solvent of political as well as all other problems that were humanity. It is the only stable foundation for "Self-government" in social and political life. Indeed that is why it began to be reproclaimed under the name of Theo-sophy, "Divine Wisdom," in new words, in 1875, when the Theosophical Society was founded in New York.

(4th ed., Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1953), pp. 13-15n.

his self he expected that, for he recognized his fellowman's dependence upon indulgence of his illusion of the collective force of society. He respected the power of his illusion of "fellowship" to dim his truth of his whole oneness, but he also recognized the danger inherent in indulging illusional helpfulness. He recognized that every apparent success of man's impersonal society or organization, one's every so-called objective victory over nature, occurs at the cost of one's biologically adequate appreciation for the wholeness of his subjective human individuality.

To illustrate, of American political party passions Salvarona courageously asserted, "in all these 'union' meetings the American idea of the individual as an end, rather than as a means (to be used to advance the special ideas of 'our people') is covertly suppressed. 'Our people's' glory: not the welfare of the individual independent of 'our people' is the ruling motive."

Such original daring appearing throughout his inspired writing, did not pass entirely unheeded or repudiated. Of it, William James wrote, February 25, 1903:

The extraordinary merits of "The Wisdom of Passion" are the copiousness of human insight and content in the way of fact and reference with which the book is crammed. It is the essence of the "voluntaristic" psychology (which I believe in) to put Passion and Desire at the basis of the MENTAL operations. Its main thesis I agree with. If one takes the book sympathetically, without cross-hackling about this statement or that, I don't see how one can help feeling the vast amount of human nature that comes to life in it; the unusual sympathy and insight as well as elevation of Soul and Character of which the author makes proof.

Belief is the basis of man's concept of reality itself. My ruling passion governs my view of my experience. Salvarona brings out the fact that emotion is responsible for belief, "only when ideas 'bite' us spiritually and morally do we believe. There can be no spiritual rational feeling in religion or philosophy without a unity of spiritual rational passions and their permanent basis." The true test of belief is ultimately its meaning derived from strength of feeling. The greater the passion,

Dr. Charcot's Lectures on the Disorders of the Nervous System (1873) is commonly regarded as his most important work.

I now record the radical individualism of four scholars of selfhood, each one responsible for the outstanding representation of conscious individuality as recorded in the justly renowned Journal of Speculative Philosophy (1867–1893), the first journal of philosophy to appear in America. As these scholars had created valuable literature which could not secure space in eastern periodicals, W. T. Harris mobilized his executive interest to assert vehemently: "Now I am going to start a journal myself." This organ became a record of the St. Louis School of Philosophy, specifically oriented to the nature and needs of the individual citizen. Deliberate "colonization" of the movement occurred in several cities (Chicago, Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Denver) and many small communities.*

Henry Conrad Brokmeyer (1826-1906) reveals independence, originality, conscious self feeling and imagination in his

"Letters on Faust," thus:

. . . if reason, with its mediation, is impotent to create an object for this aspiration (to know truth), let us see what emotion and imagination, without mediation, can do for subjective satisfaction. . . And here all is glory, all is freedom! The imagination seizes the totality of the universe, and revels in ecstatic visions. What a speciacle! . . How am I to know, to comprehend the fountain of life, the center of which articulates this totality? . . . See here another generalization: the practical world as a whole! . . .**

Eloquent speech seems to have been Brokmeyer's most effective method of describing his energetic, consciously self oriented mind. He is credited with originating the St. Louis Philo-

^{*}See Denton J. Snyder, The St. Louis Movement in Philosophy, Literature, Education, Psychology, With Chapters of Autobiography, St. Louis, 1920; Harvey Gates Townsend, Philosophical Ideas in the United States, (New York: American Book Co., pp. 116–130.

^{**}The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 1:1 (1867). Brokmeyer is considered the "moving spirit" in forming the Missouri constitution. He was Lieutenant Governor, Acting Governor of Missouri (1876-1877), and frequently a political manager.

"The very term 'theosophy' has been one to arouse my active disinterest on the basis that it seems to smack of spirituality," I hear my scientific colleague properly object. "Properly" for he is not ready to conceive his "science" as a method for studying whatever subject his mind is capable of creating. "Properly" for he is not ready to understand scientific method as requiring his real control of, rather than seeming control by, his emotion of scorn, or contempt, or fear, or whatever passion he may be needing to dispose of his unreadiness to see nothing but his very own identity in his rejected "spirituality," or whatever.

Ingenious (self conscious) Bhagavan Das affirms the observation of William James that all of the writings on the subject of emotions he came across amounted only to

tiresome lists and descriptions. . . . without any luminous or generative principle. . . . It has been said that "emotions are suppressed or condensed motions," that fear is an unfled flight (Lay, The Child's Unconscious Mind, 1919). But we may more truly say that a flight is a fled-out fear, and a fight is a fought-out anger.

Jean Martin Charcot, (1825-1893), French physician, pioneer in psychopathology, and particularly noted for his experiments in hypnosis, made a discovery of the greatest meaning for the comprehensive understanding of the intact wholeness of human individuality. However, I estimate that it will be many a year before the full significance of this discovery will be adequately appreciated by the academic educator, medical or otherwise. Dr. Charcot's astute clinical findings enabled him to establish scientific validity of, and appreciation for, force of mind. He unified the perplexing "functional" and "organic" duality in his insightful integration: the organicity of the idea. Through his recognition of the organic nature of every mental event he dispelled the illusional "duality" created by each such schism as "mind and body," "nervous and mental," "psychic and somatic," "psychogenic and neurogenic," etc., etc. His pupil, Sigmund Freud, appreciated the importance of this unification.

bounding that helps me to lose awareness of my actual marvel-

ous identity.

My heartfelt associations to this startlingly comprehensive grammar are: 1) How very little grammar has altered since its inception, 2) How effectively it is constructed to "divide and conquer" the illimitable power of mind, 3) How rarely the enormous restrictions of its systematizing force have been distinctified, and 4) How urgent is the need for the development of conscious mental organization, including an idiolect featuring conscious self love.

William T. Harris (1835-1909) rendered great service as editor of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy in the pages of which William James, John Dewey, Josiah Royce, Charles S. Pierce, and many another American and European philosopher recorded his views. Studying my annual volumes of the Journal

proves an inspiring self discipline in subjectivity.

In 1880 Harris identified his self with the renowned, however shortlived, Concord School of Philosophy (1880-1887). He next became the justly famed United States Commissioner of

Education, for seventeen years.

Harris gave his attention to the importance of the "negative," observing Plato's exposé of oppositeness in the Parmenides and Sophist, adding, "Spinoza's 'omnis determinatio est negatio' is the most famous of modern statements respecting the negative, and has been very fruitful in results." He observantly asserts:

[if positive and negative are] two independent somewhats over against each other, having equal validity, then all unity of system is absolutely impossible. . . . The Speculative has insight into the constitution of the positive out of the negative. "That which has the form of being is the self related" says Hegel. . . . The "Palingenesis" of the intellect is as essential as the "regeneration of the heart," and is at bottom the same thing, as the mystics teach us. . . . Identity and distinction are produced by the self same process, and thus self-determination is the origin of all identity and distinction likewise.*

^{*&}quot;The Speculative," Journal of Speculative Philosophy, I:1 (1867), 4-5.

sophical Society and *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. At age 17 he had fled Germany to seek freedom, always demonstrating passionate interest in the origin of political institutions. Hegel was his bible.

Thomas Davidson (1840–1900), radical individualist of scholarly genius, was able to speak his mind competently in several languages. His appreciation for grammar as a psychological system reflected his appreciation for his mind's intact wholeness. Born in Scotland, he arrived in St. Louis in 1867, an ardent lover of his Aristotle, little inclined to join movements other than his own. However he did found several societies for human culture through individual development. His interest in each one was exhausted whenever he felt signs of a creed or a tendency to overwhelming emotion.

To my Davidson I owe the thrilling satisfaction of my discovering *The Grammar of Dionysios Thrax*, which Davidson translated from the Greek.* Dionysios the Alexandrian was called "the Thracian" (from the native country of his father Teros). He defined grammar as "an experimental knowledge of the uses of language as generally current among poets and prose writers."

I thrill to this original grammar for I recognize in its limited and limiting terminology 1) overwhelming appeal to my logic or reasoning and 2) inhibition of my conscious self love. It is growing awareness for this arbitrary effort at a logical arrangement of psychic energy that explicates for me my blind obedience to my mental condition favorable to dictates of power that seems to be other than my own, hence "external" to me. Thus a preposition posits space or time; a verb posits motion; a noun posits substance; a pejorative or meliorative posits imperfection; a name hypostatizes externality, reality, truth, or whatever and its opposite, and so on. As I have grown the mental strength to realize mind's astounding greatness, I do not wonder why I subject my infinite mind to this kind of binding and

The Journal of Speculative Philosophy. VIII:1 (1874), 326. See also Chapter I, above, on Protagoras and Gorgias.

The individual as a conscious agent is the source and resource of all value; the interests of conscious individuals are essentially harmonious only in so far as they are conscious.

Ernst Mach (1838-1916), Austrian physicist and experimental psychologist, in 1885 published *The Analysis of Sensations*. His main thesis was that sensation constituted the basis of all science. Furthermore he observed the attribute of wholeness (Gestaltqualität) in sensation.

William James (1842-1910) published his major contribution, The Principles of Psychology, in 1890, two years before Edward B. Titchener came to Cornell, and died in 1910, when Titchener's power was highest. He stood first and last for his own self's independent biological mentality, and for this courageous steadfastness of his view of the whole human being he merits most careful heed. Thus from its very start he describes his selecting, changing, objectifying, sensibly continuous "stream of consciousness" as personal. His method of study of the mind was his immediate, sure, and sensitive observation of his own mental event, that he named "introspection." His "self" stands out as a living individual, not merely thought but felt, its vicissitudes being associated with biologically adequate happiness or unhappiness. He treated his psychology as a biological science.

Physician William James and the Danish physiologist C. G. Lange (1834–1900) developed the likely hypothesis, the James-Lange theory of emotions, considering emotion to be nothing but the feeling of organic activity aroused in the sensing of certain exciting experience. (Each of these investigators announced his theory independently and almost simultaneously). James presents his theory by contrasting it with the common-sense view:

Common-sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational state-

Denton Jacques Snyder (1841–1925), original member of the St. Louis Philosophical Society, was a prolific writer, interested both in philosophical and literary concerns. He wrote commentaries on Homer, Shakespeare, Goethe and Dante. Besides authoring such works as A Walk in Hellas (2 vols., 1881–82) Ancient European Philosophy (1903), Psychology and the Psychosis (1890), The Biocosmos (1909), he published four books of verse. The Concord School of Philosophy had been identified with the St. Louis group from the beginning and Snyder (along with Thomas Davidson) was invited by W. T. Harris to work for this venture in reverence for human individuality.

Warner Fite (1867-1955), Stuart Professor of Ethics, Princeton University, enjoyed most comprehensive self feeling. In a series of lectures on "Individualism" at the University of Chicago (1909), he stated:

The popular condemnation of self-consciousness rests upon a misconception,

So far as the individual becomes self-conscious he becomes never less self-regarding but more so.

Individualism holds that selfishness is ennobled in becoming deliberate and intelligent.

What individualism stands for is: intelligent self assertion. All rights and values are for consciousness and created by consciousness, and all consciousness is individual.

Individual duty is a matter of enlightened self-interest and practical wisdom.

Merit is won, not by sacrifice, but by consideration,—inclusion of your fellow in your plans.

Justice aims at perfect harmony and perfect individual freedom, which, in the end, is the only real meaning of love.

As conscious beings our ideal is a fully self-conscious realization of the values of life.

The principle of Ganzheit developed by the Leipzig psychologists called attention to the important fact that an entity or whole, such as implied by the term mind, is always autogenously effective. From 1910 on, Gestalt psychologists of Germany, as well as the behaviorists of the United States, protested against the prevailing academic Wundtian experimental psychology. Most important for the development of appreciation for the wholeness of the individual. Max Wertheimer. Wolfgang Kohler, Kurt Koffa, and other Gestalt psychologists, heeded that a whole is not the sum of its parts at all, but rather is primary unity fundamental to all of its self. A Gestalt is not a composition of elements, but rather a composition of specific wholeness itself. The Gestalt psychologist recognizes mind, including consciousness. He objects to structuralist and behaviorist orientation, basically on account of its piecemeal blockbuilding assumption that a large organic unit consists of smaller organic units arranged in some specific combination. He sees that reducing a subject to divisions for study actually undoes the very reality one seeks to understand. This organismic-holistic understanding is being stressed by the medic, especially the neurologist. Kurt Goldstein insightfully uses this clinical orientation in his study of the brain-injured person.*

John Broadus Watson presented his Behaviorism (1913) opposing his self to all of his fellow psychologists working with the concept of consciousness. He claimed three inborn emotions: love, rage, and fear. He aimed to make his psychology scientific by making it materialistic, objective, deterministic, mechanistic, nonintrospective, non-mental. His basic interest was in animal psychology. The conditioned-reflex technique developed by Pavlov is dominant in Watson's psychology. "Behavioristic" life orientation does tend to respect the concept of human individuality, however, in its requirement that "the whole organism in action" be observed.

Robert Sessions Woodworth of Columbia University is identified with Dynamic Psychology. His book of that title (1918)

^{*}After-effects of Brain Injuries in War (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1942),

ment is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be. Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we should not actually feel afraid or angry.

Writing of the physiology of the brain, James records, "But the aesthetic sphere of the mind, its longings, its pleasures and pains, and its emotions, have been . . . ignored." He adds,

Our whole cubic capacity is sensibly alive; and each morsel of it contributes its pulsations of feeling. . . . A purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity. . . . emotion dissociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable. . . . it seems to me that if I were to become corporeally anaesthetic, I should be excluded from the life of the affections, harsh and tender alike. . . . it is to be hoped that asylum-physicians and nervous specialists may begin to study the relation between anesthesia and emotional apathy.

Knight Dunlap felt emotion to be visceral activity. He followed Lange, rather than James, in making the emotion not a result of the bodily state, but the bodily state itself.*

In The Pathology of Emotions, Charles Féré, Physician at the Bicètre, makes a notable attempt to present physiological and clinical studies of affect in a consciously responsible way, frequently resorting to his personal pronoun, I. His orientation is essentially "physical." He considers "psychological" really to be an expression of physiological, thus upholding integrity of organism: "psychology is only physiology specialized." He follows Herbert Spencer in dividing consciousness into states "which proceed from the centre, or emotions; and which proceed from the periphery, or sensations." However he senses underlying identity, "physical ills and moral ills have a common basis."**

 [&]quot;Thought Content and Feeling," Psychol. Rev., XXIII (1916), 49-70.
 Trans. Robert Park (Watford, London: University Press, Ltd., 1899).

Edman and Herbert W. Schneider, includes many a helpful self observation:

That a new emotion is the source of the great creations of art, of science and of civilization in general there seems to be no doubt.

Creation signifies, above all, emotion, and that not in literature or art alone.

. . . psychology has already a tendency to use the term "interest" as much as "attention," thus implicitly introducing sensibility. . . .

It is the emotion above all which unifies, or rather vitalizes, the intellectual elements with which it is destined to unite.

F. J. J. Buytendijk* declared, "Behavior can never be reduced to physiological processes and explained as a result of the integration of reflexes. . . . The unprejudiced return to the 'things in themselves,' i.e., inspection of knowledge 'itself' as given to us directly, with nothing mediating or interfering, reveals the intentionality or act-character of all behavior."

The truth of individuality is the one certainty of science. As C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards each observed, in that classic, The Meaning of Meaning (1945); "It has long been recognized that there is something amiss with the term Datum. The 'given' is often of all things the most difficult to accept." For realizing the order of wholeness of my being, I need to be able to use my mind to recognize the helpfulness in any and all of my living, including so-called "loss" of limb or loved one. I need to be able to use my mental power of imagination to be aware that all living is always finding, never losing, despite the contrary evidence of so-called appearances. My integrity of individuality, integer vitae, is absolutely inviolable, regardless of my innumerable temptations to indulge the feeling of illusional loss, or incompleteness, or insufficiency, or any "imperfection." Integration does not mean "putting together," but

^{*}The Phemonenological Approach to the Problem of Feelings and Emotions," in Feelings and Emotions, ed. Reymert, pp. 127-141.

represented twenty years of his devotion to "the workings of the mind." He tended to base his psychology on physiology. He accepted the method of introspection but did not consider it the distinctive method of psychology. Rather, he inclined distinctly towards "objective" behaviorism.

William McDougall's Introduction to Psychology brought out the necessity for his system of psychology to go beyond mechanistic conceptions, such as Woodworth's, to deal with the "springs of action." He claimed the instincts to be the driving forces of nature and considered instinct and emotion to be intimately connected. Conation was his basic psychological category.

Of special interest on account of its both granting and withholding primacy of human individuality is Ivan D. London's "Theory of Emotions in Soviet Dialectic Psychology," based largely upon the work of S. L. Rubenshstein,* a leading psychologist of the Soviet Union:

In dialectic psychology there can be no general theory of emotions in isolation from a real and doing man. . . Any dialectic theory of emotions must, of course, be "materially based," but not in the sense of what the Soviets have come to deride as "vulgar materialism" or "vulgar mechanism". . . Emotions are not purely subjective experiences, as has been claimed. The very nature of experience presumes an objective reality, which provides the experiential material which the person either happens upon or seeks out, and which he reworks. Emotions go beyond a consideration of merely "subjective" aspects and involve not only inner but also outer reality,—physiology and society dialectically lused into an active and conscious man, who is at the complete mercy of neither (my italics).

I find whenever I live my (illusion of) objectivity that my reasoning is responsible for it. Furthermore, I am then not aware that my emotion, as ever, is "the power behind the throne" of my reasoning. Goethe saw in his acknowledged mind, "It is the spirit in which we act that is the great matter."

The insightful work, Landmarks in Philosophy, by Irwin

^{*}Feelings and Emotions, ed. Reymert, pp. 84-91,

Edman and Herbert W. Schneider, includes many a helpful self observation:

That a new emotion is the source of the great creations of art, of science and of civilization in general there seems to be no doubt.

Creation signifies, above all, emotion, and that not in literature or art alone.

. . . psychology has already a tendency to use the term "interest" as much as "attention," thus implicitly introducing sensibility. . . .

It is the emotion above all which unifies, or rather vitalizes, the intellectual elements with which it is destined to unite.

F. J. J. Buytendijk* declared, "Behavior can never be reduced to physiological processes and explained as a result of the integration of reflexes. . . . The unprejudiced return to the 'things in themselves,' i.e., inspection of knowledge 'itself' as given to us directly, with nothing mediating or interfering, reveals the intentionality or act-character of all behavior."

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^{*}The Phemonenological Approach to the Problem of Feelings and Emotions," in Feelings and Emotions, ed. Reymert, pp. 127-141.

or as a structural totality." "Phenomenology in the field of psychology attempts to objectify the subjective aspect of personal activity by elaborating inner observations derived from intuitive insight concerning this activity, and then classifying them"

A book by Charles Fox, The Mind and Its Body,* is a learned presentation of psychological physiology, beginning with Descartes' theory that all bodily activity, without exception, is to be explained on mechanical principles, mind's essence being "thinking," body's essence being "extension," and man being a skillful automaton whose activities consist of operation of machinery admitting of mechanical explanation. "This view that biological phenomena of every kind can be adequately explained on mechanical principles has, thanks to the influence of Descartes, persisted up to the present day." Fox then proceeds to examine his facts, concluding, "What the physiologist investigates is physiology. After we have studied all that physiology can teach us about nervous impulses we are still not a whit nearer the sensation, which is left on our hands unexplained and unaccounted for."

This author feels the need for responsible subjectivity, quoting Leibnitz, "Thus the world is not a machine as Descartes and Hobbes would have it. Everything in it is force, soul, life, thought, desire; what we see is the machine, but we only see the outside of Being. Being is that which itself sees." Fox observes, "The early English economists invented the 'economic man,' a creature who acted solely from utilitarian economic motives. ... no matter that people did not behave in accordance with these laws. . . . They were assumed to act in these ways and all their real ways of acting were ignored or tortured into ways which fitted these so-called laws of economic activity. Exactly the same state of affairs prevails in physiology. . . . It must always be borne in mind that the physiologist deals with bodily functions in an abstract manner since he isolates them and studies them separately. Vital activity is, however, essentially co-ordinated and integrated activity."

^{*(}New York: Harcourt Brace, 1932).

already existing unity. Individuality is never absent; conscious individuality is rarely present. Goethe insightfully described his Mephistopheles, "the Spirit of Contradiction."

Dr. J. H. van der Hoop's book, Conscious Orientation,* interests me primarily in the extent to which it represents declared autobiography. He ascribes greatest importance to his conception, intuition. "Intueri means 'to see into'." He declares, "Life is more than psychology," but also favors "aiming at a science of psychology as an instrument for life." He points out that Bergson finds that in the certain knowledge termed intuition "the true nature of reality is immediately understood." Van der Hoop records, "Intuition seems to me to be of the utmost importance as a source of development in mental life," and associates it with the cultivation of consciously independent mental life; the attainment of realization that self activity can be controlled by self insight: the enjoyment of spontaneity, inspiration, imagination, and generally increasing significance of the ego. He refers to Spinoza's feeling self certainty in scientia intuitiva. He regards empathy also as a "kind of intuition for it comprehends a whole in its rela-

My education is disciplined experience, my own life's activity entirely, evoking innate potential, generative possibility I term mental energy. In my integrating mind resides my potential appreciation for, hence control of, the wholeness power of my being.

Van der Hoop uses feeling and sentiment as synonyms, differing from emotion. His work contains numerous useful observations. "From the point of view of feeling, the meaning of life appears as a spiritual order under the domination of Love." Taking mental experience as starting point, "it becomes obvious that emotional reactions are immediately bound up with our sensations." "If we are aware of variety in our experience, and yet the unity of our ego—which can only be experienced in this way—is not disturbed thereby, we can only objectify this experience in ideational form as a multiplicity in unity

^{*(}New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1939).

psychological experience with Jean Martin Charcot in Paris (October, 1885-February, 1886) excited his interest in psychopathology. In 1885 he wrote Martha Bernays, "No other human being has ever affected me in the same way." In 1893 he said: "M. Charcot was the first to teach us that to explain the hysterical neurosis we must apply to psychology."

Freud's further observation of hypnosis with Liebault and Bernheim in Nancy in 1889 helped to affirm the biological force underlying his mind consciousness. He was now readying his conscious self observation to discover his epoch making contribution to the welfare of his world, namely, his method of free association enabling his systematic revelation of his subjectivity. From then on his self analysis continued to reveal his true nature to his mind's eye, steadily rounding out his conscious self identity so that he might awaken to his comprehensive, insightful view of his whole individuality.

He found the practice of self awareness to be the open secret of conscious personal fulfillment, of acknowledgeable individual creativeness, of ever growing identification of the complete indivisible whole with all of its activity. He named his method of restoring consciousness to repressed mental material "Psychoanalysis," adding, "psycho synthesis is achieved during analytic treatment without our intervention, automatically and inevitably."*

In Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905), with sense for the supreme importance of honoring his personal integrity, Professor Freud brings out the fact that thinking as well as feeling involves physiological processes. "Here, physiology shows the way in that it teaches us that even while an idea is in the process of conception innervations proceed to the muscles. . . "Also, "If we do not require our mental apparatus at the moment for supplying one of our indispensable satisfactions, we allow it itself to work in the direction of pleasure and we seek to derive pleasure from its own activity." Refering to physiological expression of mental activity he includes ideational mimetics, "I believe that these mimetics . . . occur

^{*}Standard Edition, XVII, 161.

In his chapter "The Psychology of Language," Fox states:

The study of aphasia has shown us that as far as the psychology of language is concerned, no help is to be derived from investigations concerning the structure or function of the brain. Seeing that language is the most distinctively human function, any account of human psychology which fails to deal with it is lopsided. . . . It is most unfortunate that writing was ever invented, or grammar discovered, for both of these confuse the psychology of language. . . . When we speak, the whole process is subject to the guiding force of what we wish to say. . . . The importance of emotional expression as one of the roots of language has long been recognized.

Of "the external world" and its "real state of affairs," Professor Sigmund Freud wrote: "We have no hope of being able to reach the latter itself, since it is evident that everything new that we have inferred must nevertheless be translated back into the language of our perceptions, from which it is simply impossible for us to free ourselves."* Similarly, Immanuel Kant had declared a science of existence (involving "externality") to be beyond the compass of the individual mind. Pure mental activity being purely subjective and about nothing but itself, can evince the reality only of its own modifications.

The psychoanalyst's interpretation of the specificity of mental activity is the result of his practice of a specific kind of analysis. By consciously observing his own ongoing mental events directly, instead of losing sight of his wholeness, he creates a process providing incremental appreciation for the meaning of that wholeness, in the only way possible, by honoring his mind's unity through conscious self observation; by systematically augmenting his acknowledgment of, hence appreciation for, his own whole individuality.

Professor Freud's interest in physiology, cultivated as a medical student of his great physiologist E. W. von Brücke, found ready extensions in his neurological studies. His clinical work with Joseph Breuer, culminating in Studies on Hysteria (1895), called his attention to the power of mind. His profound

^{*}Standard Edition, XXIII, 196.

psychological experience with Jean Martin Charcot in Paris (October, 1885-February, 1886) excited his interest in psychopathology. In 1885 he wrote Martha Bernays, "No other human being has ever affected me in the same way." In 1893 he said: "M. Charcot was the first to teach us that to explain the hysterical neurosis we must apply to psychology."

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as well when the subject is forming an idea of something for his own private benefit and is thinking of something pictorially . . . in the innervations of his features and sense organs. . . " And, "a person indicates somatically the concentration of his attention and the level of abstraction of which his thinking is at the moment proceeding."*

As in all of his writings, here in explaining the pleasure derived from joking this master of his mind shows his far-reaching insights. For instance, he describes the costliness in man's withholding his awareness about the marvelousness of his nature, and the wise economy he practices in devoting his interest to discovering his true magnanimity. He calls attention to the child's original good nature, his native capacity for enjoyment of his living without resort to any extra device such as joking. He also considered the origin of unpleasure as a transformation resulting from the inhibition of instinct satisfaction that would otherwise be associated with pleasure.**

With his productive conscious mental freedom Professor Freud observed the primary self affirming joy of living characteristic for the basically uninhibited infant and child. He also observed how gradually increasing inhibition in the child's life tended to obscure his fundamental conscious life appreciation and cultivated life depreciation in its place. Freud freely associated the dream, day dream, "mental disorder," and similar resorts to unconscious sources of life satisfaction, as the individual's effort to recover some of the unencumbered joy of living of his very early childhood. For example, he accounts for the emotional release and relief secured from wit, humor, and the comic thus-

**Sec Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926 [1925]), Standard Edition, XX. 91.

^{*}Standard Edition, VIII, 193. In an address at Wayne State University College of Medicine, the eminent surgeon Charles Mayo similarly observed that the personality of the individual expresses itself in characteristic visceral appearance. Such insightful sensing of the monogenic wholeness of mental activity is reminiscent of Cicero's understanding, "The whole countenance is a certain silent language of the mind."

All three are agreed in representing methods of regaining from mental activity a pleasure which has in fact been lost through the development of that activity. For the euphoria which we endeavor to reach by these means is nothing other than the mood of a period of life in which we were accustomed to deal with our psychological expenditure of energy-the mood of our childhood, when we were ignorant of the comic, when we were incapable of jokes and when we had no need of humor to make us feel happy in our life.*

Psychologist Samuel J. Beck writes of his Freud, honoring his

painstaking search into recesses of the human psyche, where prior to him so few had even dared to look. What his influence on psychology will be has as yet not even begun to be measured. He turned the lights full on our emotional life and on the role it plays in the whole personality pattern. The consequence to the sciences concerned with human nature, both systematic and psychotherapeutic, was that he started psychology on the way toward studying the whole individual.**

Anna Freud has devoted her self faithfully to understanding emotional development. Her findings, now collected,*** record unique contributions to self insight attained from her psychoanalytic research, especially upon infant and child behavior. She provides clear accounts of infantile feeding, maternal care, aggression in relation to emotional development, and other specific resources of the mind for coping with its difficult emotional experience. With Dorothy Burlingham, she provided very helpful reports on their work at the Hampstead War Nurseries: War and Children (1943), Infants Without Families (1944).

Psychoanalyst Marjorie Brierley, M.D., observes, "The dynamics of the psyche are the dynamics of affect. . . . Affect

^{*}Jokes and the Unconscious, Standard Edition, VIII, 236.

^{**}Emotional Experience a Necessary Element in Knowing," in Feelings and Emotions, p. 105.

The Writings of Anna Freud (6 vols., New York: The Universities Press, Inc., 1966-68).

language is older than speech." She clarifies:

What happens when a repressed fragment of ego-experience comes into consciousness? The patient feels the emotion he was formerly unable to endure. . . . Abreaction does not do away with the liability to feel, though it reduces the pathological intensity of the infantile emotion. Its major function is to open the hitherto barred path from id to personal ego. Working through is, in part, a drainage of residual affect pockets, but, in essence, it is a stabilizing process of ego-assimilation and re-integration.*

Edward Glover calls attention to a "comparative neglect of the problem of affect" in the development of psycho-analysis, stating that "the exploration of affect tends to arouse greater subjective resistances" than does the exploration of ideational content. "It is to the actual derivatives of instinct stress that we must look for an explanation of mental behavior. And among the primary derivatives of and responses to instinct-stress, affective reactions are by far the most powerful."** Dr. Glover points out advantage in the study of the early history of affect and, before reporting his original views about tension and discharge affects, comments, "Freud has already shown that no mental event can be understood unless it is examined metapsychologically."***

Max Schur**** clearly upholds the cognitive factor as "an intrinsic part of all affects. I believe that this formulation is a logical extension of Freud's definition: 'Anxiety is a reaction to danger.' " He observes:

[Freud] defines affect as a composite state including motor innervations and/or discharges and "feelings" of two kinds: perceptions of

** The Psycho-Analysis of Affects," Int. J. Psycho-Analysis, XX (1939),

**** Affects And Cognition," Int. J. Psycho-Analysis, L (1969), 647-653.

[&]quot;Affects In Theory and Practice," Int. J. Psycho-Anal., XVIII, (1937), 1-13, and Trends In Psycho-Analysis, (London: Hogarth Press, 1951), pp. 43-56.

^{***}In my present thesis I meet this worthy requirement only broadly in considering my affect 1) topographically by localizing it entirely in and of my mind, 2) dynamically by attributing my every mental condition to the disposition (vicissitude) of my self love; and 3) economically by accounting for all of my psychic energy as love (including each of its modalities).

motor actions and of direct feelings of pleasure and unpleasure, which give the affect its keynote, a definition not too different from the James-Lange theory of affects. Finally, affects are also termed repetitions of an experience "placed in prehistory not of an individual but of the species". . . . The signal concept gains its full meaning in "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" (1926) and in the New Introductory Lectures" (1933).

Henri Bergson (1860-1941) honored the power of vitality, the élan vital, the impulsive urgency of human nature.* He cherished insight and free growth "rejoicing more than other men in the spirit of life that is in him" (Wordsworth's description of the poet):

It is the emotion above all which vivifies, or rather vitalizes, it is destined to unite, constantly collecting everything that can be worked in with it and finally compelling the enunciation of the problem to expand into its solution. And what about literature and art? A work of genius is in most cases the outcome of an emotion, unique of its kind, which seems to baffle expression, and yet which had to express itself. . . . Let us then give to the word biology the very wide meaning it should have, and will perhaps have one day, and let us say in conclusion that all morality, be it pressure or aspiration, is in essence biological.

To Bergson Thomas Carlyle's remark applies, "We might say, in a short word, which means a long matter, that your Shakespeare fashions his characters from the heart outwards." And as Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) commented, "He who has lived most is not he who has numbered the most years, but he who has been most truly conscious of what life is."

Gerald Heard** states that the "normal individual" develops his need for Totalitarianism because he cannot live satisfyingly without a goal adequate to control and exert his power. He cannot conceive his own self as adequate for that. Heard clearly and cogently points up the problem confronting every human being in his biological necessity to expand his self con-

**Pain, Sex, and Time (New York: Harpers, 1939).

^{*}Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932), trans. R. A. Audra and C. Brereton (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1935).

sciousness, hence self understanding, in direct proportion to his awakening to the tremendous vital power that is his. Thus the alternative to the functioning of my power is the function of my pain in one form or another of unhappiness.

Heard pictures the task of life to be the freeing of consciousness from "accident" to ontogenetically adequate purpose. Thus, if I do not live in such a way as to extend my self consciousness, hence my own life appreciation, then my pain can drive me to do so. He sees man's most advanced evolution in psychic life orientation as the "awareness of the self." He observes pain is not just "the body's burglar alarm," or "the quickest way of educating man in objective knowledge." He asserts that pain "is going to prove a larger thing than we thought and a deeper thing to eradicate. He regards all pain as a measure, crude or not, "of vital creative energy in any creature, animal or man. Man finds more pain than animal for he contains more pent up unused energy within him." The more he uses his energy, the less he feels pain:

Complete proof that pain cannot exist if the mind concentrates its interest on something else, is given by hypnotism. . . . We have not therefore, to discover new drugs in order to free ourselves of pain. . . For our capacity for pain is no more and no less than the crudest indication of our capacity to produce new powers to evolve further. . . The aim is not to get rid of pain but to achieve a new quality and intensity of awareness, one of the by-products of which is the disappearance of pain.

Heard sees two ways of being painless: one by being anesthetized, and this new way of being actively intense in greater self awareness.

B. P. Babkin of the Montreal Neurological Institute writes: "It is evident that a physiologist is not entitled to discuss the emotions in all their complexity. He may speak of emotional behavior—somatic or autonomic—but not of emotional experience, which is a psychological concept." However he concludes:

I have no doubts regarding the importance of a purely physiological approach to the study of all functions of the brain. When we have

attained full knowledge of the physiology of the brain, then and then only shall we understand the highest and most complex forms of its activity.*

Richard de Charms emphasizes:

Affect is to be understood as an emotional response with physiological and phenomenological correlates aroused or elicited by certain stimulus condition in the environment.**

In medical as well as semi-popular writings Dr. Flanders Dunbar explains how emotion can create structural development important in contracting as well as curing health troubles. "The emotional system is as delicate as the brain, and the same rules of professional ability apply to those who would treat it."*** She sensibly features the indivisible wholeness of the individual, the necessity to see every person as a complete human being.

Referring to her clinical experience Dr. Dunbar describes how excessive anger, fear, irritability, exaggerated sensitivity, are productive of insecurity, uncertainty and other unhappy psychological tensions. She anticipates the enlightenment when the educator will know that his mind is his body and his body is his mind, referring to the "French physician with imagination, Claude Bernard, who about the middle of the nineteenth century began to speak of the mind's share in ailments which manifested themselves in the body."

Dr. Dunbar aptly calls attention to an article, "Organ-Jargon," written by Dr. F. G. Crookshank (1930) about the physician who refused to concede that an emotion can cause psychological tension leading to structural disturbance:

I often wonder that some hard-boiled and orthodox clinician does not describe emotional weeping as a "new disease," calling it parox-

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[&]quot;The Conditioning of Emotions," in Feelings and Emotions, ed. Reymert.
"Personal Causation, The Internal Affective Determinants of Behavior
(New York and London: Academic Press, 1968), p. 63 (italics in original).
"Mind and Body, Psychosomatic Medicine (New York: Random House,
1947), Foreword, v. viii.

ysmal lachrymation, and suggesting treatment by belladonna, astringent local application, avoidance of sexual excess, tea, tobacco and alcohol, and a salt free diet with restriction of fluid intake; proceeding in the event of failure, to early removal of the tearglands. This sounds, of course, ludicrous. But a good deal of contemporary medicine and surgery seems to me to be on much the same level.

In her helpful work, *Emotions and Bodily Changes* (1946),* a survey of literature on "psychosomatic interrelationships," Dr. Dunbar writes that any dichotomy lurking in the term psychosomatic is a

Dr. Dunbar concludes her volume with the insightful observation;

The old aphorism "nemo physiologus nist psychologus" becomes today not merely an ideal but a fundamental necessity for our further research, just as "nemo medicus nist psychologus" is fundamental to our progress in therapy. . . . the field of psychosomatic interrelationships. . . . is the kernel and focus of all medical knowledge and practice.

In his Introduction to The Wisdom Of The Body,** Walter B. Cannon writes, "When we consider the extreme instability of our bodily structure, its readiness for disturbance by the slightest application of external force and the rapid onset of its decomposition as soon as favoring circumstances are withdrawn, its persistence through many decades seems almost miraculous." He develops his helpful theory of homeostasis explaining the stabilization of the body: "In the main it per-

^{*(4}th ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).
**(2d ed., New York: W. Appleton Co., 1929).

tains to the relation of the autonomic system to the self-regulation of physiological processes and the production of steady conditions in the body. This 'mileu interne' as Claude Bernard pointed out, is the product of the organism itself."

With great genius Professor Cannon wondered at the stability of his bodily economy. Then he carefully investigated (and reported in his volume, Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage*) the influence of emotional excitement on endocrine activity. All of his scientific endeavors pointed up the wisdom inherent throughout the wholeness of human being.

In his self sensible book, *The Laws of Feeling*,** F. Paulhan asserts, "In hunger, in thirst, in all the organic needs which are manifested to consciousness by affective phenomena, we find arrested tendencies. Passing by the emotions caused by the exercise of our senses, we find that they are all accompanied by an arrest of certain tendencies."

Paulhan describes affect as "the expression of a more or less profound disturbance of the organism, due to the fact that a relatively considerable quantity of nervous energy is released without being able to be used in a systematic manner." He associates pleasure as well as pain with inhibition:

Confirmation of the doctrine that all pleasure is associated with freedom of functioning of one's subjectivity may be derived from the observation that even unhappiness itself may

^{*(}New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1932).
**Trans. C. K. Ogden (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1930).

be enjoyable as long as it is volitionally (safely) exercised, as in reading a novel or seeing a play, or as experienced by the enduring mind that can develop to tolerate such tension. The subjective individuality of whatever, is the beauty of it. Whoever appreciates the ubiquity of individuality finds beauty everywhere. Beauty is in the eye of the whole-seeing observer. On this head William Hamilton notes:

In reference to Taste, it is quite a different thing to sunder a whole into its parts, and a whole into its lesser wholes. In the one case we separate only to separate, and not again to connect. In the other, we look to the parts, in order to be able in a shorter time more perfectly to survey the whole. This must enhance the gratification. . . .

Paul Thomas Young traces the meanings of "emotion" thus:

The word "emotion" is derived from the Latin e (out) and movene (to move). Originally the word meant a moving out of one place into another, in the sense of a migration. . . The word came to mean a moving, stirring, agitation, perturbation, and was so used in a strictly physical sense. Thus: "Thunder. . . caused so great an Emotion in the air." . . This physical meaning was transferred to political and social agitation, the word coming to mean tumult, popular disturbance. . . Finally the word came to be used to designate any agitated, vehement, or excited mental state of the individual. . . *

Later, he helpfully elaborates on his definition, describing what he denotes by "emotion":

... an acutely disturbed affective state of the individual that is psychological in origin and revealed in behavior, conscious experience, and visceral functioning. This definition has been extended to include persisting, relatively stable, states of disturbance within the individual which underlie repeated emotional outbreaks. Such persisting disturbances include states of conflict, expectations, incompatible attitudes, motives, and other conditions of emotional upset. The extended definition is useful when we consider emotional development and the dynamics of emotional behavior.

^{*}Emotion in Man and Animal (New York; John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1943), p. 25.

As a bodily event an emotion involves the organism as a whole. Well-integrated patterns of response appear during emotional disturbances. These patterns resemble reflexes but are more wide-spread and complex, involving the total body. Many of the patterns are organized in subcortical neural centers.

Visceral processes are invariably present during emotional upsets. The visceral changes indicate involvement of both divisions of the autonomic nervous system in emotional response.

The dominance and control of the cerebral cortex is weakened during emotion and the subcortical mechanisms take over more of the control. This weakening of cerebral dominance is associated with frustration, the clash of motives, painful stimulation, thwarted expectation, the release of tension, and other conditions which are direct determinants of emotional upset.*

The hedonic experience of pleasure or pain, called "affective arousal," is being considered by the psychologist as the basis for motives.** David Rapaport calls attention to Freud's formulation of affect,*** "This is regarded as a motor or secretary function, the key to the innervation of which is to be found in the ideas of the unconscious."

Katharine M. Banham Bridges observes, "The emotional reactions of the tiny infant are certainly not highly differentiated." She finds "excitement" to be the original emotion, and the nuances generally regarded as emotional to be evolved from it. "Delight is much later in becoming differentiated from general excitement than distress."***

Daniel H. Funkenstein's findings "suggest the theory that man is born with the capacity to react with a variety of emotions (has within him the lion and the rabbit), and that his early

***Organization and Pathology of Thought (New York: Columbia University Press 1656).

^{*}Motivation and Emotion (New York: John Wiley & Sons., Inc., 1961), p. 409.

**Current Research in Motivation, ed. Ralph Norman Haber (New York: Holt, Risade and Motivation).

rress, 1959). An excellent compendium.
****See her Social and Emotional Development of the Preschool Child
(London: Kegan Paul. 1931).

childhood experiences largely determine in which of these ways he will react under stress. . . . individuals' habitual emotional reactions have a high correlation with their perceptions of psychological factors in their families."*

In place of the textbook definition of emotion as a state of disorganization of behavior, some eminent psychological theorists assign to feeling and emotion central roles in production of motivation (e.g., W. B. Cannon in 1927, J. Jastrow in 1928, Elizabeth Duffy in 1934, R. Leeper in 1948.)** R. B. Macleod (1957) traces this interest to Darwin and Freud. Cannon's thalamic or emergency theory posited the thalamus as the seat of emotions and attributed to certain ones, like fear and rage, the emergency function of preparing the organism for action against danger.

Magda B. Arnold defines emotion as: the felt tendency toward anything intuitively appraised as good (beneficial), or away from anything intuitively appraised as bad (harnful). This attraction or aversion is accompanied by a pattern of physiological changes organized toward approach or withdrawal. The patterns differ for different emotions.*** She distinguishes emotions from feelings: "While an emotion indicates my attitude to an object (I want a thing or fear it), feelings merely refer to one of its aspects. . . Emotion always focuses on the object, while feeling reveals my momentary state of mind." She considers emotion an action tendency, and feeling a positive or negative reaction to some aspect of an experience. She writes:

The German word Gefuhl means both feelings and emotions and has usually a positive significance; for instance, a Gefuhlsmensch is a man of heart. . . . In contrast, the French emotion has the force of a rather negative emotional upset, with passion as its positive

 [&]quot;Emotional Development in Early Infancy." Child Development, 1932.
 See C. N. Cofer and M. H. Appley, Motivation: Theory and Research, (New York: John Wiley and Sons. Inc., 1964).

^{***}See Emotion and Personality (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), I, 182. A useful two volume contribution.

counterpart; and sentiment is the term for feelings in the broad sense. . . .*

In his "Observational Definition of Emotion,"** Wilson McTeer states: "in the study of emotion, human perceptional limitations restrict the extent and the nature of observations which may be made at any time." Each author naturally describes his emotionality characteristically, from his unique point of view. Therefore one may term violent feeling a passion, or violent emotion a passion "in a narrow sense." Another may claim any wish can become a passion. Still another may differentiate feeling from sensation or a strong wish from a "ruling passion." Or he might attempt to classify "higher" and "lower" or "active" and "passive" feelings.

In 1897 D. Irons*** wrote:

Pleasure-pain is simply the way in which things affect us while emotion is the manner in which we react. . . Whatever is at variance with the individual's interests and wishes causes pain, but anger does not appear until he feels that he is "injured." Any bodily disorder is painful, but the sense of danger must be present before fear is aroused. Admiration and contempt imply the recognition of worth. . . . Hate presupposes that the object is cognized as a hostile personality.

In his psychology textbook of 1889 Gustav Adolf Linder

Since arrest and furthering constantly take place in our consciousness, in that ideas constantly come and go, we ought in reality to experience feelings constantly. The most of them are too weak. . . . in the life But in their totality they do make themselves felt. . . in the life feeling. . . Since under normal conditions the furthering, or realization of self, predominates over its retardation, or arrest, the life feeling is in general one of pleasure, and life must be regarded as a positive good, despite all pessimistic views.

^{*}The Nature of Emotion, ed. Magda B. Arnold (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 10-11.

^{****}Chological Review, LX (1953), 172-180.
****The Nature of Emotion," Philosophic Review VI (1897), 242-256.

Adolf Meyer, M.D. (1866-1950) divided emotion into "pure" (almost continuous moods of sadness or elation) and "impure" affects (fear, worry, hate, anger, suspicion, or anxiety) associated with some objective starting point.

James Hillman's lively book Emotion* presents clearly a comprehensive survey of diverse "emotion theories," including a practical synthesis of them pointing towards their creative organizational power for furthering insight about the wholeness of the individual mind.

Elizabeth Duffy** considers "energy mobilization" to be a meaningful aspect of emotion, suggesting a continuum ranging from sleep or minimal activation to strong emotion. Both she and D. B. Lindsley use the term "activation" in referring to mental excitation. G. L. Freeman, Harold Schlosberg, Robert Malmo, and D. O. Hebb, have worked on the "activation theory" of emotion.

Gordon Allport was a chief psychological interpreter and advocate of the necessity to study the unique, undivided, selfactivating personality.

C. N. Cofer and M. H. Appley present a comprehensive account (including self-actualization) of emotionality and incentive in their helpful book, Motivation: Theory and Research.*** They state:

. . . hedonism a widely influential doctrine persisting from the time of the ancient Greeks to the present day, has held that behavior is regulated by the pleasantness or the unpleasantness of its expected or actual outcomes. These terms, pleasantness and unpleasantness, are instances of that group of affective states called feelings, which are often regarded as less intense than, but closely related to, the other group of affective states, the emotions. The feelings in hedonistic doctrine, at least, have a role in motivation.

 ⁽Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1961). "The Concept of Energy Mobilization," Psychol. Rev., LVIII (1951),

^{***} See note above, p. 74.

Nina Bull* insightfully honors emotion as "that part of a feeling of motor attitude which gives the sense of orientation and intention "

Arnold Gesell** states, "The genesis of emotion may be sought in the fetal period."

John E. Anderson*** says emotion "is now considered a basic process that is present in some degree in every reaction of the human being in his environment. The emotional processes are intimately related to those of learning and of problem solving, in fact, these can be treated as different aspects of the same basic process of adjustment."

Roger J. Williams**** observes sagely:

The superficiality of talking glibly about "man," "the child," or even "the individual" (a hypothetical average individual who does not exist) is pathetic in an age when we apply our science so successfully to the production of atomic bombs but so ineffectively to the problem of human understanding.

Ernest Harms**** believes:

A real psychology of feelings and emotions. . . , is still in an embryonic stage. . . . To achieve that end, the readiness and willingness of many to acknowledge the universality of feelings must be matched by corresponding courage to transform them into a research tool of scientific investigation.

Sheldon J. Lachman reports in his forthcoming book, Psychosomatic Medicine, as follows:

Emotion is behavior. The essential difference between emotional behavior and nonemotional behavior is that emotional behavior is

Medicine, VII (1945), 10. **The Embryology of Behavior (New York: Hoeber, 1945).

*******A Differential Concept of Feelings and Emotions," thid.

[&]quot;Towards a Clarification of the Concept of Emotion," Psychosomatic

^{***} Embryology of Behavior (New York: Hoeber, 1943).

***The Young Child in the Home (New York: Appleton Century-Crofts, 1946).

^{*****}Some Implications of Physiological Human Individuality," in Feelings and Emotions, ed. Reymert.

characterized by multiple and intensive changes in physiological functioning. These include alterations in the activity of the cardio-vascular, gastrointestinal, endocrine, and respiratory systems in particular, although other organ systems are also implicated. To define the term: Emotional behavior refers to extensive and intensive changes in physiological functioning which are psychological in origin.

An analysis of the definition may serve to clarify it:

- (1) The phrase extensive changes indicates that the reactions are not narrowly confined to a small part of the organism such as face, arm, foot, chest, or hand, but rather involve all of these parts and more via blood vessels, glands, and other structures widely distributed and broadly influencing bodily function.
- (2) Intensive changes suggests that in emotional behavior there are vigorous changes in physiological functioning from the nonemotional baseline; such changes may involve either an increase or a decrease in activity.
- (3) Physiological functioning refers essentially to reactions in structures innervated by the autonomic nervous system and includes changes in heart rate, rate of stomach or duodenal movement, and alterations in gastric gland or adrenal gland secretion, among others. These physiological reactions are also called covert reactions and implicit reactions.
- (4) The phrase psychological in origin indicates that the reaction pattern is a response to stimulation of sense organs; it may also refer to a response to central nervous surrogates, i.e., symbols of such stimulation. The phrase "psychological in origin" serves to distinguish the physiological changes in emotion from very similar changes which may be a consequence or concomitant of violent exercise, tissue pathology, ingested drugs, parasitic infection, or other such conditions.

Whoever enjoys grateful appreciation concerning his cultivation of consciousness for the wholeness of truth, as well as the truth of wholeness, will sense identity in his (her) similarly insightful Jan Christian Smuts (1870-1950). Field Marshal and Prime Minister of Africa Smuts composed a beautiful treatise Holism and Evolution.* Even in its Preface this whole-mindful author refers to the principle of conscious self identity by recognizing the concept of Personality as specially illustrating wholeness. He feels:

Wholes are not mere artificial constructions of thought, they point to something real in the universe; and Holism as the creative principle behind them is a real vera causa. . . . Wholes are dynamic, organic, evolutionary, creative. . . . Above all, biological science must ever keep before itself the standpoint of the whole, without and apart from which all the details—so far from being recognized as organic to each other are mere loose meaningless items, like the sands of the seashore, utterly useless for the understanding of that unique unity which constitutes an organic individual. . . . As an active living whole, Personality is fundamentally an organ of selfrealization

My single meaning named plurality or fraction does not numerically differ from my one property of individuality! Distinctification is neither a process of division nor multiplication. This subject deserves study. For example the question arises, How many several objects can the mind at once consciously survey? Hamilton agrees with his Destutt de Tracy whom he appears to regard highly, that the mind can have one distinct notion of six objects at once. The mind treats "groups" as units (wholes).

G. E. Coghill* studied developing organisms from the standpoint of the development of motor behavior as correlated with neural growth. He made the meaningful discovery in amblystoma that movements of the whole body appeared first, and that out of these undifferentiated whole movements—the regional activities like reflexes occurred in the course of the organism's whole development. The investigator finds indications of the same kind of development of the whole in the human fetus.

In his insightful The Natural History of Sensibility,** Louis 1. Bredvold attempts "to trace the life history of that complex of ideas and feelings which the eighteenth century called 'sensi-

**(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962).

^{*}Anatomy and the Problem of Behavior (Cambridge: University Press, 1929).

bility." He found that happiness was first "almost universally associated with virtue," with "virtue like holiness. . . . not to be won without some suppression of one's own nature." Professor Bredvold points out that even seventeenth century man was objecting to "sour views" of his "total depravity." He refers to the Cambridge Platonists as expounding the idea that goodness is in the "temper" or "completion" of the mind. He found the liberal minded third Earl of Shaftesbury "reducing virtue to a matter of the passions and affections. . . attained through good breeding. . . , by harmonizing his affections and impulses," He also discusses the "exaltation" of unhappiness, describing how James Thomson (1834-1882), Thomas Warton (1688-1745), Thomas Gray (1716-1771), John (1608-1674), Samuel Richardson (1689-1761). McPherson, alias Ossian (1736-1796), and Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749-1832) respected the helpfulness in unhappiness, e.g., the joy in grief of Ossian and the sorrows of Werther, as essential for self fulfillment. The author observes, "To put an end to this unnecessary war within the nature of man was the grand ambition of the naturalistic ethics of the eighteenth century, and the longing for the complete emancipation of the natural man was at the core of the philosophical revolution then capturing the minds of men."

Feelings and Emotions,* the recording of the Loyola (1970) Symposium, ably edited by Magda Arnold, is a worthy successor to two previous volumes recording the outstanding Wittenberg (1927) and Mooseheart (1948) international symposia edited by Dr. Martin L. Reymert. Each contributor (notably) Magda Arnold, Karl H. Pribram, Silvan S. Tomkins, James Hillman, Silvano Arieti, Robert Ward Leeper, Richard S. Peters, Otto Ewert, Albert Wellek and S. Strasser) theorizes about feeling and emotion with invigorating originality and refreshing independence, including respect for his (her) tradi-

tional orientation.

^{*(}New York: Academic Press, 1970).

When great physician Sir Walter Osler was asked by his medical resident to refer him to literature about the nature of the human mind, instead of providing the titles of leading orthodox texts of the subject, he sagely replied, "Read Emerson." Sydenham similarly enjoyed this helpful sense of direction, referring his patient to Cervantes. My experience has confirmed the wisdom in such mind orientation and I gladly include in this fragmentary historical review of my understanding man as emotional man, consciously passionate scientist,

poet, philosopher, or divine.

William Shakespeare (1564–1616), my poet and playwright of spiritual insight, mastered the use of his emotionality to become, I believe, the greatest dramatist in world history. Merely to realize that each of his characters (historical or not) is his own creation reveals this genius's appreciation for 1) observing his wholeness of man and 2) the signs and symptoms helpfully heralding any neglect of due esteem for that wholeness. His word picture of the hunted hare or the dying deer, his creating a flower whispering to the human heart, his recognition of his own femininity and divinity, his immortal sonnets eternalizing love's lessons,—nowhere can I stop in honoring his self reverence, his mind heroism. Most complete emotional continence is ever evident in his writings, in his "imagination all compact."

Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749–1832) wrote, "Viewed from the heights of reason all life looks like some malignant disease and the world like a mad-house." It is evident that this wording reflects the pained impatience motivating it. Peerless Emerson wrote of Faust, "The wonder of this book is its superior intelligence. In the menstruum of this man's wit, the past and the present ages, and their religions, politics, and modes of thinking, are dissolved into archetypes and ideas."

Goethe felt, "For life is love, and spirit the very life of life itself." He declared, "To develop my individuality, quite as it is, was unconsciously from youth on my desire and purpose." As Professor Harold A. Basilius points out: "Goethe's writings and recorded conversations are replete with observations con-

cerning the self, and the ways in which development of the self can and must be done."*

Incomparable Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) observed that the language of the street is much more forceful and eloquent than that of the school, on account of its emotional power. Of innumerable illustrations of soul-stirring beauty I select his accounting for the comic on the basis of its gay irresponsible neglect ("manic denial") of the allness of wholeness:

The essence of all jokes, of all comedy, seems to be an honest or well-intentioned halfness; a non-performance of what is pretended to be performed, at the same time that one is giving loud pledges of performance. . . .

We have no deeper interest than our integrity, and that we should be made aware by joke and by stroke of any lie we entertain. . . .

We do nothing that is not laughable when we quit our spontaneous sentiment. . . .

The multiplication of artificial wants and expenses in civilized life, and the exaggeration of all trifling forms, present innumerable occasions for this discrepancy to expose itself. . . .

The comedy is in the intellect's perception of discrepancy. . . .

A perception of the Comic seems to be a balance-wheel in our metaphysical structure.**

As Poet Wilbert Snow observed, Emerson is "all in all the most germinal writer that has yet appeared in America."***

Walt Whitman (1819–1892) responded to suggestion that he suppress certain passages in *Leaves of Grass* relating to sexual matters: "What I am trying to write is a poem or epic about a man—a man representing humanity. I want to write about a complete man; and I will not castrate him." As Lafcadio

^{•&}quot;Goethe's Conception of Individuality," in The Growth of Self Insight, 95.
••"The Comic."

^{*** &}quot;Individuality in the Work of Emerson," The Growth of Self Insight, 51.

Hearn observed, "'What am I' became the one great question of Whitman's whole life." On that count alone I honor and praise my Whitman's honest, solipsistic, song of his self:

Do I contradict myself? Very well, then I contradict myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes.)

Within me latitude widens; longitude lengthens, My elbows rest in sea-gaps; my palms cover continents, I am greater than sunshine, for I go into depth.

There is no God any more divine than myself.*

Hardy pioneer Margaret Laird identifies religious and medical education. She upholds the efficacy of modern medicine as no exception to relying solely upon self experience, independently felt. She enjoys realization of the quickening, tempering, ordering power of the spirit of love. The unitary term identity justly names the biological adequacy in my loving all of my self experience with the same homogeneous good-will. Thus, as a faithful M.D. I am pleased to be able to see healthfulness in this feelingful self assertion of my Mary Baker Eddy**:

This is my support, the fact that the male and female natures are equally expressed, co-existent in me. This is the way that I exist and is the reason that I can never lack.

It is because I am of the nature of infinite completeness, there is never anything in my experience in which the male and female qualities are not infinitely at one supporting each other. It is because my spiritual inspiration is perfectly balanced with scientific understanding, my joy is perfectly balanced with courage, and because my love is perfectly balanced with strength.

^{*}Quoted from the MS. in Charles E. Feinberg's Whitman Collection.

**Through courtesy of Mrs. William P. Doyle. Copied from the author's works, Rare Book Room, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

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MY THEORY OF EMOTION

Morality is the self conscious living of life Warner Fite

Most of all I wish to learn how to live in such a way as to fulfill my potential possibility. Of any or all of my functioning I consider it most helpful to realize just how it contributes to my appreciation for the personal wholeness and allness of my marvelous activity called human being. Of the power I name feeling or emotion, therefore, I am most interested to discover its specific biological function. How does it operate to process my integrated living itself? How does it enter into my growing my self as a consciously inviolable, intact, individual? How does it constitute my emotional equilibrium? How can I grow to operate it personally, i.e., with emotional consciousness for my whole individuality?

The only evidence on which my theory is based is conscious self (or soul) evidence, nothing but conscious wishful subjectivity. I find every other kind of methodological ground to consist of unconscious self (or soul) evidence, nothing but unconscious wishful subjectivity. I find love, the very desire for self living, to be the prototype of all emotion or feeling. Each modality of this primary joy in living contributes to creating the illusion of many emotions, including so-called opposites or conflicting, ambivalent and mixed emotions. However, I find every pain or unhappiness to be really a lovable version of love itself, once I can understand just why and how it functions. Only my disciplining my mind in supreme devotion to truth can save it from the dire consequence of my not doing so. Living is willing (wishing) to live.

At first sight, every pain or unhappy feeling does not seem desirable and therefore I do not easily wish to explore its absolute truth. Instead I tend to give it a name that signifies unlovable, such as hate or fear or jealousy, and so on, thus creating the illusion of many. However, as I take the trouble to study so-called "emotionally disturbed child." The so-called "psychodynamic" help this child needs is that of ever so gradually finding out the helpfulness to his self of his every emotion by discovering how to use it to the advantage of his whole self. I include under the term psychodynamic the psychology of the whole mind, including its so-called body or somatic physique.

Traditionally the psychologist studies the activities of the organism as a whole, but as an integrated unit "reacting to its external environment" rather than as entirely self sufficient and self contained. Conventionally the physiological psychologist then studies "the relationship of integrated behavior to the various bodily structures and functions." My psychological psychology is my using my mind to study my mind only, to observe its self contained wholeness nature, to consider all of its functioning to be the only psychology possible. However, my orientation is intentionally (wishfully) individualistic.

My method of study is as consciously introspective as I can make it. My strong feeling for my over-all truth that psychic reality is my only possible reality necessitates this procedure. No other method can provide me with biologically adequate evaluation of reality. My affective experience expresses itself directly in my psychological processes ranging from pleasant to unpleasant, as my living is either facilitated by my self appreciating personal consciousness or inhibited by my self ignoring personal unconsciousness. Self appreciation is the deepest necessity of life, and without self awareness there can be no conscious self appreciation. So-called "selfishness" does not consist of valuing my self, but in ignoring the equal valuing of my fellowman who also consists of my living self. Only an individual mind can be "social," or be anything else that is human

Conscious self feeling, the issue of conscious self love, affords my realizing highest developed unity of my life in terms of my acknowledgeable personal identity. It intensifies the truth of my personality by enabling my conscious mastery of my primary feeling, my love being. To the extent that I practice self awareness I can lovingly renounce other systematizing, all of the fact (truth) necessitating the seemingly undesirable feeling or emotion, I always discover its absolute truthfulness, hence its basic lovable goodness. For instance, when my way of conducting my life engenders anxiety or depression, by studying the truth underlying such unhappiness I discover not only why I am anxious or depressed but also how to conduct my life in a way that can relieve my unhappiness. Concern for truth is concern for reality. Truth deservedly requires my utmost devotion on account of its indispensable biological utility.

My present theory of emotion posits it to be the soul of the meaning of my life experience, providing and amounting to all of the mentality of my human individuality. This explanation is fundamental for my understanding all that I can mean by my mental development, including my so-called education. Either consciously or unconsciously, my "education" must apply only to my emotional or feeling discipline, namely conscious self experience through which I cultivate my emotional development, continence and control.

My Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic method of self analysis proves itself to be ideal self experience for my arousing my mind to the lifeful functioning of all of my emotionality. My "formal education" does not. Therefore it was necessary for me to resort to this conscious self analysis to discover the open secret that all I can sense, or feel, or think, or experience in any way is only and entirely my innate self activity. My emotionality constitutes the activity I call my mental condition.

What passes for formal education in the mind of my educator either ignores or belittles emotionality, largely in the name of being scientific, practical, objective, or even impersonal. The teacher is devoted chiefly to "fact subjects" that disregard the main fact of passion. It is only the exceptional teacher whose imagination is sufficiently free to consider: taking emotion from study would be tantamount to taking the child from the child. I must learn to renounce kindly my tendency to assume and feel that classroom experience is a recess from living. The consequence of the child's attitude of irresponsibility about carefully cultivating his regulation of his affective power is the

cence "and" guilt, courage "and" fear, and so on, is the consequence of seeing my own unity underlying both my conscious and unconscious living. This oneness concept of "opposites" may be helpfully elaborated to account for intensity of affect.

My love is strong exactly to the extent that it includes whatever is difficultly loved. Strong love is not required whenever it is "easy" to love. Only when I can live with love that which at first I had to live merely with dislike (extending all the way to hatred) can I even realize what strong love is. Similarly my courage is strong exactly to the extent that it includes whatever is difficultly lived courageously. Only when I can live with courage that which at first I had to live merely fearfully (extending all the way to terror) can I even realize what strong courage is. Strong courage is not required whenever it is "easy" to live courageously. Likewise, my innocence is strong exactly to the extent that it includes whatever is difficultly lived with innocence. Strong innocence is not required whenever it is "easy" to feel innocent. Only when I can live with innocence that which at first I had to live merely with guilt (extending all the way to "unpardonable wrong") can I even realize what strong innocence (wholesomely vigorous responsibility) is. And so on, every one of my happy emotions may be understood as subsuming its corresponding (opposite) unhappy emotion.

In the same general way, the intensity of each of my unhappy emotions may be understood as subsuming its corresponding ("opposite") happy emotion. My hatred is strong exactly to the extent that it includes whatever is difficultly hated. Strong hatred is not required whenever it is "easy" to hate. Only when I can live with hatred that which I formerly lived merely with love (extending all the way to adoration) can I even realize what strong hatred is. My fear is strong exactly to the extent that it includes whatever is difficultly feared. Only when I must live with fear that which I formerly lived courageously can I even realize what strong fear is. Strong fear is not required whenever it is "easy" to fear. And so on.

By increasing my conscious tolerance for unhappy emotion of any kind I make it effective for my controlling and directing

realize the wholeness of my individuality and eventually attain insightful appreciation for my necessarily solipsistic nature. I can encounter only my self, and that truth shows me all true "objectivity" is impossible. Leo Tolstoy stated, It is easier to produce ten volumes of philosophical writing than to put one principle into practice. The principle I practice in this writing may be stated: The psychology of all of my emotion reveals the emotionality of all of my psychology.

Disciplining my mind with its ordering principle, conscious self love, I find all of my apparent dogmatism is really my passionate egotism, and discover I have no choice other than to be an absolutely orthodox individualist in all of my feelingful views and ideas about my world creation. I can and must choose however to be either conscious or unconscious for this truth of truths. Furthermore, only my conscious faith in the absolute inviolability of my self can awaken me fully to conscious responsibility for any of my behavior. Thus I discover in all of my so-called intellectual interest the ever present passion that reveals it as nothing but my deep longing to enjoy the functioning of my individuality. Conscious self love is required for biologically adequate self esteem.

Love is the power of power. To illustrate, relief from depression may seem to be reached by replacing it with a stronger emotion, but such "relief" is more apparent than real (as in "manic denial" of depression). Real relief from depression, as of every unhappiness or pain, occurs only as I discover its seeming "unlovableness," itself, is a modification of love.

It is my specific effort to try to make manifest the latent unition, the sameness of purpose, of my every passion, to show that each one's basic function is to subserve the ideal wholeness of my absolute individuality. To understand just how such distressing excitements as hatred, fear, rage, suspicion, jealousy, guilt, or whatever, are biologically as useful as hunger or thirst, or sexual desire, for preserving life and attaining life fulfillment, is a vital issue clarified only by my cultivating consciously controlled emotional orientation. Seeing the real unity underlying the apparent duality of my love "and" hate, inno-

tute absolutely certain ground for my life affirmation. My appreciating my full sameness involves the functioning of both my pain and my pleasure. Each is equally desirable, equally lifeworthy. Discovering that my unpleasure is of lifesaving help to me I gradually include it in my conscious self identity, thus dispelling illusional duality of 1) my conscious personal identity and 2) my whole self.

Whatever is, is beautiful, yet I cannot feel it surely until I can feel all of the beauty of it. On the other hand, I cannot feel all of the beauty of it as long as I cannot feel the whole truth it

contains.

Whatever is, is good, yet I cannot feel it surely until I can feel all of the goodness of it. On the other hand, I cannot feel all of the goodness of it as long as I cannot feel the whole truth it contains.

Whatever is, is real, yet I cannot feel it surely until I can feel all of the reality of it. On the other hand, I cannot feel all of the reality of it as long as I cannot feel the whole truth it contains.

Whatever is, is desirable, yet I cannot feel it surely until I can feel all of the desirability of it. On the other hand I cannot feel all of the desirability of it as long as I cannot feel the whole truth it contains.

Thus I can go on accounting for my every experience of pain or unhappiness as self imposed upon my life by my inability to feel the whole truth it contains. On the other hand, once I can feel the whole truth in any of my difficult living I can no longer condemn it as undesirable, or objectionable in any way, but rather must feel it as the "blessing in disguise," as the self providence, it factually is. I can imagine nothing more catastrophic than that all of the requirement for a production be present without its occurring.

Furthermore each emotion is all about its self, that is, it does not "take an object." Thus, love is all about its self, namely love; hate is all about its self, namely hate; guilt is all about its self, namely guilt; and so on. To state: I am in love with you, or angry with you, or suspicious of you, or the like, implies

my living in a way that respects my wholeness. Thus I become capable of exciting my strong anger, hatred, fear, guilt, jealousy, prudishness, or so on, without feeling overwhelmed by it, without its developing power of panic proportion pre-empting the possibility of my consciously feeling my self identity. Furthermore I avoid the risk of denying that I am capable of such emotionality. I have found that whenever I am unaware of the existence of any emotional potential in my self (such as envy, or suspicion, or shame, etc.) my living is then being excessively affected by this particular emotion that I am not even aware is operating in me. Thus my negated jealousy, shame, disgust, or whatever, becomes (unconsciously) hyperactive in guiding my behavior.

My lowly passion is exactly as worthy as my lofty emotion in that each manifests my biological law enforcing active affirmation of my intact oneness. My every pain (unhappiness of any kind) is indispensable for my conscious self discipline. By disregarding it I must overlook most important truth, namely, that I am violating my duty of respecting my united allness. To illustrate, my grief helps me to confront my self with the evidence that I am whatever I am mourning as "gone." My appreciation for my wholeness is obscured when my attention is compelled by my grieving or fearing that some of me is "lost," but gradually my concern for this lost selfness reveals itself as the beginning of acknowledging its presence. I never withhold my loving from the living of any of my selfness that I can recognize as my helpful being. Without consciously painful experience to discipline my mind in conscious self preservation, I must end my living. Pain is as wishful in my good as is my pleasure.

Therefore, the lifesaving importance of my cultivating my conscious self identity, that is, of my growing my awareness of my being my omnific self, becomes my first and foremost vital concern. To wit, I must awaken to the truth that all of my painful or unhappy living is my indispensably helpful self living, that "dislike" in any form or degree cannot constitute any basis for my life negation whatsoever, but rather must consti-

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tion is the residuum of a specific critical event characterizing man's phylogenetic experience, is a fascinating one. Just as every arrest of his individual development appears to be represented specifically by an emotionally charged mental pattern that he expresses "beyond his volitional control" (for example, a "hysterical attack") so it may be imagined that specific cataclysmic events in his prehistoric lineage were capable of modifying love of life to explain his forebear's emotional pattern of seeming unlove characteristically felt in every unhappiness. Such phylogenetic occurrences in the life of prehistoric man may have resulted in his originating and cultivating helpful but difficultly regulated feelings of fear, hate, guilt, jealousy, shame, and so on. Freud conceived, "a hysterical attack may be likened to a freshly constructed individual affect and a normal affect to the expression of a general hysteria which has become a heritage."*

In keeping with my primary principle of unity (oneness, individuality) I consistently posit one primary emotion, namely love (or adoration), as reflecting life affirmation (the joy of living). Then I account for every emotion but conscious self love as being merely a sign or symptom of it. Every other conscious affect being understandable as a modification or aspect of this primary wishful loving, its particular quality is determined by its purpose of serving its self in my living of my con-

scious self identity.

Crudely put, fear is a sign of love that seems endangered, grief is a sign of love that seems lost, guilt is a sign of love that seems withheld, anger is a sign of love that seems hurt, jealousy is a sign of love that seems overlooked, and so on. My study of my anxiety shows it to be of greatest use for my heeding that I am overlooking my wholeness (unity, allness). My anxiety occurs when I am unaware of the consequence of my disregarding the helpfulness of my meaning for my wholeness. Its functioning always excites my need for my living of my self identity.

^{*}See Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926), Standard Edition XX, 84.

that my emotion can somehow apply to another. Whereas my every emotion can and must concern its self only, thus: love is in love with love only; hate is in hate only; guilt is all about its guiltiness; and so on.

K. Fischer (Uber den Witz, 1889) observes that the "purely aesthetical. . . . depends entirely on itself, its end is only itself and it fulfills no other end in life." This description of the aesthetic feeling, that it is clearly self-contained pleasure contributing to self satisfaction, is consistent with the finding that conscious experience of wholeness furthers life appreciation.

I am self conscious only in the active process by which I build up my knowledge of my world. I experience no mind except that which I produce by my living of my mental events. Although self consciousness is never complete, it is always a unity precisely reflecting its own activity, growing in complexity but never losing its unity. This self conscious identity merely expresses the fact that there is only one world of experience, namely, self experience. The self, or subject, realizes its unity in a specific way, namely, through its desires. Without my desires I lose appreciation of my unity because there is nothing to be unified. My emotions form a unity with which I can try to realize my ideal of self fulfillment, of complete life.

Integral to the truth of consciously subjective individuality is absolute liberty, composed of the united freedom and necessity in being wholly and inviolably one organic life. If I know what the self is like I can deduce what the cell is like, hardly the converse. The necessarily full extent to which I-am-all-of-my-wholeness, is a consideration beyond my conscious appreciation. My mind is not consciously free to feel all of it. Every observation I cannot experience self consciously must be a derivative of a fixation (arrest of my emotional development). Any meaning, any emotion, that I cannot live with love is active beyond my conscious control. My resistance to feeling my identity in it is a costly limitation of self control.

Constituting as it does the only coin of the psychic realm, the tension of sensibility named emotion or affect is of greatest importance for self understanding. The theory that each emo-

To associate my feeling of unpleasure with anything besides its self is the origin of my "problem of evil," as of all of my socalled mental disorder. "Heaven" is often used as a meliorative term concealing faultfinding ("a future world better than this one"); "hell" and "evil" are pejorative terms manifestly containing faultfinding. I help my self to the extent that I do not use the word "consciousness" or "observation" except in the felt sense of self consciousness or self observation.

I locate the origin, course and extent of all emotionality only in the individual mind, specifically in my mind. Again, this treatise is no effort to reduce my psychology to physiology, but rather to reveal the psychological nature of the psychological functioning of emotion, to explicate the meaning of each emotion for all emotionality, to discover the place of passion in human life, specifically in my life.

I conceive my only scientific purpose to be the discovery of my self power for its most useful exertion and control. Therefore I try to observe my emotional power in order to understand just how it does function in my living, so that I can then see how to put it to work in whatever I conceive to be the vital

interest of my whole being.

Thus in the matter of the most crucial issue of all emotionality, I consider it most beneficial for me to be able to understand 1) my love as my ardent desire to feel my present activity as my own living, and 2) my hate as my ardent desire to feel my identity as separated from whatever I must presently live in hate. For this purpose it is helpful to recognize all of my love as merely love of love, and all of my hate as merely hate of hate,-each being all and only about itself. Feeling love I can consciously comprehend (feel its identity in) its potential hate, but feeling hate I do not consciously comprehend (feel its identity in) its potential love. I can honor the truth that I strengthen my conscious self by growing able to live with love whatever I difficultly love. Hence it is life affirming for me to cultivate my motivation (will) to extend my conscious loving to subsume its unlovable (hurt and seemingly only hateful) being.

It is noteworthy that the alleged purpose of working up a

In his The Unknown Self,* Georg Groddeck reveals his alert self consciousness, thus:

Freud has made the ambivalence of mental life clear enough to be understood by everyone. We know that love includes hate, that contempt is bound up with respect, that scorn betokens admiration, that counsel dissuades, that commands forbid, that "Yes" means "No," and not until we know this are we able to understand what Freud calls "transference."

In my language wherever conscious self sentiment is lacking a "transference" word (meaning not-I) is employed. Whatever I live irresponsibly, that is, without acknowledging that it is entirely and only my own living, constitutes my transference living. Self consciousness or transference consciousness is my only choice. All of my conduct of my life comes under the heading of an affair of my heart. Consciously responsible self love or irresponsible transference love is the vitally important choice I must make. Transference is the strongest kind of "resistance" to self consciousness, and hence worthy of greatest consideration. Recognition of its helpfulness as modified self love, once fully appreciated, enables the return of clear acknowledgment of the (repressed, modified) self love. Transference, as every other seeming exception to recognizable self love, can always prove itself to be the only available protection against even more difficult conscious loving.

To illustrate, I am my every sensation or perception or mentality of any nature. That is, my wish to live includes whatever I experience. Therefore I sense or perceive, etc., only, what I please. All of my living is wishful, being dictated by whatever I want to want. However this extent of conscious self sincerity may regularly be far too great to be included in my conscious self identity feeling. Then my wish to localize my seemingly unwished for experience in my transference love proves practical. I can feel my own identity only as and where my feeling occurs.

*(New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1951).

self ceaselessly. I feel all of the content of this book to be my

responsibility only.

My life's work has necessitated my growing great experience about the bitter-sweet hardship called "family living" each individual must undergo as infant, child, and adolescent. Even as I realize that such passionately eventful existence is the most helpfully developmental of any that I can imagine, I am also mindful of the critical consequence (for the cultivation of vitally essential lovable self identity) of all such taken-forgranted family rights as special privileges of painful familiarity, indelicate intimacy, domineering and innumerable other attempted suspensions of the biological fact of inviolable human individuality characterizing every individual's home living.

When I finally awakened to see all love as self love, and every other emotion, beginning with hate, as self love modified specifically in the service of its own interest, then as never before, I could summon courage to imagine my theory of emotion as reliable basis for a Science of My Self. For the first time I really understood the Ode to Love of that profound student of his own mind, Samuel Taylor Coleridge:

All thoughts, all passions, all delights, Whatever stirs this mortal frame, All are but ministers of love.

And feed his sacred flame.

More to the point of health, after this lovable self revelation I found it possible consciously to choose the truth of (self) love as my guiding life principle disclosing all of my being (doing) as good. At that arousal of my self wisdom I saw and felt the vitalizing power of conscious peace I had been hiding away in my unrecognized soul under the alias of Somebody Else, or Hate, or Pain, or Impersonal, or Enemy, or some such name for my disguised Self Love. Thus I achieved also the conscious strength to try to endure the excitement of being constantly born anew, alone, asking my self and answering my self about my every concern. Furthermore I have never been able to find

medical history or any kind of "case" study is gradually to discover sufficient truth to account for, or understand, the subject's way of living, such as his presenting symptoms or throw light upon the person's behavior, nevertheless in my experience they are seldom if ever appreciated as disclosing its slways vitally ideal, hence proper and beneficial, nature. The so-called facts of the case may be construed as barely explaining it, but hardly, if at all, fully honoring it as in every way desirable and perfectly worthy truth, quite as the truth is always good.

Would not this degree of reverence for truth make it impossible for one to build up any case against a so-called adversary or even criminal? Yes, it certainly would. Full reverence for all its perfection. In her clarifying account, "The Conventional View of the Child's Emotional Life," Anna Freud states,

Until the end of the last century, the psychological conception of the child's emotional life was of the simplest kind. It consisted rather of child's emotional life was of the simplest well-known picture of the so-alied' happiness of childhood''. . . These views of the child's emotional life gave little help in the understanding and interpreting of the actual needs of children.*

Discovering the fact of my necessary subjectivity in this way, all of my views of soul (including spirituality, ideality, and the like "high minded, grander, divine" passions) can at last become understood as natural to me, as desirably expressive only of my real being. Without such courageous self love, I from my self wonderful truths of my completences and whole ness by hiding them behind my own self screens I name religion, society, objectivity or other externality of innumerable forms. Life treats me the way I treat my life. I am feeling my forms.

^{*} The Writings of Anna Freud, IV, 431-433.

nothing but a front for my feeling of conscious self love. All of my conviction is lovable self certainty. And so on. I cannot separate my intelligence, or will, or whatever, from my life feeling that conceives, constitutes and confirms my all.

Therefore living all of my self experience with love is a specific form of mental discipline accounting for my self endurance and courage. It derives from appreciation for, and highest developed unity of, all of my emotional living. My proof of my self authenticity becomes gradually attainable as I undergo each ordeal of acknowledging my own responsible individuality in each experience momentarily tending to overwhelm my sense of personal identity, on account of its intense excitation, either pleasurable or unpleasurable. As far as any of my meaning is concerned: Whatever is, only psychically is. And all experience of any conscious meaning is emotional experience contributing to my reverence for the greatness of my existence. I feel empty and of no account to the extent that I do not feel conscious self love.

By the consciously insightful psychologist it was recognized even in the nineteenth century that a sensation is a mental event of purely subjective character. Only gradually does the growing infant develop his ability to use his sensation to incite his creation of meaning (specific emotionality) for his imagined outer world. My observation of my self growth is my feeling it. This self experience is the only possible source of all that I

mean by mental.

Adoration is the full affirmation of living and the attainment of this complete life appreciation is the consequence of sufficient conscious, self fulfillment. Clearly it is understandable that nothing can happen until every factor necessary for its happening is operative. This means that the whole truth is always on the side of whatever happens, making it desirable, adorable. This means that every aspect of my living that I find objectionable is really ideal. Not only must I live through it, but also, I must live by means of it. Without my living by means of my every painful ("unhappy") experience, obviously my existence must cease.

any other way to become consciously innocent in all of my emotion rather than unconsciously guilty in it, responsible for my self activity rather than seemingly enslaved by it.

I need my self consciousness to function as steady watchfulness against my sleeping away my appreciation for the allness of my individuality. In order to practice honesty, or any virtue, I must live it as lovable. Thus, I practice recognizing the inseparability in so-called separation; the wholeness in so-called parting; the unity in so-called plurality; the egoism in so-called altruism; the divinity in so-called devilry; the happiness in socalled unhappiness; the psychology in so-called physiology or anatomy, or whatever so-called scientific vivisection. My nature's greatest need is the constant heralding of the inviolably intact integrity of my human individuality along with the realization that thus I draw my conscious strength from my unconscious vitality. The more insight I create in each of these directions, the more my appreciated self identity harmonizes with my whole life itself. Thus I find my essential nature, equating my life process with my mental (emotional) process, behaving according to my inmost heart.

Hard-won conscious self love is the necessary condition of conscious individualism. Only through self love can I enjoy adequate appreciation for the true extent of my very existence. My loving is my enjoying the reality of my being, my only truth. My daring to love my being is the courage I need for my adventure through the infinite reaches of my nature. My whole life can be nothing but the functioning, genesis and growth, of the feeling of my individuality. My uniquely human power is in my feeling that accounts fully for whatever "wisdom" is mine.

Discipline in conscious fidelity to my self is my one sure safe and sane way of life. My at first shocking discovery that all reason is in the service of passion, rather than all passion in the service of unreason, ultimately led to my finding all of my wisdom in my love, instead of in the pursuit of "the love of wisdom." All of my understanding is a fundamental condition of the depth and breadth of my feeling of conscious love. All of my "possession," over which I may figure or fume, can be

as language of my emotion. As I grow my sensation or perception (whether I nominate it I or not-I) I feel that experience. I am the feeling, the feeler, and the felt. I have taught myself to see that my language always expresses my emotional activity, as a kind of word-picture of feeling. Thus, my complaint verbalizes the logic of my suffering; my rejoicing words the logic of my happiness; my accusation words the logic of my anger; my idea of suicide words the logic of my grief. Similarly, every way I can feel, finds verbal release in language characteristic for it.

How can I be aware of anything but my own living? Can I assume the consciousness of another person? How can anything exist for me besides my own existence? Can I assume the existence of somebody else or something else? Yes, my free imagination enables me to use my mind consciously in every such way, quite as if I can achieve the impossible.

The ancient Indian sage founded his philosophy in the truth of the individualized and inviolable self or soul and its only way of choosing its course of life, namely, by what felt good. His chief concern was the prevention of the root-cause of his unhappiness, namely, his overlooking his own nature and needs, his preventing dependence on his illusion of any-other. Therefore the emotional aspect of his living was accorded the importance of primacy it requires and deserves.

This present writing observes the biological value of purposeful regulation of human sensibility in setting forth 1) a scheme of conscious emotional control and 2) an account of the vitally healthful functioning of every emotional process, pleasant or unpleasant. All of my life's confusion is traceable directly to my living my emotional functioning without realizing that it can refer only and entirely to me. Therefore, rather than rule emotionality out of my scientific orientation by striving for an impossible "dispassionate impersonal" approach, I find it desirably necessary that I honor my emotional capacity by granting it the study priority warranted by its biological worth. I am certain that the most urgent need existing in my fellowman throughout my world is his difficultly working up his own Once I study all of the fact (truth) involved in any of my troublesome living I can no longer "find fault" with it but rather must thank my self for being able to endure, and ultimately revere, it. Consciousness for this truthful consequence enables full understanding for its goodness and beauty. My unconsciousness for this consequence of truth leads to my hypostatizing unrecognized truth as an entity named "falsehood"; or to my hypostatizing unrecognized reality as an entity named "unreality," or to my hypostatizing unrecognized good as an entity named "evil"; and so on. Obviously this way of helping my self is most costly in terms of my understanding that my soul (my divinity) is my all-perfect self possession. Therefore, I reiterate it.

Whatever is, wholly, perfectly, desirably, and adorably is. Consciousness for all of the truth about any experience always accounts for it completely. Hence it is, only terms naming feeling of adoration can really apply to any or all of one's living. Hence it is, the one emotion of conscious love or conscious adoration is biologically adequate for the living of any or all experience. However this "divine look" that observes all is divine (perfectly true hence perfectly desirable) is only possible whenever I am able to recognize the power of truth necessitating it. Thus, if I cannot appreciate the truth (fact, reality) as accounting fully for any event, I cannot live that event as good or true or beautiful. Thus arises my need for modifying my conscious emotion of love so that it can unconsciously be expressed in one or another form of inhibited love such as hatred, guilt, fear, or anger. In other words conscious love is expressed in the form of conscious life satisfaction or pleasure, whereas, unconscious love is expressed in the form of life dissatisfaction or pain. This means that consciousness in the form of self consciousness is associated with self love or life affirmation; and unconsciousness in the form of self unconsciousness is associated with some form of inhibited functioning of love such as hate, or some other painful tension such as jealousy, suspicion, envy, embarrassment, shame, disgust.

All of my mental activity, including wording, may be defined

self whether or not I am feeling my own psychological body as such or some other being of my world. This ability may lead me to indulge the illusion that when I am not consciously touching my psychological body, I am not touching my self at all. Although all of my touching must be of my self alone, the illusion that it is not can support the whole delusional system of "an external world verifiable by sensory experience."

Even beyond this degree of self deception, if my affective experience can ever seem to "relate to," or have anything to do with, existence other than my own, then this illusion facilitates my deluding my self that my emotion can refer to existence other than my own. Then with feeling of self justification I can indulge such a delusion as "I love you," or "I hate you," or "I am jealous of you," or "I am sorry for you," or "I can help you," or whatever.

In addition of course, if I can thus somehow leave my self to have meaning for some other self, it is only natural for me to assume that my fellowman has similar power to go out of his mind to influence another one. Then with similar feeling of self justification I can indulge such a delusion as "You love me," or "You hate me," or "You can help me," or whatever.

Traditional hypothesis about emotion is based upon the concept of the human individual as one of very many others external to him but meaningful and united to him by emotional ties. The scientific fact, validatory to every individual who wishes to prove it to his self, is that his every emotion is only and entirely an affirmation of his own living of his own mental condition. ("Intentional" genesis of emotion is also the act of the accomplished performer who at will purposefully feels his real affect, although it is judged by the spectator to be pretense.)

The keenest sensibility is felt in the vital process called consciousness, and the keenest consciousness is felt in the life process called self consciousness. Insight regarding specific essence of existence as constituted of self activity is obscured in my term "phenomenon" (rather than disclosed in the term noumenon), my futile attempt to objectify my subjectivity.

My awakening to the truth of my monogenic subjectivity has

method of dealing with his emotional life with conscious self continence, his attaining his emotional maturity. The inescapable fact is that human living must be as difficult as it is marvelous, true, but I can imagine escaping it.

The health consequence of low spirits or high spirits is so obvious that it may be tempting to take it for granted rather than to give it the attention it biologically deserves. The actual fact is that my insightful understanding of the working of my emotion is essential for my being able to make up my mind that my life is worth living. The discipline of conscious emotional control gradually develops deep life cheer.

By "psychology of emotion" I refer to my study of the nature and functioning of feeling by which consciously felt individual living is created and maintained. By psychology I mean: conscious or unconscious functioning of the whole individual. I choose this terminology for it stresses individuality and does not lend itself to unnoticed not-self illusion. My every science is psychologically created by me, the scientist, just as is all of my self experience.

Although an analysis of each emotion is surely desirable, my present intention is merely to record some of my observations upon my whole person's experiencing my capacity for feeling. I shall forego listing the fine experimental elucidations by W. B. Cannon, P. Bard, C. Sandis, G. Dumas, L. T. Troland, and many another able student of physiology. I observe affectivity in all of my conscious living, for example, from most elemental psychological processes called "sensation" to aesthetic and ethical conduct called "sublime" (or "spiritual").

My recognition that I create all of my own sensibility, including all of my own emotionality, enables me to study it quite as I would undertake any scientific observation, namely, as consciously directed self observation. This freedom to observe that I activate my emotion directly instead of being just the passive experiencer of it, enables intentional exciting of it, for purpose of study. In other words, I find my science of emotion to be a possibility quite as is a science of any other interest, such as my "pure" mathematics.

When I activate my sense of touch I can ordinarily tell my

I created this analogy as a consequence of my disciplining my mind with self awareness by practicing free association. Speaking my mind without reservation and directing attention to the emotion in what I am saying seems similar to running my hand over my body to explore it from the standpoint of its feeling. A certain region proves characteristically sensitive, tender, painful, or whatever. I tend to use my probing finger in a way corresponding to the feeling aroused. Thus I approach one or another region tentatively, lightly, or even not at all. However by means of my manual palpation, percussion, visual inspection, auscultation, olfactory examination, each a kind of touch, I may discover much of the nature of the feeling of my mind's body. Similarly by allowing my attention to rove freely, while the rest of my mind excites itself to function freely also, I may discover much of the nature of other extent of my mind's feeling.

Just as I may observe that my finger's sensitivity is distinct from that of the rest of my body's sensitivity, so I may observe that the consciousness in my attention is distinct from the unconsciousness of the rest of my mind. Any and all of my mind is unconscious until it activates its power of its self consciousness.

As stated, inhibition of any positive happy affective excitement gives rise to the negative unhappy modification of that specific emotion. Such "inhibition" is the result of my being unaware of the helpfulness to me of that particular experience I am living with arrested pleasure. Once I am able to observe the life containing value of any experience, then I can no longer withhold my grateful appreciation for being able to live it. It is therefore of most practical value for me to be able to realize. I must either live by and through whatever experience I create in my existence, or die.

Of all my reality I can ill afford to ignore or even slight this biological truth, namely, the precious benefit to me of whatever experience I do live. Furthermore it behooves me to honor my tolerance for the painful (unhappy) tensions I must endure pending my working up my fully pleasing appreciation for any

enabled me to make a fresh look for whatever I experience. Certainly my conscious self orientation has made me "think for my self" about all of my psychic scenery.

As my whole mind is unconscious, so every affective or emotional impulse is unconscious. How "consciousness" itself constitutes its own emotionality is another matter of its own activity. In other words "conscious" and unconscious do not and cannot constitute an antithesis. Rather each, as all clse, constitutes its self only.

For consciously feeling the nature of my mind I help my self by studying the sensibility of its foundation, namely, my body meaning (feeling). Just as Alfred North Whitehead, in *Modes* of *Thought* (1938), insightfully claimed:

All sense-perception is merely one outcome of the dependence of our experience upon bodily functioning. Thus if we wish to understand the relation of our personal experience to the activities of nature, the proper procedure is to examine the dependence of our personal experiences upon our personal bodies.

One zone of my body may be specially sensitive, another not. The sensitive region is particularly excitable and autonomically develops a condition exciting its sensitivity in characteristic ways. I discovered one way as an infant when I moved my finger or hand to "feel" it. My finger or hand of course can feel only its self. When this zone is not exciting its sensibility it is living unconsciously; when it excites its sensibility it is living consciously.

Using this specific body-of-my-mind model I can help my self to understand the general nature of my consciousness or unconsciousness. Thus one zone of any of my mind may be specially sensitive, another not. The sensitive region is particularly excitable and autonomically develops consciousness in itself in characteristic ways. One way I discovered when I move or use my attention purposefully so that the region activates its sensitivity. My attention of course can feel only its self. Attention functions for my whole mind somewhat as my feeling finger can function for my mind's body.

you perceive pain is no more necessarily an evil, but an essential element of the highest good.*

Purely organic functioning is the source of all of the joy of living. However, the living of my appreciation for my personal identity is of utmost biological importance, for it is this self honoring power that exercises conscious responsibility as well as control about whatever way I live. As my recognition of the individuality of my nature functions, my conscious will power develops so that my ability to select and direct my self functioning become a reliable source of profound self satisfaction.

It is specially notable that intense degrees of my emotion of positive love itself can become a source of difficulty and also be inhibited in the interest of the functioning of my conscious self identity. To illustrate, my emotive meaning of my divinity may be repudiated as being truly self meaning and relegated to an other-than-self (or beyond-self, or greater-than-self) order, pending my growing my own acknowledgeable endurance for such exciting being. Again my wish for this endurance is engendered by my feeling the advantage to my self in acknowledging, rather than disowning, any of my feeling of divinity (adoration, worship, ecstasy).

It is the nature of all excited unpleasant living to limit attention as nearly as possible to wherever impaired functioning is occurring. This centering of my interest upon where any trouble occurs is noticeable with regard to pain, but it is equally true of all unhappiness. Conscious hatred, guilt, fear, or whatever unpleasant feeling, calls attention to the region of living that is immediately endangering my conscious appreciation for the wholeness of my individuality. It does so particularly by its demanding all attention it can, even at the cost of obscuring other wishing of my wholeness. My consciously disowned unconscious hatred functions continuously.

However, the fact is that consciously unpleasant living does

[&]quot;See also the excellent chapter on "Faith and Sight" in J. Allanson Picton, The Mystery of Matter. Hinton's Mystery of Pain may well remain the classical utterance on this mind-saving subject.

and every difficult experience I may suddenly observe I happen to be creating for and of my self. Whatever pain (including unhappiness of any kind or degree) I ever find in my living, is produced by the organic functioning of my enduring difficult experience until I can, if possible, duly appreciate it as my own life process and thus welcome it gladly as augmenting my acknowledgeable personal identity.

Only by increasing my capacity to observe this psychological functioning of unpleasure (that is, unconscious pleasure) in protecting the intactness of my whole individuality, can I cultivate my willingness to excite it whenever the occasion (of my experiencing more difficulty than I can appreciate as lifesaving) requires it. I must either endure it willingly, in which event I can see it as my own helpfulness; or suffer it unwillingly, in which event I must repudiate it as if harmful. Whatever I live consciously (as my own living) I can ultimately enjoy as helpful; whatever I must live unconsciously (as if it is not my own living) I can complain about as "harmful."

Although pain, or unhappiness of any kind, is a sign that I am living dangerously, it is always beneficial, never harmful, itself. Quite as renowned English physician and philosophical writer James Hinton (1822–1875) said in *The Mystery of Pain* (1866):

Little inconveniences, exertions, pains-these are the only things in which we rightly feel our life at all. If these be not there, existence becomes worthless, or worse; success in putting them all away is fatal. So it is men engage in athletic sports, spend their holidays in climbing up mountains, find nothing so enjoyable as that which taxes their endurance and their energy. This is the way we are made, I say. It may or may not be a mystery or a paradox; it is a fact. Now, this enjoyment in endurance is just according to the intensity of life: the more physical vigour and balance, the more endurance can be made an element of satisfaction. A sick man cannot stand it. The line of enjoyable suffering is not a fixed one; it fluctuates with the perfectness of the life. That our pains are, as they are, unendurable, awful, overwhelming, crushing, not to be borne save in misery and dumb impatience, which utter exhaustion alone makes natient-that our pains are thus endurable, means not that they are too great but that we are sick. We have not got our proper life. So

When I am not exciting my pleasing wholeness-consciousness, I am being excited by my own emotion nevertheless. Inability to excite my emotionality accounts for any and all of my antipathy to work. To the extent that I might restrict my affectivity in the name of safety, I may inhibit my emotionality in fear. Then I cannot sing and my imagination is held in close check. My joy of living is correspondingly limited.

Quite as a full circle may be described as consisting of a sufficiency of incomplete circles or arcs, so a good may be described as consisting of a sufficiency of incomplete goods or "bads." This kind of realization of the whole truth reveals the limited power of reasoning or logic. If I depend merely on my reasoning I thereby seem to rule out of my self awareness whatever I happen to be reasoning against, by appearing to depreciate that as unreasonable, illogical, irrational, fallacious, untrue, nonsense, and so on. Emerson noticed, "Belief consists in accepting the affirmations of the soul; unbelief, in denying them."

My thesis that happiness is the natural expression of the appreciated wholeness of human being, that joy of living consists of sensitive awareness in the unity of human nature, does indicate that any life event serving to obscure the reality of the integrity of the self be characterized as interference with conscious happiness.

As far as I can excite my sense of personal identity in whatever experience I live, obviously I do not then have to resort to the painful feeling of conflict of any kind. As far as I can enjoy ready access to my self awareness, clearly I do not have to fear

loss of control of any of my functioning.

Unpleasant emotionality such as that implied by strife, hostility, opposition, antithesis, battle, combat, contention, argument, fight, envy, suspicion, jealousy, embarrassment, fear, guilt, rage, pain, hunger, thirst, and so on, clearly indicates that the organic unity of my individuality is being overlooked. It takes the illusion of at least "two," of more or less than one, to disturb the peace provided by observed intact self wholeness.

How then can I conceive of so-called positive and negative

awaken consideration for individuality itself even though that self concern may be regional at first. I am "painfully aware" that my unhappy living is my own. Such "bringing my self to my senses" is a great biological service that deserves closest heed. It augments my conscious wishing to live. Whatever favors my awakening to truth of my wholeness is a recuperative power worthy of most careful study.

Insight upon the biological functioning of conscious unhappiness to concentrate awareness for my personal identity enables me as sufferer to discover the real "why" of my trouble by revealing an irresponsible way I am wishfully conducting my living. Once I discover that my "painful awareness" is itself therapeutic, I shall then be able to temper my resort to a "pain killer" or to any other effort to distract my attention from my therapeutic unhappiness.

My medical realism clarifies the issue in observing the following delicate balance: I must use my comforting medication (anodyne or tranquilizer) to keep mobilizing my self interest even though I feel unhappy so that I can keep feeling the amount of unhappiness that can awaken me to consider that my wholesome emotional relief derives from my mending my ways.

Study of the laws of feeling discloses the mighty psychological power of endurance, that is, the developed capacity to feel intense excitement with sufficient composure to preserve awareness for one's wholeness at the same time. What cannot be cured must be endured, is a statement of deeply passionate wisdom. My nature is perfect. It cannot be cured but can be endured. Once endured it is enjoyed as my owndom. Elsewhere I refer to this process of enduring hardship as the only possible source of hardihood. I am whatever I may be living, and only by taking heed that I am all that I live can I, as Emerson worded the desire, nerve my self "with incessant affirmatives" to "chant the beauties of the good." Little wonder that my ancient forebear considered Aum, the secret name of his God, to mean I am.

Either I control my whole self with awareness for that truth or some other aspect of my self seems empowered to take over. My unconscious mind, too difficult to become subject of my "conscious" process, remains inacessible for that function. It is necessarily expressed and if I observe it only as "impersonal," I refer to it as "alien" "external" "not-I," and so on. Each unpleasing feeling consists of the return of its corresponding (but repressed) pleasing feeling.

It is possible to name many a conscious self negating feeling merely by adding the negative prefix to its corresponding life affirming one, thus implying: unready to be lived with con-

scious self love:

Life Affirming Love certain happy enjoyable pleasing faithfut true grateful wholesome kind able willing desirable responsible righteous known

Life Negating Unlove uncertain unhappy unenjovable unpleasing unfaithful untrue ungrateful unwholesome unkind unable unwilling undesirable irresponsible unrighteous unknown

It soon becomes evident that a most important distinction must be observed in any of my unconscious mind. It makes a great difference whether or not its process of "consciousness" has or has not ever functioned with respect to it, as well as just how that "consciousness" continued to operate.

To illustrate, my earliest kind of life consciousness functiceed with little or no conscious feeling of my unique selfness in it, although of course it was constituted of my own nature orly. Although it was only I who did all of the discovering of affectivity such as pleasure and pain without doing violence to my governing principle of the absolute oneness of my united wholeness? How can I conceive of the plurality implied in so-called duality of opposites without forfeiting my ground truth of identity, or sameness, or whole individuality? Merely by attributing to each so-called "opposite" its due wholeness (allness, unity). Each "opposite" is its own oppositeness. I acknowledge it is my same one organism with which I live each emotion. Whether I extend my fingers and palm or clench my fist, it is my same hand with which I accomplish each unique gesture.

In trying to trace each life negating emotion to its one denied and withheld life affirming feeling of self love, I am only attempting the economy of making it unnecessary for me to posit emotional duality for explaining so-called "opposite feelings."

In this intentionally self-oriented account I shall mention several positive feelings of conscious love and indicate how the arrest of each one results in negative feelings, in unconscious love. Thus, the furtherance of each positive emotion is consciously life affirming in its self pleasing, self satisfying, self realizing and self fulfilling consequence. The hindrance of a positive emotion brings out its negative (unconscious) aspect so that only its "opposite" excitement of unhappiness, or pain, is felt. Inhibited love takes on its negative aspect of hate, inhibited innocence or responsibility, takes on its negative aspect of guilt, and so on.

As whole individual I live each emotion meaningfully so that its specific excitement is important not only for the dimension of my conscious personal conduct but also for the dimension of my unconscious psychological processes. Every positive (conscious, lovable) and every negative (unconscious, unpleasant) affect is accompanied by many psychic activities or behavior tendencies. My love of life, self love, manifests itself in every kind of joyous realization, including expectation or recollection. My repudiated love of life, self hate, also manifest itself in every kind of unhappy feeling.

On account of the clear light it throws upon the process of my speculation ultimately reducing all emotionality to the unity of love, I refer briefly to several other daring early self discoveries of Professor Freud, beginning with his amazingly insightful "Fragments of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria," mostly written in 1901 but not published until 1905. Concerning unpleasurable feelings elicited on an occasion when pleasure might be expected he states:

The elucidation of the mechanism of this reversal of affect is one of the most important and at the same time one of the most difficult problems in the psychology of neuroses. In my own judgment I am still some way from having achieved this end; and I may add that within the limits of the present paper I shall be able to bring forward only a part of such knowledge on the subject as I do possess.*

Then follows a translator's footnote: "This is one of the problems which recurs constantly throughout Professor Freud's writings."

Conscious self analyst Freud adds,

Contrary thoughts are always closely connected with each other and are often paired off in such a way that the one thought is excessively intensely conscious while its counterpart is repressed and unconscious. . . The two thoughts then act towards each other much like the two needles of an astatic galvanometer.

Again in "The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words" (1910) Professor Freud elaborates upon his understanding that opposites" are of single category of meaning. I well recall I once made the observation that my mind can do only what it can, and his adding, "Or its opposite." Throughout his works I find many an instance indicating his fine feeling for his Aristotle's dictum: "Knowledge of opposites is one."

I select an especially apt illustration for understanding emotion, from "The Psychology of Love." Referring to potentially my being, I took little or no heed for such an "embarrassment of riches" and did not claim it as all and only my own production. Hence, much of this accumulation of my unconsciousness is the consequence of my neglect to conspicuously notice my unique selfness in it to begin with. However vast extent of such "unconscious" selfness may be subsequently claimed as my own even without great expenditure of effort.

I tend to avoid consciously owning any experience that I cannot possess with sufficient comfort to want to keep it accessible for volitional use. Merely by living unhappy feeling I am also experiencing all of the logical views integral to unhappiness. If I indulge my temptation to ignore my (helpful) unhappiness by seeking distraction in happiness ("manic denial" of unhappiness) I forfeit conscious access to much valuable mental power. This consequent unconscious extent of mind tends to remain aloof from the functioning of my "conscious" process, being protected from it, as it were, in the very painful feeling with which it was first consciously experienced. Nevertheless it is, and therefore must be expressed, either voluntarily or involuntarily.

In addition to the return of repressed conscious self love in the form of various kinds of hurt feelings (anger, rage, sorrow, fear and the like), self love or its modification or derivative may undergo other vicissitudes to be expressed organically as "strangulated affect" or "emotional equivalent" or "affective residue," or as some other fixated condition.

As usual wherever his work is concerned, my admiration is strongly excited by my Sigmund Freud's having observed and recorded in his great work, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), the real identity underlying the apparent "poles apart" of any term and its so-called opposite:

The way in which dreams treat the category of contraties and contradictories is highly remarkable. It is simply disregarded. "No" seems not to exist so far as dreams are concerned. They show a particular preference for combining contraries into a unity or for representing them as one and the same thing.*

^{*}Standard Edition, IV, 318.

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Standard Edition, VII, 28-29.

cruel lust and tender love, the Professor notes, "we long ago discovered that what, in the conscious, is found split into a pair of opposites often occurs in the unconscious as a unity."*

In Totem and Taboo (1913), that excellent contribution to human understanding, Professor Freud appears to trace ambivalent feeling to alternating consciousness for perceptions of unmodified love and altered love (in the form of hostility). He further recognizes the role of projection in relieving unpleasant tension created also by ambivalence, "perceptions of ideational and emotional processes are projected outwardly, like sense perceptions, and are used to shape the outer world, whereas they ought to remain in the inner world."**

Innumerable are the illustrations of my costly devotion to my so-called pairs of opposites at the expense of my truth's oneness that alone can convince. I have had to re-survey my self knowledge on account of my new orientation to truth. My dominant idea that truth is all that there is has helped me to renounce my habit of classification, based entirely upon my indulging my illusion of "separation," especially by working my true-false dichotomy.

For example, I no longer allow my language implying "pairing" to do my thinking for me since I discover that every man is his own woman, every woman is her own man; every husband is his own wife and the converse; every parent is his (her) own child, and the converse; every oldster is his (her) own youngster, and the converse; every black is his (her) own white, and the converse; every victor is his own victim, and the converse; and on and on, thus dispelling every illusion of betweenness, or oppositeness, or otherness, or foreignness of any kind or degree. By unconsciously personifying my own abstraction (e.g., "not-I") I can make my self no end of trouble.

Only by seeing the individuality existing everywhere in my world does it become intelligible and explicable. By attributing to each entity its due wholeness (allness) my imagined external

^{*}Ibid., VII, 55.

^{**}Ibid., XIII, 64.

world becomes understandable as consisting absolutely of its self contained unity. This consciously insightful kind of observation opens the possibility for my constructing whatever I imagine as being "external" with full appreciation for its wholeness (its truth). Again, I can dispel my illusional pair of opposites called Subjective-Objective, once I can imagine my every external world abstraction (any so-called "object") as consisting only of its constitutive subjectivity.

The following law of my human nature merits my closest heed, for implicit in it is the sure solution for all of my so-called social ills, including crime and war. I can love my fellowman only as my self, and only to the extent that I can love all of my self. My respect for anyone of my world varies directly with my love for all of my self. Just as I cannot care what happens to any existence of mine except to the extent that I can personally appreciate its true worth as my own living, so I cannot care what happens to my fellowman except to the extent that I can see my precious personal identity in my living of my fellowman. My cultivation of this comprehensive love for all of my living is essential for every kind of my peacemaking, including all of my healing.

As self love is the one feeling of happiness characterizing my free conscious living, so self hate (including its modification or derivative) is the one feeling of unhappiness characterizing my

inhibited unconscious living. To illustrate:

My imagining of my self possession is my lovable source of conscious love appreciation. However if this source of pleasure is blocked by any life experience I cannot consciously acknowledge as my self possession, then instead of feeling my love in it, I feel icalousy in it.

My imagining of my self security is my lovable source of conscious life adventure. However if this source of pleasure is blocked by my life experience I cannot see is my own creation, then instead of feeling courageous self exploration in it I feel it

fearfully.

My imagining of my self innocence is my lovable source of conscious appreciation for the intact wholeness of my individu-

ality. However if this source of pleasure is blocked by my life experience I cannot consciously acknowledge as integral to my individuality, then instead of feeling my inviolable wholeness in it I feel it guiltily.

My imagining of my self confidence is my lovable source of conscious fidelity. However if this source of pleasure is blocked by my life experience I cannot consciously acknowledge as of my own creating, then instead of feeling my self trust in it I feel self doubt in it.

With a kind of lightning self awareness I see my science of the biological functioning of each specific emotion, discovering its unique good in man (as individual man) to be the first need of my psychology. The reporting of my findings in that research is what this book is all about. My emotional living reveals the nature of my utilization of my vital force.

Emotional self consciousness is all that is possible, quite as emotional reasoning, or emotional perception, or emotional sensation is all that is possible. I name my self consciousness my pacific emotion, enabling my peace of mind. Exactly to the extent that I have lived my experience with consciousness for my identity in it, just so have I been able to tame (temper, or compose, or pacify) my self love, including its several modifications (hatred, anger, grief, fear, jealousy, as well as self blinding adoration, ecstasy, transport, sublimity, and the like).

All of my passion finds its unity in my self love. Beginning without my self love I cannot account for any other emotion I can feel. Beginning with my self love I can account to my complete satisfaction for the biological helpfulness of my every other emotion. My every other emotion is explicable as a specific form of obedience to the law of my self love. The heart of my every feeling is harmonious with my master passion of my love for my own nature, for my own specific and universal individuality. Thus, my anger is always in my self for not being able to feel my love, my guilt is always in my self for not being able to feel my innocence; my jealousy is always in my self for not being able to feel my self possession; my shame is always in my self for not being able to feel my pride; and so on.

It seems that one of my most helpful insights was my awakening to the fact that every one of my thoughts, or ideas, or views, or whatever intellectual process, is merely but mightily the expression of a specific emotion giving rise to it, generating it. Underlying and constituting my every sensation, perception, conception, judgment, or reasoning, or meaning of any kind, I find a specific emotional force responsible for the way it is expressed. Thus my word "hell" or "devil" may name deep moral anguish or superficial gaiety, depending upon its affective constitution; my word "hatred" may name intense hostility or lackadaisical indifference; my word "bad" may name diabolical evil or humorous opposition; and on and on my ideational associations prove to be verbal forms of the way I happen to be feeling.

My duty to my self interest demands that I renounce my "baby" method of seeing to it that my every emotion in turn rule my mind. Plain self obligation requires that I renounce my helpful philosophy, or psychology, of my infanthood that judged to be "good" whatever I was then able "to like," or to be "bad" whatever I was then unable "to like." Mere self respect ordains that I cultivate the utilization of my self love to be able to extend it to whatever I find necessary to live.

First I must consciously be whatever I would consciously attribute to my fellowman. My steadfast devotion to living consciously has resulted in my transforming my description of my self identity from that of an unconscious (negated) mystic to that of a conscious (affirmed) mystic. I no longer have any doubt as to where my psychology or philosophy, or education, or religion, or science, or "external world," or time, or space, or motion, or truth, or whatever, originates. All of my life's meaning originates in me. I see my every fellowman as either a conscious, or unconscious, mystic. For me the term mystic names mere subjectivity.

I allow my conviction of the biological adequacy of my every emotion to be fiercely felt, for this conviction serves me as a valuable kind of self preservation. Again, my every emotion is itself self love, either disguised or undisguised. This fact

explains how I can feel any emotion all through me, so to speak. Being able to feel by love "possessed" enables me to feel by hatred (or jealousy, or whatever love modification) "possessed." Hence my any emotion-consciousness seems capable of preempting every other emotion-consciousness, even including my full self consciousness. Such realization serves to awaken me to the benefit of "taming" each of my emotions so that my whole self-love-respecting self consciousness can assume its biologically adequate overall subjectivity.

Each so-called painful affect (pain or unhappiness of any kind or degree) is naught but struggling love, self love undergoing ordeal,—exactly as all so-called "sickness" of any and every kind or degree is naught but health trying to survive. The fact that each emotion functions in the soma of the mind, in the mind's so-called "body," accounts for its powerful force, even as it points up the importance of every emotion for inhibiting or furthering life itself.

My discovering that my body is really the very heart of my mind is just another instance of feeling the indispensable value of the stone that the builders rejected. Attributing to my body its real mentality is essential before I can begin even to wish to study each of its organs for its truly emotional nature. My every "higher" mental process (thinking, feeling, observing, willing, etc.) is an extension of my felt visceral process. Thus my "high" mindedness can become understandable only in terms of my "lowly" living. The mental process of my so-called 'body" is the root accounting for the growth of feelingful meaning in all of the reaches of the rest of my mind. It appears I may trace my psychology or philosophy or whatever educational performance, quite as I may trace all of my other emotionality ultimately, to sensed stirring in the functioning of my so-called internal organs. Sensation is feeling in the body element of my mind.

The sensible working of all of my organs or organ systems subserves my feeling of self love enabling my self consciousness. Just what specific organic functioning subserves each modification of my self love will be valuable self knowledge.

Even now such understanding is being developed beyond the stage of conjecture (to illustrate, lust, shame, disgust). Over the centuries the poet novelist or essayist has courageously ventured organic localization of origin of emotion, a worthy effort somewhat reminiscent of the physiognomist's valiant prescientific attempt at localization of cerebral functioning.

Naming of each and every element of my microscopic and macroscopic anatomy with practically no regard for its functioning as an emotional organ is the most costly instance of my overlooked identity. In the sense that "science is a well made language" my every anatomical and physiological name needs reviewing from the vital viewpoint of whether it reveals or conceals the emotionality inherent in the wishful functioning of the element it names.

My individuality consists only of my subjectivity (of becoming and being) which is the very spirit of my life. I can try to justify, or clarify, the ways of my God for the awareness of but one man. I have studied how each person over the centuries has helped himself by seeing his God's will as his own. Insightful St. Paul observed, "The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance: against such there is no law." Life loving Emerson recorded, "Union is within. . . . Union must be ideal in actual individualism."

Self conscious American, Russell W. Davenport, wrote of "the unsovereigned beaches of the mind. . . . There is no place for a science of man to go except to man. The key to all its inquiries is the ancient injunction, 'O Man, know thyself.' "Giovanni Battista Vico (1668-1744) saw the true goal of knowledge must concern self, not "nature." His supreme law of knowledge states: Any being truly conceives and fathoms only its own productions, the creations of its own mind.

Ernest Cassirer self sentiently observed in *The Myth of the State* (1946): "All logical 'proofs' for the existence of other selves which have failed and all psychological explanations that have been given are uncertain and questionable. . . Here, to be sure, solipsism may be viewed as a small frontier fortress,

which may prove increasingly invincible." Whatever is, is self dependent only. Every being depends upon itself only. Thus the knowing of being is dependent upon the knowing of being. My imagination enables me to feel the process of my own being only. All of my experience is conscious or unconscious emotional experience. My mind is synthetic for my emotion is.

The continuing process of observing "It is I," of all of my experience, of feeling my personal identity in all of my living, enables my mind ultimately to create its conception of its own Divinity and its corresponding reliance upon self feeling for its meaning of truth or reality. It is my necessity to be responsible for my whole self world that generates my conscious ethical unity and its moral principle of self discipline for self insight and self reverence.

To further illustrate my effort to take a fresh look at my psychology I may observe that all of my will is my will to live my self. My every sensation may be felt as a component of my will, and my every emotion the elaboration of a sensation. The separating of emotion from conation or cognition, like every other effort at separation for special examination, has obscured the discovery of the wholeness nature of the subject of study.

Apart from emotion, sensation makes no sense, cannot be felt; apart from emotion, reason or knowledge has no being; apart from emotion, determination has no being; apart from emotion personal identity has no being. The leading intention of this book is to observe the affective identity underlying every postulated differentiation of psychological power. The very term identity names the self's sensation of longing to be itself.

My "highest" sublimity is a development of my emotionality. All of my so-called "highness" begins with, and is an extension of, my "lowness." My every affect consists of my will power, hence the helpfulness in my consciously controlling it (making it "voluntary") rather than being unconsciously controlled by it (making it "involuntary").

Revealing passion as volition supports the doctrine of Freedom of Will. My desire for dominion over my passion may be

to my awareness of the interest of my whole self. Biologically adequate ethic is always based upon conscious will. Somewhat as did my James Mill, I regard will as the most powerful passion of the moment. God is well defined as love (emotion).

I once asked my Professor Sigmund Freud from which philosopher of his he had learned most about the nature of mind. Without hesitation he said, "Lipps." For the moment I felt he was referring to the revealing lips of each analysand. I soon realized that he referred to his renowned psychology and philosophy professor, Theodor Lipps (1851-1914) of the University of Vienna, a man of profound understanding for the unconscious nature of the mind.

Particularly in view of the fact that the "popular" educator of the times tended even to equate mind and consciousness, Lipps' respect for the unconsciousness of the whole mind (except for its one function of consciousness itself) appealed most strongly to Freud's studied observation of mental events. In his book Komik und Humor (1898), in the chapter "On Psychical Force" Lipps offers this astounding insight:

The factors of psychical life are not the contents of consciousness but the psychical processes which are in themselves unconscious. The task of psychology, if it does not merely wish to describe the contents of consciousness must therefore consist in inferring the nature of these unconscious processes from the character of the contents of consciousness and their temporal connections. Psychology must be a theory of these processes. But a psychology of this kind will very soon find that there are quite a number of characteristics of these processes which are not represented in the corresponding contents of consciousness.

A person's gender applies to the wholeness of his (her) nature, entering into all activity. Hence it is helpful to realize that one's individual growth always involves his (her) sexual development. Innumerable are the possibilities for arrest of sexual development occasioning inhibition of satisfying and comforting sexual functioning.* The consequential signs and

^{*}See Freud, Three Contributions To The Theory of Sex. Standard Edition.

symptoms of unhappiness may or may not be recognizable as helpful indicators showing the need to alleviate the restraint imposed upon the free enjoyment of natural sources of creature comfort.

So pervasive is the masculinity or femininity of human nature, extending as it does throughout the constitution of every person, that willing sexual control proves to be basic for the volitional emotional control necessary for conscious self sovereignty. Full realization of this truth introduces the clear necessity for the most biologically adequate kind of self education possible for one's sexual responsibility.* "Sex education must not merely teach a few facts of physiology but must be a true education in the emotional orientations which are basic to mature sexual attitudes. . . . The prevention of man-made misery is the prevention of emotional disorders."** The ordering of emotionality of greatest biological adequacy for the whole individual discovers all of its helpfulness in the attaining of full appreciation for the comprehensiveness of human individuality, the definition of the most wholesome development of conscious self identity.

Over sixty years ago Sigmund Freud began observing and recording the truth that a person cannot ignore that his (her) opposite sexuality consists entirely and only of his (her) own nature, except at the cost of grievous signs and symptoms indicating danger to life in such enormous self disregard. It is every person's birthright to be able to feel all of his (her) self with the life satisfying feeling of self possession.

To the extent that 1 am growing my own individuality without realizing consciously that I am, I must suffer signs and symptoms warning me of my lack of due self respect and life appreciation. To be sure, I am growing my self in all of my experience and it is of lifesaving importance for me to discover that truth and live by it as much as I can.

^{*}See my Illness or Allness (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965), pp. 326-399.

^{**}Leon J. Saul, Emotional Maturity, The Development and Dynamics of Personality (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1947), pp. 10, 22.

As I do this work of consciously developing my self I cultivate vital resources of my nature and I can take just pride in such steady accomplishment. As a male, if I can begin to recognize that I am also all that I experience as female, I attain conscious sexual independence thereby. Or, as a female if I can begin to recognize that I am also all that I experience as male, I achieve my conscious sexual independence thereby. This specific sexual independence is indispensable for my discipling my mind for conscious self control based securely upon emotional control, conscious emotional continence allowing me to feel that all of my emotion is wholly and solely in and about my self. By gradually growing such needed self esteem I reach my teenage feeling like a somebody rather than as a "nobody." Then I can feel ready for the challenges of my adolescent experience, instead of feeling "stranded on the rocks of puberty." Appreciating more and more of the true greatness of my own marvelous life, I can sense the importance of taking corresponding care of my self. Seeing my self growth as the life long adventure it really is, I feel no need to "experiment with drugs" or to seek for any other thrills seeming to come from "outside of me." All of my conscious experience with my so-called "mental trouble" reveals it as the only currently available emotionality I can summon to help my self, until I can work up further conscious-self possession of my mind's natural greatness. To wit, my every word names only me.

In my only realm of my reality, my subjective mind, I can recognize the duality "yes-or-no" as unitive "and-and," quite as I observe "either-for" as "and-and." Realizing that my reality is what my mind makes it, is one helpful consideration. Realizing that whatever my mind makes is my reality, comprehends the whole truth of the matter. Is it real?, is tantamount to asking, Is it I? Also, Is it I?, is tantamount to my asking, Is it my reality?, or, Is it my mind? All I can affirm is my conscious selfness; all I can negate is my unconscious selfness.

Yes" is the language of love (happiness); quite as "No" is the language of inhibited love (unhappiness). Thus my verbaltration of happiness may be reduced to (summed up by) my life affirming word, "Yes." My language of unhappiness may be reduced to (summed up by) my life negating word "No." Either negation or affirmation is the product of reasoning which is always the verbalization of emotion, and not the product of self consciousness. The moment I become self conscious with regard to whatever my reasoning negates I immediately feel this negated living as entirely precious living of my own.

Each decision, either Yes or No, is strictly emotional. Whatever I choose or reject, each equally is entirely my own precious living. With this understanding the issue, How To Use Negation Without Implying Riddance Of My Own Living (implying my annihilation or nullification), assumes its due importance. To illustrate, my assertion, "The moon is made of green cheese," is constituted of the reality of my mind, quite as much as is my assertion, "Two plus two equals four."*

The course of self love seldom seems to run smooth. A consequence is that love modifies its self in many ways. My judgment, or reasoning, is itself an issue of my love or its modification. I associate with conscious love none of my experience that I can more easily associate with unconscious love (disdain, scorn, revilement) or somehow judge either above me or below me. This truth, that I never live any of my living with conscious love until I have to, is indispensable to my understanding that all scorn is self scorn, all revulsion is self revulsion, all divinity is self divinity, and so on.

As Otto Fenichel noticed, "Originally, every outburst of affect was. . . . a trauma. . . . Later the ego learns to defend itself against affects and master them. . . . danger is always anticipated trauma; in the last analysis every fear is actually a fear of a traumatic state."** In a traumatic living it is the loss of my sense of personal identity that is truly disabling. I help my self

^{*}Logical question-and-answer also suggests "duality." Self consciousness sees the unity of the answer in the question quite as the unity of the question in the answer. (Sigmund Freud discovered that there is no negation in the unconscious and that "either-or" in the unconscious becomes "and-and.")

***"The Ego and the Affects," Psychoanalytic Rev., XXVIII (1941), 19.

by keeping ready access to this truth shaping my self development. Absence of conscious self love is tantamount to absence of conscious self sensibility or conscious self movement.

Insofar as I cannot love my self consciously I conduct my self as an actor imagining "somebody else" (not-I) can see me or hear me, etc., and that I can see or hear, etc., "somebody else" (not-I). As long as I could I postponed the emotional strain of discovering 1) the theatrical aspect of my affective display, 2) the origin of my immoderate passion in my easy melodramatic "otherness"-consciousness, and 3) the source of my emotional control in my difficultly appreciated but absolutely inviolable self continence.

I imagine as an infant I had no need for such distinction as mine or thine. There was no need for questioning about the "private personal property" nature of any of my living of my individuality. My joy of living (self love) was alone sufficient to prevent my trying to dissociate my one mind into 1) whatever I could consciously live with love and conceive as my lovable own and 2) whatever I could not consciously live with love and therefore must conceive as my hateful disowned.

My hate is love's primary modification generated to support the illusion of "separation" pending my conscious love's strengthening and extending its self until that illusion of plurality ("thine") is subsumed in the truth of unity (one-being). "Mine" or "thing," each is ordained individuation of my individuality.

Every derivative (modification) of conscious love such as hate (all pain, or unhappiness) serves my immediate need to suspend temporarily my desire for sensing the completeness of my life affirming personal identity. When my hate can no longer be associated with my (illusional) "external object," on account of my honoring my conception of "object" as my own self's creation, then this modification of my conscious love (hate) is no longer needed. I live my every modification of conscious love (anger, fear, jealousy, guilt) as subject to the same law of organic economy.

As a young child I could not seem to satisfy my need for attention by conscious self observation alone. Rather it seemed important that I appear to be the focus of attention of my powerful parent. I enjoyed this role of a performer, of seeming to be a spectator or spectacle for somebody other than my self, until my union-seeking appreciation for my own personal identity became sufficiently intense to enable me to conceive my "other one" as being my own individual life's creation of my other one.

This confusion was confounded by my observing my parent's living of her (his) child consistently as if having only being outside of her (him). Subjecting my mind to my parent's illusion of not seeing her (his) personal identity in experiencing her (his) very own child facilitated my developing analogous illusion of not seeing only my own personal identity in my living (creating) my very own parent. Then as I learned to speak my mind, my language fully supported this illusion as being the irrefutable truth. From then on, until I systematically cultivated my insight (self consciousness), I "followed the crowd" in letting my words implying "otherness" (plurality) do my thinking for me, thus disregarding my selfness (unity).

It is "open secret" that this very insistence of mine in trying to live more or less than my own life (experience, truth, reality, or self-world by whatever name) is associated with all of my loss of conscious emotional control and my consequent blind efforts to regain it. It is open secret that all of my world's life-expending war, crime, or disorder of any kind is ultimately traceable to this emotional incontinence of human individual-

ity.

The distinction of 1) love and 2) conscious love underlies every distinction of unconscious and conscious living. Therefore, to live any experience with conscious love merely means fully conscious living of it. The beneficial consequence of this insight is the discovery of the simplicity, rather than complexity, of the organicity of emotion. It is the fictitious and arbitrary "division" of human behavior that makes it appear complex, quite as it is the synoptic viewing of it that reveals it as primary the simple. For example, my separating reasoning from feeling involves me in such complications as irrational feeling and f

ingless reasoning; or my separating conation from any of my activity involves me in such paradoxical terms as involuntary, irresponsible, suggestible, hypnotic, and the like.

Thus if I were to try to list and describe each modification of love (including modification of hate) as a separate entity my effort would be as unclarifying as it would be interminable. By assuming individuality as divisible I obscure the truth of its wholeness and the wholeness of its truth. So-called mental trouble arises only from one's disregarding truth of his oneness, not from any other imagined source in a part (as in the case of a machine) such as difficulty with one of his organs or with one of his fellowmen.

Whatever trouble located in any organ of mine, has all of its meaning in and for the wholeness of my organicity (being). I exist in but one dimension, in my wholeness. Where I am not conscious for my self possession, cherishing it all and only for what it is, I must substitute unrecognizable self possession such as seemingly "external worldly wealth," Then my love of life when consciously threatened appears disguised as greed, covetousness, jealousy,—all directed seemingly "away from me." There can be but one consciously loved direction, namely, selfward.

Always associated with my giving birth to my self is death defying adventure. All daring to live is at the expense of eluding death. From the moment of my conception on, my self feeling is implicit, existent but as yet unborn. I give birth to my individuality in three distinct ways.

First, in the ordinary and self-evident sense of travelling through and out of the birth canal. This dangerous "being born" every one must undergo and, if possible, complete with his whole life intact

Second, in the less evident sense of my mind's awakening to its capacity for functioning of its power, thereby building up first its so-called body ego. I undergo great discomfort in order to give birth to each body meaning of my mind entering into the composition of its body ego. Activity of each of my general and special senses is a source of my life experience enabling me

work too that is discontinued as soon as possible, so that I rarely discover the full use and satisfaction of my sensory (including motor) resourcefulness. I need strict mental discipline to heed consistently that every allusion to my body (every organic sensation such as psychic tension or discharge) must refer to my body ego only. My body ego is a vast store of funded emotionality. I consider it to be the soul of my mind. It is strong temptation to reason that I already know as much as can be known about each of my senses, just as soon as I discover the most obvious usage of it, Therefore, I may not care for and develop the keenness, quality, and depth of each one. Thus I may decide that the essence of my seeing lies in the peripheral functioning of my ocular activity and quite overlook that I see only with and through the wholeness of my mind. In that event the view that my visual pleasure extends into emotional satisfaction of self insight must seem untenable, too far fetched, and so on. Similarly, the view that my pleasure in taste extends into emotional satisfaction of savoring any and all of

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love to include experience of mine that I have not thus far been able to tolerate as conscious self development. Therefore it is always undertaken with great courage, to overcome my fear of risking my life by attempting it. It always seems to involve my willingness to lose my present life in order to be born anew, my willingness to do away with the existing man in order to be able to "put on the new man." As Spinoza maintained, every individual being, so far as in it lies, endeavors to persist in its own being. My clinging to my sense of my personal identity, and refusal to enlarge upon it unless necessary, illustrates this conservative tendency.

My illusional conviction (that in order to extend my conscious self love to include further individuality of my very own, I must first disown all of my individuality I have thus far invested with my self love) very effectively supports my preserving the status quo of my conscious self identity. The fact is that any activation of my acknowledgeable self consciousness never entails any loss of previously attained conscious self identity. Heeded self consciousness is always experienced harmoniously, peacefully, as a functioning of my appreciation for the truth of my inviolably intact wholeness.

Nevertheless, unless I discipline my mind otherwise, I choose the repose provided by my preserving my status quo rather than the exertion necessary for me to keep my view of my self identity developing with my enlargement of my self experience. This understandable but disastrously consequential preference leads to my stopping my cultivation and control of my emotion just as it led me to discontinue my care and direction of my sensory activity. The aesthetic appreciation for my life experience becomes correspondingly restricted. The discipline of self control through conscious self love is as rare as it is difficultly attained. Yet, just as Goethe observed, "Only he merits Freedom, as Life, who daily can master himself." Every so-called sage is astoundingly insightful in defining liberty as the desirable result of the discipline of conscious self control.

The consequence is "disastrous" for without conscious emotional control there cannot be enjoyed the wonderful life satisto sense or feel the nature of my human being. This is hard work too that is discontinued as soon as possible, so that I rarely discover the full use and satisfaction of my sensory (including motor) resourcefulness. I need strict mental discipline to heed consistently that every allusion to my body (every organic sensation such as psychic tension or discharge) must refer to my body ego only. My body ego is a vast store of funded emotionality. I consider it to be the soul of my mind.

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Third I give birth to my self in the least evident sense of all, namely, in my mind's awakening to its conscious realization of its creativity, to its feeling and cherishing the biological role of its wholeness, allness, unity, and monogenicity. Only this third birth process develops my consciousness sufficiently to comprehend the fact, the truth, of my self continent individuality. It is always difficult for it entails my effort fully extending my self

painful sensation as an undesirable attack rather than as an understandable danger signal, as a function I want to get rid of rather than help my self with. An infant or child merely wants to stop feeling pain, and cannot attend to the valuable life lesson provided by it. The physician has awakened to the indispensable diagnostic and therapeutic helpfulness of pain and the potential danger to life in obscuring it or deadening it. Thus I may use a drug to permit my self to go on hurting my self without feeling my self injury. A drug may seem a temporary help to get to my dentist but my suffering my tooth ache consciously would function as most effective motivation for my future dental care. And so on, a pain killer is two-edged.

What is true for the biological value of the sensation of pain is equally true for the lifesaving significance of every kind of unhappiness. My being angry without feeling my anger consciously as helpful makes me want to modify my conscious conduct of my life merely in such a way as to prevent my feeling my anger. Thus I may have to avoid my cultivating extensive or intensive personal living of my fellowman,—act withdrawn, seem particular, appear egocentric, show my autism, etc. Similarly my necessity to possess my jealousy without consciously feeling it as a biological resource of my own helpfulness, merely makes me want to live in such a way that I will not excite my jealousy. Thus I may have to avoid caring, loving, desiring, and so on, that might lead to my possibly having to "feel jealous." Similarly my necessity to possess my modality of love named "guilt" without consciously feeling it as vitally helpful makes me merely want to conduct my life specifically to avoid becoming aware of it. Thus I may have to avoid every kind of pain or hardship ("manic denial") and deprive my self of the development of such basic virtue as endurance, hardihood, stoutheartedness, etc. Thus, each unhappy derivative of hurt self love is indispensable for cultivating insight as to 1) the specific nature of the hurt and 2) the specific nature of the kind of living I must conduct to control, alleviate and prevent such hurt.

Therefore my very approach to the studying of my emotion

faction of conscious self control in general. Whatever of my living I do not experience as my own creation goes on functioning as if it can control the life of my self that I can claim as my own. My rejected emotion merely becomes emotion that continues to be mine without my being aware of that truth. The fact that I live it with this unconsciousness makes it impossible for me to recognize it as mine when it is operating, and therefore impossible for me to moderate it to harmonize with the rest of my conscious needs. To illustrate, by assuming that I am not fearful, or jealous, or whatever, each such emotion is effective in my behavior without my realizing it. Clearly I can do nothing consciously about my mental condition that I do not see even exists.

To make my mind anaesthetic for my emotion carries with it all of the kind of hazard that I create when I make my "body ego" anaesthetic for its sensory experience. My emotionality is my standard human equipment. The reality that I am alive carries with it the power of my wish to live. My love of living is my love of my self. Whenever I create experience that I live with difficulty, the difficulty consists of my trouble in living it as lovable selfness.

It is essential that I, as growing being, associated my living with pleasure, or my wish to live becomes correspondingly ineffective. Particularly the importance of my finding my living lovable becomes noticeably great as soon as I start creating my specific sense of being a life, an entity. Before that stage of my development, however, the importance of loving my living was expressed essentially in my need to live as much of my loving as possible. High infant mortality is consistently associated with the infant's inability to enjoy readily lovable living.

My primary emotion of love becomes modified under difficult living, each alteration proving to be specifically adequate for the biological purpose of my feeling the specific difficulty. As noted each modality of my self love, e.g., hate, fear, guilt, etc., is not at all readily recognizable as love, however, and that lack of recognition develops dire consequence.

Unless I discipline my mind otherwise I tend to regard any

honoring the truth of the wholeness of my own life. Hence I have been able to be vigilant in observing the fact that my every emotion has all of its source and course, all of its possible meaning and extension of its meaning, only and wholly in my own sole human being.

Thus, I see clearly how my mind uses its sensorium for feeling, for becoming sensible about, its own body's functioning, and nothing else. By means of its every sense it feels the existence of each of its body's meanings constituting its body ego. Next I see clearly how my mind uses its emotion for feeling, for becoming sensible about, its own functioning beyond that

of its body ego.

Furthermore, just as it seems helpful to theorize that all of my body ego experience enters into my creating of all of my mind's experience beyond that of my body ego (e.g., my "external world," or whatever) so I may theorize that my emotional experience is an elaboration of my sensory experience. Thus, I find it a useful synopsis, to see my senses as the emotionality of my body, quite as I may see my emotion as the senses of the rest of my mind. This affective orientation is in strict keeping with my explicating the biological utility (self preservation power) of each emotion in its enabling me to feel the safe and sane extension of my mental activity, the prudent and productive reach of any and all of my self experience.

And now I come to the recording of a most meaningful discovery of my career as a mind conscious individual. Self awakening is ever a wondrous experience, on occasion even amazing. Perhaps not my most exciting, but surely my most helpful, mental arousal occurred when I first opened my mental eye sufficiently to observe clearly: my greatest personal power consists in my ability to affirm whatever experience I live as being lifeworthy as being my most helpful, desirable, vital, biological functioning then and there.

Obviously as a child I was incapable even of wanting to attain this highest human achievement. My earliest development occurred entirely under my undisciplined emotional control rather than conscious self control. Only as I gradually

is specifically that of discovering how my emotionality contributes to the maintenance of my appreciation for my complete individuality. My experience with study of my sensation has taught me not only the importance of localizing all of this self activity (sensation) entirely in my mind, wholly and solely, but also the force of my insistent temptation to indulge the soft illusion that my sensation might qualify as some kind of means for bridging over such artificial dichotomics as the mental and physical, the self and not-self, and the like illusional duality.

Once I can succeed in denying that I really am whatever I happen to be living, then I furnish my self with the enabling excuse for positing two sets of meanings in my mind: the one set that I can acknowledge, own up to being; and the other set that I can refuse to recognize as my very own being. To serve this comforting intention I may not take the trouble to bother my head about how one can manage to make two or more out of its oneness. Much less may I exert the effort to see how I can disregard my unity with impunity. The reality however is that such self amnesia succeeds only at the life endangering cost of valuable signs and symptoms warning me of my reckless counterfeiting of my true worth under the guise of being able to value alien energy called external world, otherness, and on and on.

My theory of emotion therefore must respect 1) the biological fact of individuality of my human being, 2) the development of consciousness for the inviolability of that individuality, 3) the consequence of my disregarding the necessary integrity, the absolute self continence, of my one and only life, and 4) the specific way in which my emotion, quite as all of my sensitiveness, can enable me to function consciously as the constantly whole person 1 am, in all of my being of my individual world of my self. My working up full appreciation for the true extent of my individuality, my self fulfillment, is furthered by the degree to which I cultivate all of my potential sensitivity, including emotionality, and become competent in controlling it.

I have therefore heeded the ease with which, and extent to which, I may use my senses to deny, rather than affirm, my have to get rid of one idea in order to develop another. Quite otherwise, all of my self experience continues to exist along with my most recent mental developments.

Furthermore all of my behavior that is rejected as "asocial" because it might lead to my making trouble "with my fellowman"—all of it, if it is considered to be "nonmental"—must be condemned as "inhuman" as unfit for my living, so that I cannot claim it as precious self possession. However, once any of my living is recognized by me as occurring only and entirely in my mind, it thereby becomes safe and sane self possession properly augmenting my sense of my true personal worth. For getting along well with my fellowman, seeing my identity in my living of him is all that it takes, but it does and must take that and no less than that.

Conducting the career of an adventurous explorer making my voyage of spiritual discovery of my land of subjectivity, and finding it to be my only native land, has enabled me to trust my self for my source of truth. Passion is the mental activity truly at work in my every verdict about "reality;" self evidencing, fervent, reasonable, foolproof, vital, unitary passion, uttering the spirit of man by way of his will, tingling and thrilling with the very sense of living wholeness. Each modality of my self love animates its own kind of being, each contributing its specific quality to my nature, each awakening its own kinds of reaches in my consciously feelingful sanity.

My scientific temper starts with unwavering reliance upon any and all of my experience as being nothing but my very own self's emotional activity. The experience I desire is that which I can feel as being worth my living. Not until I felt this truth keenly could I fully appreciate the heart of this supreme wisdom, "For whosoever hath to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance."

Only my self can appeal to itself. The truth-disciplined wish for the consequences is the beginning of consciously cultivating the growth of self love. This mental condition is the life attitude that affirms living. Only loving my whole self can enable me to want to keep its commandments, beginning with rever-

worked up my awareness for my self identity could I appreciate, or hope for, the possibility of my cultivating control of my emotionality itself. At last I did reach that wide awake mental condition that disclosed: I must either see how to control my emotionality or seem to be controlled by it. Certainly I could recognize that it was my controlling emotion that inhibited my recognizing that I owed my very life to whatever I experienced, just as it was my controlled emotion that facilitated my observing that my every experience is more than my "lease on life," in that it is my actual living itself.

My ability to control my emotion is an absolute necessity for my awakening to the truth of my wholeness. As long as I continue to seem controlled by my emotion, the meaning of my personal identity must be limited accordingly. Only what I consciously control can constitute my acknowledgeable personal identity.

I can be conscious about my self only in terms of my living being, of my activity, and I am pleased with my self to the extent that I sense my capacity and readiness to act as I please. To illustrate, my mental power includes my imagination's functioning without any inhibition or restraint or limitation. Not only as a fairy-tale loving child, but also as an adult with my imagination under control, I can enjoy all of the freedom from the toils of so-called "objectivity," produce any phantasy I please and revel in the reality of it, dismiss every care with or without the wave of a wand, indulge magic happenings at will, and generally exercise all of my wishfulfilling omnipotence.

It is tempting to make an analogy between the development of the mind and the building of any other kind of structure, but every such effort can only apparently succeed and then at the expense of understanding the mind's true nature (mind is anything and everything but non-mental). To illustrate, in the imagined external world denial, opposition and destruction seem necessary. For example, I must demolish the old building and clear the ground in order to erect the new. Not so with my acknowledgeable mental creations. Mental development is always positive. In the mind everything is possible. I do not

SUMMARY

I am the midwife of my ego. Socrates

This book is all about my discovering through my conscious self culture 1) just how I had to save my life by being unwilling to see my personal identity in my pain or unhappiness as long as my interest in staying alive, itself, depended upon my being easily pleased with living; 2) just how I have also had to save my life by being willing to see my personal identity in my pain or unhappiness as soon as my interest in staying alive began to depend upon my becoming difficultly pleased with living; and 3) just how my every mental process, from my simplest sensation to my highest view, or from my slightest touch to my most sublime ideal, becomes consciously meaningful to me only through its emotional nature, that is, only through my being able to feel it in some way.

I find I may accurately refer to any of my personal experience as a passion, thus: my passion of truth, or of liberty, or of reality, or of scientific "objectivity," or of study, or of awareness, or of spirituality, or of sensing or working my vitality in

any perceptible way.

Only when I take careful heed that I am whatever emotion I am exciting and that I am every experience occurring with it (every thought, perception, etc.) can I be awake about it. Although my need for sleep is honorable, the importance of my waking up from my every other emotion to that of consciousself feeling, also becomes clearly evident. Self consciousness is my omnific emotion that is indispensable for my disciplining all of the rest of my emotionality in the service of my lovable self order. My need to be loved derives from my not living my self with conscious love.

Seeing the meaning of emotion expressed in the facies (e.g., smiling, frowning, fearing, sorrowing, etc.) is unavoidable. However, discovering this physiognomic activity throughout ence for wonder. Furthermore, what I feel thus in my life I hesitate least to call my divinity. I am ever alone ("all one") but I may not be willing to strive to be consciously alone. I am ever good but I may not be willing to strive to be consciously good. Only by consciously feeling my good can I ever enjoy being consciously or unconsciously "alone."

I ask my self "How does it feel," to be living one way or another? By my getting down to sensibility (feeling, emotion) as the ultimate soul of life, I have boldly awakened as never before to enthusiasm for the truth of my being. This infeel (called also insight) amounts to a kind of responsible solution of life which may enable every individual to consciously live his neighbor as his self, and hence love his neighbor as his self, the acme of divine wisdom dispelling the illusion "conflict" based upon the illusion "difference." From this vantage ground of acknowledged self, self identity becomes recognizable as the substance of the doctrine "peace on earth" shaping itself into a working philosophy of freemasonry every individual can discipline his love to enjoy. Somewhat akin to M. Jourdain in Molière's play, I am delighted with my discovery that I have been talking soul all of my life.

It is vitalizing thus to be able to feel in on how my living moves and has its being. To feel certain that my every word must be merely but mightily exercising my self love reveals the unity of art and nature in my being. At last I rejoice quite as if I never lived otherwise about it, truth is felt rather than seen. Indeed whatever is "seen" is felt rather than somehow otherwise pictured. I find my self feeling views about my unique nature, I revere as axiological: self evident self evidence. I cannot even passively be nourished; I can only augment my self by self assimilation. I cannot affiliate; I can only beget my own feeling. All of my reality is felt experience: what I cannot consciously feel, cannot enter into my conscious reality, and I then try to disown it by nominating it external reality.

Every person is a self developed individualist but it is the rare one who is consciously a self developed individualist. Fully developed self unity is the attainment only of one who makes this mind consciousness his conscious ideal and hence freely devotes his will to realizing it. Only by recognizing that all of my mental activity is my own can I attribute discrete owndom to any of my mentality, such as seeing that my every emotion is all and only about its self and cannot refer its self elsewhere.

My self insight, mind consciousness, is the achievement only of the difficult discipline of assuming sole personal responsibility for whatever experience I live. It is the absolute requirement for my scientific study of my emotion, that is, for my investigating the exclusive self reference of my hatred as of my love, of my every pain or unhappiness of any kind as of my every pleasure or happiness of any kind. I naturally imagine that convincing understanding for this conscious self orientation, that responsibly includes all of one's self experience and responsibly excludes none of one's self experience, is possible only to the individual who has succeeded in making the same kind of difficult discipline his own. Hence it is that every systematic presentation of this specific kind easily may come to be impersonally judged as just another theory of affect rather than self consciously hailed as one's own genuine product of conscious self feeling that it is.

In my viewing emotion as providing life with all of its meaning, I feel that I have a broad scope of the vital unity to be respected in all mental activity. Such appreciation for feeling as the sign of wholeness-functioning is essential for continuing origination and maintenance of appreciated personal identity, i.e., consciously responsible individuality. Observing emotion thus, as personalizing self experience, properly features the true subjectivity nature of human being.

Recognizing love as primordial mentality underlying the lifesaving meaning of self worth, each of the other affects (such as Pride, jealousy, fear, guilt, anger, etc.) becomes understandable as love exerting itself in the interest of its inviolable wholeness. Discipline in consciously feeling his mind enables the developthe body meanings of the mind is clearly indicated. It does seem in this respect that the structuralist has been right over the years by persevering in calling attention to the importance of the somatic nature of mind. He has had something real to be concerned about in his nuclear somatic meanings of mentality.

Little wonder that William James, C. G. Lange, Walter Cannon and others, found the roots of emotionality in these very somatic sensations. Flesh is spirit. The energy of my emotion is an expression of activity of my (mental) body. Innumerable expressions attest the scientifically verifiable fact that misprized pain (including all unhappiness) signifies troubled living favoring its terminating itself.

As a psychologist I must concern my self with discovering the holistic functioning of the organicity of all of my emotion, just as I have already awakened to the specific meaning for the whole individual of my functioning of my stomach in creating my feeling of hunger, of my parched throat in creating my feeling of thirst, of my genitals in creating my sexual feeling, of my distended bladder or bowel in creating my sensation of elimination, of my relaxation of my limbs in creating my pleasing rest, and so on. In just what way does my self love become grief, or jealousy, or fear, or whatever? How does my self love turn to hatred and how does my hatred return to self love? How does each seem to have the power of subjecting me to it? How did I ever succeed in overlooking all of my meaning for my vital body as being the very foundation of my mind?

I could never discover the beneficent harmonious unity of all of my emotion as long as my self observation involved the double vision and associated ambivalence needed to account for such impossibles as opposites, conflicts, contradictions, and antagonisms, and all such conceptions based upon illusional duality or any plurality. Until I succeeded in developing fully my own individuality consciousness, I could only attribute incomplete individuality to anyone or anything of my world. My awareness for the unity of my unity has enabled me to ascribe intact uniqueness to my every self observation, begin-

ning with my fellowman.

curiosity, knowledge, imagination, will, or whatever to its innate affective essence I succeed in scoring its inwardness, its intrinsic nature in the wholeness of my individuality, its reality as a play or working of my self activity, not to be accessible in any way to anyone but my self. I can only be. All I am ever capable of, is of being me. Of whatever I live, I may well ask, if it is not I, who then is it?

Only my understanding (that is, feeling of belief in the truth) that each unpleasing emotion is nothing but a modality of its corresponding pleasing emotion, that the one cannot exist without its other, can confront me with the necessity that I cherish this understanding as the sign of balanced life that it really is. Then I cannot but recognize the benefit in making a virtue of this necessity by basically modifying my notion of what is the real "line of least resistance," as far as choosing (wishing) my activity is concerned. I thereby incorporate in my mind the most helpful ideal I have been able to create of that glorious emotional condition I call Wisdom.

To be ideally wise is to revere my guilt or suffering as perfect self help, quite as divine as innocence or sublimity,—each merely enabling me to feel my truth and thereby my way. The realistic "treatment" for my depression is grateful trust in its biological adequacy, for helping me to extend my conscious self identity. Inhibited conscious integrity reveals itself as facilitated emotional imbalance such as depression, anxiety, excitement. Completely satisfying reward for achieving conscious wholeness is conscious life appreciation. I must find wanting my full attainment of any other seeming success, such as wealth or luxury or any other kind of possession I cannot weigh fully as my self possession.

This true-to-life way of life can seem most difficult but it is simplest of all, and the only one adapted to plain living of conscious independence. Vanity in the appearance of external things is always at the full cost of conscious life appreciation, of revered self esteem. My seeking the meaning of my life "under the sun" is always at the expense of my finding all of my worth "under my skin," so to speak, under every view of be-

ment and cultivation of a concept of Total Self Awareness that subsumes all of the individual's meaning for his whole world. Appreciation for such a conscious self world affirms the full worth of man, necessitating his caring for his life according to its actual wonderfulness. Therefore, affirmation of my mind's wholeness as constituting my one and only reality reveals all of my experience as self activity only, as self begetting of self. With this mind recognition I can, in the words of Charles Dickens, consider my self as the hero, rather than victim, of my life. Only thus can I use my love for cultivating the mental strength I need to live my world responsibly.

I find science of the nature of mind is essentially the effort to study the fact of emotionality in each of its several appearances. This definition, as every other, can be made only in terms of the definer. As ever, my effort to discover truth leads directly to observation of the wholeness (allness) of the discoverer, the most urgently needed observation I can possibly make.

The sensorium of my body ego constitutes its emotionality, its capacity for feeling pleasure or unpleasure; quite as each emotion constitutes the sensorium, or capacity for self feeling, of my entire ego. My whole mind is my grown-up body mind, in much the same sense that my altruism is my grown-up ego-ism.

To a great extent, either selection of my conscious whole individualism or my unconscious emotionalism must be my choice for steering my self world. Nothing points up this truth more than does the individual's emotional living of his abstraction "group" (family, church, society, crowd, mob, etc.). Therefore it is my urgent need to grow able to realize that my civilizing process is as biological (individual) as any other. My alternative is to have to limit my civilizing ideal to mean: the illusion of making mankind an inhuman "crowd" concept instead of one concept of a human creature. Who is not exciting his self consciousness subjects his self to being excited "out of recognition" by his own affect.

By reducing my sensation, perception, attention, interest,

ic, consciously individualizing life process that I find underlying Hebrew literature of wisdom, the love of understanding of the Book of Proverbs; the strengthening patience of the Book of Job; the joy and sorrow of the Book of Ecclesiastes. John Franklin Genung felt, "Who knows but the man's first-hand insight and the Lord's revelation may come to coalesce and be identical, the man's reason being lifted to the higher plane where he can see divine things as they are, and even on such matters speak with real authority?"**

I feel my love of wisdom to be grounded in the wonderful wisdom of love itself. For me love and wisdom are one. This kind of wishful appreciation for the power of love may be traced to Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, Book IX, Ch. 8):

If a man were always anxious that he himself, above all things, should act justly, temperately, or in accordance with any other of the virtues, and in general were always to try to secure for himself the honorable course, no one will call such a man a lover of self or blame him. But such a man would seem more than the other a lover of self. . . . Therefore the good man should be a lover of self (for he will both himself profit by doing noble acts, and will benefit his fellows).

Again, the course of true self love never seems to run smooth but rather appears to alter its very nature to fit the exigencies of its existence. Injured love reveals its protecting hatred. Similarly each happy affect, when "hurt," reveals its self-protecting unhappy oppositeness. This theme is of vast scope and I feel that I but dimly record some of its salient factors.

By "injured" feeling I refer specifically to its inhibited functioning. Thus, whenever I cannot live any of my experience with conscious love, that inability to revere the truth in that experience necessitates functioning of my love's protective oppositeness, conscious hate. Whenever I cannot live any of my experience with the conscious pleasure that is biologically adequate for it, that inability necessitates conscious functioning

^{*}The Hebrew Literature of Wisdom (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1906).

loved life which I may proudly, thankfully, feel is wholly and solely my own buoyant being.

Specific conscious self feeling is needed to unite my continuing self experience into my grateful consciousness for my intact wholeness as an individual. Only my keenly conscious I feeling can clarify "the facts of life" as being wishful manifestations of the fact of my life. Wisdom is the product of the feeling of love associated with conscious self activity. Folly is inhibited wisdom, the folly of inaccessibility to full (wise) conscious functioning. This life-worth orientation stands paramount as my distinctive contribution to my conscious self helpfulness. My Matthew Arnold aptly quotes an ancient Latin prayer: "Da mihi, Domine, scire quod sciendum est"—"Grant me the knowing of worth."

As sage Seneca felt: "Man does not die, he kills himself." My terminus is my native right and it cannot be caused by some impersonal force such as a dread disease, or fatal accident, or old age, or some other act of a foreign power personified as the Grim Reaper, Father Time, or whatever. I shall do all of whatever can be meant by my own dying. Furthermore the view that I must kill my self by the way in which I live my self, be it overexertion or whatever, is far more descriptive of the actual truth, far more helpful for discovering the real nature of longevity. The sentiment that a man digs his grave with his knife and fork, or is sickness or accident prone, takes duly into consideration this necessity that only he can end his life in his own unique way.

Over the years it has become increasingly evident to me that the way a man lives his life, to his terminating it, is essentially a matter of how he conducts his love life, of how he consciously controls (or seems controlled by) his emotionality. The very meaning of any and all of my existence is an emotional experience. Emotion constituting the nature of mind, it is all unconscious except that in which is added the power of consciousness which is itself emotional in nature. To be literally without emotion would amount to being dead. My awakening to my mind feels it as a sea of emotionality. It is this infinitely organ-

the intact wholeness and allness of my own individual self necessitates the appearance of its only so-called social problem. On account of my reluctance to feel the inviolability of my own organic integrity I cannot attribute the whole truth of individuality to anyone. Neither therefore can I believe that similarly constricted self awareness necessitates the only "social" individual problem of every other unique person of my world. Until I can feel my identity in my living of my fellowman I lack the kind of understanding enabling me to design the specifically adequate approach to the important problem of my mankind. I refer to my consciously living my every fellowman as the existent in my own being that (my) he or she really is. To illustrate, until I can recognize that all of my service is self service, that all help is self help, I must confuse self devotion with self sacrifice. Loving my neighbor as my self, for he or she is my self, relieves this ancient imperative of all authoritarianism except that of my divine self control.

The trouble I get into my self by not loving consciously is most costly, but wherever my hurt love is concerned it seems I do not tend to count the cost sufficiently. Insight that love "and" hate are basically one, not two, provides the emotional orientation needed for my appreciating my intact oneness, my only firm foundation for my feeling of reality as of sanity.

Whatever I consciously feel may only appear to be a source of conviction (either belief or disbelief) in anyone else of my world. My everyone must develop all of his (her) own capacity for conscious feeling entirely and only out of his (her) own personal schooling of emotion.

In the interest of consistency, particularly in purposefully avoiding the appearance of changing the subject of conscious emotional continence, I have purposely labored that point. Therefore I feel full responsibility for clearly appearing to be repetitive. The kind feeling occurs to me that even my enjoyable regular breathing may present that seeming to me also.

Sensibility is the feeling of individual life. My present theory of my Emotion posits it as the total sensibility of mental life. the essence of all meaning. Whatever is mental, is felt. My of that pleasure's exposed oppositeness, or unpleasure, e.g., th unconscious oppositeness intrinsic to conscious joy is conscious sorrow, to conscious responsibility is conscious guilt, to conscious hope is conscious despair, to conscious pride is conscious shame, to conscious faith is conscious jealousy or suspicion, to conscious authority is conscious suggestibility or alien control and so on. All dispute, discord, turns ultimately upon conscious emotional incontinence only. My truly wishful emotiona nature can always be discovered as the whole of my thought, or conviction, or hypothesis.

My love of emotion is really love of love, and is the firmes foundation for all I can mean by my "love of wisdom." The truth of the spiritual is an emotional experience. Genung states it, "the utterance of Wisdom takes its peculiar literary texture from being the utterance of the whole man." Only by consciously feeling newly lovable regions of my self-felt self knowledge can I cultivate my imagination to appreciate the truth of my intact wholeness, of the oneness of my life.

With rare and rightful discernment Rene J. Dubos, Professor of Rockefeller University, subjects his science to his self:

I believe scientific knowledge has increased little during the past century. . . . assumption of an immense and explosive increase in knowledge. . . has come about because as an academic and especially a scientific community we have decided to consider important only those aspects of knowledge in which we happen to be interested today. But if you were to take the tremendous body of ignorance which prevents us from dealing with the problems of most of the people of the world, then you would see how our knowledge has failed to increase in any significant manner. . . . We advance very fast in those narrow components of knowledge in which we of the academic and scientific community happen to be interested, not into the areas of knowledge which would be most relevant to the world at large.*

As long as I unwittingly oppose my abstraction Society to my self (to the very mind that creates it) that very disregard for

^{*&}quot;Biological Limitations of Freedom," Man and Life: A Sesquicentennial Symposium, ed. Charles D. Aring, University of Cincinnati, 1970, pp. 62, 63.

as the sensation of the rest of my mind. All that I name my "body" is really the very foundation of my mind. Every kind of unpleasure, including pain, is the form loving takes when its functioning is inhibited rather than facilitated. Conscious loving is inhibited whenever sufficient conscious truth to account fully for any self activity is inaccessible for my recognizable personal identity, and facilitated whenever sufficient conscious truth is available to reveal to my acknowledgeable mentality the complete desirability of any of its self activity. I can imagine no greater catastrophe than that all of the truth necessary to produce any event be present without its occurring. Whatever I live is always potentially lovable, consciously, on account of the fact that it is my living.

Love, including each of its modalities such as fear or anger or jealousy, is all and only about its own subjectivity, and cannot "take an object." Every man lives all of his own emotional femaleness quite as every woman lives all of her own emotional maleness. It is divine to be human and it is human to overlook it. To feel my divinity in my living is the height of biological adequacy, the fulfillment of psychological development in which the love of wisdom resolves itself in the wisdom of love.

Self discipline to conscious emotional continence enables my growing in the direction of appreciating my wholeness, oneness and allness.

ability to feel my living protects and maintains the organic unity of my individuality. All seeming division, separation, dissociation, fragmentation, plurality, and every other kind of ignored wholeness of individuality, is the illusional consequence of withheld conscious loving. By acknowledging my inviolable wholeness I can observe that it is impossible to experience any opposing "otherness," despite innumerable appearances "to the contrary." Whatever is, wholly is, perfectly is, divinely is. Melioration, pejoration, progress, and similar terms connoting better or worse, conceal painful faultfinding always traceable to inaccessibility of the sufficient conscious truth that would reveal only wisdom of love.

Being an individual I am necessarily constituted only of my solipsistic individuality, but I can escape the heavy conscious responsibility for my own living any of my world by ignoring or denying that it is officially, personally, mine, My gradually assuming conscious responsibility for my self world diminishes activation of my unconscious responsibility called "guilt." Conscious happiness results from my appreciating the inviolable wholeness of my being. Strong love results from living with love whatever is difficultly lived with love.

I name my "truth" all that I can found in my lovable belief in my own existence, the only source and course of all that I name by "reality." My devotion to my truth is strengthened by my practice of fact-finding, ultimately to the extent of my feeling lovable certainty in the sufficient truth that is always on the side of whatever happens. Only my insufficient conscious truth can account for my finding fault in whatever happens. Being modified love, unpleasure or pain is also desirable living.

Conscious emotional continence is the unique source of acknowledgeable individual wholeness, avowable self identity and disciplined self control. Self love is my one and only emotion, my joy of living. It composes each wish, making up all motivation. Each seemingly "other emotion," beginning with hate, derives from self love, is constituted of it.

My sensation of pleasure or pain functions as the emotion of my body ego, quite as my happy or unhappy emotion functions

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